

STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: 6

ARMS
AND STABILITY
IN EUROPE

A British-French-German Enquiry

A REPORT BY

Alastair Buchan
and
Philip Windsor

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Foreword

In August 1961 two events occurred which led to the enquiry from which this book has stemmed. One was Britain's decision to seek membership of the European Economic Community, acknowledging the economic importance and political vitality of the new Western Europe, and marking an historic change in British policy. The other was the building of the Berlin wall and the weeks of tension and uncertainty that followed and preceded it. This symbolised the hardening division of Germany and the whole of Europe, and served as a warning that the achievements of the Atlantic Alliance would be incomplete if they implied a permanent estrangement of Western Europe from the countries which form the other half of our own civilisation.

The immediate prospects for any negotiated end to the Cold War in Europe, for disarmament in Europe, or for a general European political settlement are not promising at the moment. Yet there are forces at work, political, economic and social, on both sides of the wall, which could lead to a more liberal conception of co-existence than the present one, and enable the two Europes to grow gradually together again. However, the absolute precondition of any such hope is, in our view, a period of stable relationships and lessening military tension between the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, something that is not easy to conceive in an age of rapid technological transition and of important shifts of power within the two alliances. It was with this assumption in mind that we set out to re-examine the relationship between political stability and arms policy in Europe, and the requirements of each in the decade ahead of us.

The Directors of Le Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère in Paris, and of Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Bonn responded with enthusiasm to a suggestion from the I.S.S. in October 1961 that this enquiry should be

conducted on a truly international European basis leading to a book which would be published over the imprint of the three institutes. But these are subjects on which there has often been a wide divergence of views between and within our three countries, and a study which made no attempt to resolve them would have little value. It was therefore decided to create a working group in each institute, five members of which met together in Paris each month throughout most of 1962 as an international study group. The members of this international study group were:

Général d'Armée Beaufre (Directeur, Institut Français d'Etudes Stratégiques, Paris; French Member of the NATO Standing Group, 1960-1; Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAPE, 1958-60); Alastair Buchan (Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, London); Hedley Bull (Reader in International Relations, London School of Economics); Wilhelm Cornides (Editor, *Europa Archiv*, Bonn); Le Contrôleur Général Pierre Genevey (Defence Adviser on Disarmament to the French Government); Professor Léo Hamon (Professor of Law at the Universities of Dijon and Paris); Professor Michael Howard (Professor in War Studies, King's College, London); Dr. H-A. Jacobsen (Director, Forschungs-Institut, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik); Michel Legendre (Counsellor, European Division, Quai d'Orsay); F. W. Mulley, M.P. (Rapporteur, WEU Defence Committee, 1958-60); Dr. K. Ritter (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Wissenschaft und Politik); Professor U. Scheuner (Professor of International Law, University of Bonn); Professor Hugh Seton-Watson (Professor of Russian History, University of London); Dr. Theo Sommer (Foreign Editor, *Die Zeit*, Hamburg); Jacques Vernant (Director, Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère, Paris). We owe a great deal to the stimulus provided by this group.

The chairman of the group was the Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger, Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, whose skill and patience contributed greatly to the fruitfulness of our discussions. Philip Windsor, Research Associate, I.S.S., acted as Rapporteur.

The members of the British group which met at the Institute for Strategic Studies to discuss drafts and comment on the conclusions reached in Paris, were:

General Sir Geoffrey Bourne; Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, Bt.; Lt.-General Sir John Eldridge; Sir Kenneth Grubb; Captain Eugene Hinterhoff; Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor. To them we are most grateful.

In order to set our deliberations in a wider focus, a preliminary report consisting of British, French and German papers was discussed at the I.S.S. Conference held at Bad Godesberg in July 1962, which included strong representation from the United States as well as from France, Germany and Britain, and at which almost every European country was represented.

To translate our discussion into book form we chose a method which, it is hoped, combines the vigour of personal authorship with our desire to produce an international consensus. The draft of each chapter was prepared at I.S.S. and circulated for comment. Most of these comments have been reflected in the final text, but where it has proved impossible honestly to reconcile major differences of national viewpoints this has been made clear by a note by the Institute concerned at the end of the chapter. Some dissents of individual members of the group from a particular point, are shown in comments grouped together at the end of the book.

This book is not, and is not intended as, a committee document. It is the work of two authors drawn from one of the three participating countries, and the final text does not commit other members of the international group. But at the same time we have paid close heed to the views expressed in the group, and in places the emphasis given to particular problems or the priority ascribed to particular solutions is somewhat different from that which we would have chosen had we been writing purely as individuals. We are particularly grateful to Général André Beaufre, Wilhelm Cornides, Theo Sommer and Jacques Vernant for their useful comments in the final drafting.

Although this is a study on Europe by Europeans, our work would have been incomplete without the stimulus and co-operation which we have received in the United States. In particular our thanks are due to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, whose generous grant made it possible to organise the study and the international study group, and

who, together with our hosts, the Deutsche Gesellschaft, financed the Bad Godesberg Conference. We are also grateful to Mr. James King, Jr., Director, International Studies Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, in Washington, who acted as our consultant and commented on our papers and drafts as well as eliciting comment from other American experts.

It goes without saying that, since this study was the product of discussions between the members of three private institutes, nothing which it contains in any way commits our governments, whose policy we have had occasion to criticise. We were engaged in free discussion as individuals, rather than in negotiations as nationals of different countries. Nor are the three institutes, none of which is committed to any particular line of policy, bound by our conclusions.

This study was near the final stages of completion when it became clear that one of the informal assumptions of all our discussions—that Britain would shortly become a member of the European Economic Community—had been invalidated. This has involved a considerable amount of re-drafting and has forced us to make some of our conclusions more tentative. But the breakdown of the negotiations for Britain's entry into the E.E.C. in its present form does not make her any less a European power and it has not in general altered the conclusions of the study. The events of late 1962 and early 1963 have, however, powerfully reinforced the view which we reached in Paris, that the beginning of a lessening of tensions between East and West is crucially dependent upon a similar process within the Western Alliance.

March, 1963

ALASTAIR BUCHAN
PHILIP WINDSOR

PART ONE

Stability or Deadlock?

Chapter I

The Present Confrontation

I

AT the beginning of 1963 a series of events occurred which cast sudden doubt on the confident expectations that had been aroused in the Atlantic Alliance by the development of the European Economic Community. As the sixties began the countries of Western Europe had shown a resurgence of pride, confidence and ambition that little more than a decade before seemed to have disappeared for ever. They had joined forces, not only to repel an external enemy, but also to develop an economic union which held the promise of a true political community. They were conscious that, for all its apparent lassitude and confusion, the history of Western Europe since the war had in fact moved with great speed. On the day in 1949 that the Blockade of Berlin came to an end the West German constitution was completed. Scarcely had the Federal Republic regained her full sovereignty in 1955, when discussions began between the European Foreign Ministers on the formation of Euratom and the Economic Community. The Treaty of Rome was signed less than two years later, and entered into force in January 1958. Within three years the Community governments had agreed to press towards an even speedier execution than its clauses provided. Europe, ever since the Second World War an object of international politics, incapable of resisting the Soviet Union, and entirely dependent on the United States for the preservation of her freedom and political existence, had recovered a powerful spirit of independence and an economic and political dynamism which gave her a new importance in the world. For a number of old and proud sovereign states whose civilisation was lying in ruins within the memory of children who were still half grown this was formidable progress.

This progress was confirmed in the internal developments of the member-countries. The Communist parties which in the

immediate post-war years seemed ready and able to take over several European states could no longer be seriously considered as the possible successors to any government. The crises of decolonisation, which seemed to grow more acute as empires shrank, were near their end in 1962. They had previously threatened the internal stability of France, but seemed now to have confirmed it. The economic security of Germany, her integration into the Atlantic Alliance, her acknowledged political influence—all were evidence of the stability of a political system which was secure from internal challenge. Italy had awoken to a new political and social confidence in the full flush of economic progress. These, and the three smaller countries of the Community, were confident in themselves and in Europe, aware of their social and intellectual vitality, and of their growing importance in the Atlantic Alliance and in the rest of the world.

By the end of 1962 it appeared that the members of the European Community were well on their way to becoming a cohesive political union, and that they were about to be joined by Great Britain. Western Europe would then rank once more among the great powers of the world: not one that would attempt or even desire to confront the Soviet Union by itself or cut loose from American support, but a great power in the sense that the political and economic influence of the Community would extend throughout the world, and that the United States would increasingly rely on its European allies as one Community to play a more active part in the military defence of the Atlantic Alliance, and in the political and economic relations of the West with the rest of the world. An economic, political and strategic partnership between the United States and the European Community would offer the most healthy future for the West as a whole and would in turn strengthen and confirm the stability of Europe.

But the events of December 1962 and January 1963 emphasised that underlying such expectations there were a number of fundamental questions to which there was as yet no answer. The Bahamas meeting of the American President and the British Prime Minister, which began as an argument about the best method of prolonging the life of the British strategic bomber force, developed into an attempt to settle

the future form of strategic partnership between the United States and Europe. Within three weeks President de Gaulle had rejected this agreement and closed the door, at least for the time being, to British entry to the European Community. These were two capital moments in the development of the Atlantic Alliance. They revealed that the rise of the European Community had occurred within an ambiguous setting. The Community was born into an age where the nature of the world balance of power was changing and the nature of the European balance was changing with it. And at the same time, it was seen that the European Community had not yet created the true political identity with which it seemed to robe itself, that some of its members disagreed profoundly on vital political and strategic problems, and that little progress could be made in offering a new strategic partnership between Europe and the United States in an attempt to answer the new problem of the changing balance until the old problems of European unity had been settled. The events of Nassau and Brussels did not so much reverse previous tendencies as show that the attempts to create a new NATO partnership had been putting the cart before the horse. President de Gaulle's rejection, both of the American-British proposal of Nassau and of British entry into the European Community, brought to light the disagreements of the European nations on the future shape of the Community itself, on the relationship between the United States and Europe, on Europe's role in the strategic balance and on the place of Europe in the world at large. These disagreements may eventually be narrowed. There can be little question but that Britain *is* becoming more European, that in one form or another a political Community will emerge in Western Europe, and that this Community will maintain close links with the United States. But these developments are still concealed in a near or distant future, and the success with which Western Europe resolves its dilemmas will be determined to a great extent by the evolution of the strategic balance between the two Great Powers. The stability of Europe depends on this balance; and the relationships between the two giants depend in a large degree on the evolution of Europe.

This study attempts to explore this relationship and to

examine the nature of the European balance. It is concerned above all with the interaction between the strategic confrontation of the two alliances which dominate the world and the stability of the whole of Europe. The first part of the book explores this relationship, and the second and third discuss practical measures of arms control and Western defence which might bring a greater stability to Europe. Stability here means a military system which is less vulnerable to sudden catastrophe—less liable to be toppled by an outbreak of fighting into thermonuclear war. It also means the eventual achievement of an easier pattern of human relations between the two halves of Europe—for the new Community in the West is only half of Europe, and many of the great cities and provinces of European civilisation are cut off in an alien and hostile camp. Although the reunification of Europe cannot yet be foreseen, it must remain the ultimate objective of Western statesmen. It is true that a unified civilisation, that of the Mediterranean world, has been cut in two before, and one half went on to flourish in perpetual enmity with the other. But it is impossible for Western Europe to reconcile herself to this new loss when it entails the division of a nation and its capital city, in whose survival the whole Western world has a vital stake. Even though there is no immediate hope of reunifying Europe, the presence of the Western powers in Berlin is a symbol of their determination that the countries of Eastern Europe shall not remain for ever under Soviet control.¹ They can not retreat without casting doubt on the security of the whole Alliance and on the American commitment to Europe. Yet in the present pattern of strategic relationships between the two blocs, Berlin is also a symbol of the permanent threat of a thermonuclear war developing from a great power conflict in Europe. If ways can be found of making the strategic confrontation of the Great Powers less brittle, the chances of developing better human communications across the Iron Curtain may also be greater.

The search for stability in this double sense is the principal object of this study, and it has been prompted by the belief that in spite of her economic success, political influence and disbelief in war, Europe remains the centre of world tension.

¹ See comment by Michael Howard, p. 229.

It is in Europe that the two Great Powers are locked in the most unyielding confrontation, and it is there that, short of an agreement on general and comprehensive disarmament, a beginning would have to be made in lessening tension and the risks of war.

Tension today takes a different form from the post-war years. Then the hostility which sprang up between the United States and the Soviet Union was due to the Soviet subjection of Eastern Europe and Stalin's naked ambition in Germany. Europe was the cause of contention between the two powers that had emerged supreme from the war. This is no longer true today. The United States and Russia are engaged in a conflict of interest and ideals which extends to every corner of the world, from competition in outer space to the struggle for the allegiance of the uncommitted nations. Their enmity would continue if Europe no longer existed. Nevertheless their struggle is intensified through the growing importance of Europe. It is in Europe that their wish to avoid war is most likely to be threatened; and Europe is still the most vital arena in the world theatre.

The tragic aspect of this situation is that as long as the strategic deadlock between the United States and the Soviet Union, which is one product of their intense competition, continues, the military situation of the Continent is relatively stable. But progress towards a reconciliation of its two halves can hardly be brought about without radical changes in the present structure of greater Europe: Western as well as Eastern Europe. For the present, however, the division of Europe is hardening. The eastern half is becoming more tightly integrated, and the western Community, though it is not yet developing into the highly organised political union which was expected a short time ago, is preoccupied with the internal relationships of its member states. And even when the day comes that a united Community presents a single front to the world, will it not experience again the old dilemma which has been a constant part of European history since 1945? As long as the West was divided and weak, it was unable to wrest the European countries from Soviet domination; if it is united and strong, the Eastern bloc tends to close its ranks.

If there is to be any escape from this dilemma, the military

confrontation in Europe between the two Great Powers must first be relaxed. But the Community has been emerging at a time when the strategic relationship between them is undergoing deep changes. The two titans are becoming so vulnerable to each other's strategic power that they are increasingly inhibited in threatening the direct use of nuclear force. The effect may be that as the scope for strategic action, or strategic diplomacy is restricted, a new freedom of action will develop at a lower level of conflict, where it seems safer to threaten, or to carry out, local operations without any real risk of nuclear retaliation. This time has not yet come. Berlin still stands to prove it. But the day may come when it can no longer be seriously believed that an American President would threaten the destruction of his own cities in order to protect some distant outpost; and then Western Europe, which still relies chiefly on the strategic power of the United States to defend its own existence, could find itself in serious danger—unless by that time it has developed a great nuclear arsenal of its own, or more effective means of local defence. These questions will be discussed later in this book; but for the present it is clear that the position of the European Community in the strategic confrontation of the two blocs is uncertain, and that the ambiguities of the armed peace, which the military deadlock between the United States and the Soviet Union imposed on Europe in the years after the war, are likely in the near future to be crudely exposed.

The first effects of this increasingly fluid situation can be seen today in the relationships within the two blocs. The nations in each half of Europe are being integrated more closely into the economic and military systems of their respective camps, but the tensions within these two camps are increasing. Russian and American leadership still hold good, but they are no longer unquestioned. As they assimilate the political implications of military technology, particularly in space, their preponderance will continue to grow; but their political authority may be increasingly challenged. There is certainly no symmetry in this position: Eastern Europe will never be able to organise itself and throw down the gauntlet to its protecting power as Western Europe has shown itself capable of doing. A more anarchical system of relationships

may develop in the East, and the West may become more united. But both groups are in different ways challenging the authority of the two Great Powers, just as the Great Powers themselves are achieving a relationship on the test ban and other arms control measures, independent of their European allies.

In the early 1950s these relationships were dominated by fear, not only of the opposing bloc, but of the policies of the leading power within each bloc. In the West, it was feared not only that the Soviet Union might attack across the Elbe, but also that the United States might precipitate a war for reasons which were of no vital interest to the European countries. It was feared, on the one hand, that, in the event of a surprise attack, the United States might not be able or willing to act in time to save Western Europe from Soviet conquest; but, on the other, that the United States might bring about the destruction of Europe through its own belligerence. In the East there was less fear that either Power would start a war than anxiety over the effects of West German rearmament, and, after the death of Stalin, a greater concern that the Soviet Union might lose control of the situation in Europe. There was until 1956 apprehension that any rising in Eastern Europe might either succeed, or if it failed, provoke Western intervention.

These fears have now died away. In the West, it is the United States which takes the possibility of war in Europe more seriously than any other NATO country, and one European anxiety, especially in Germany, is that American precautions against such a war breaking out might diminish the credibility of the American commitment to Europe and so make a Soviet attack more likely. The Eastern European countries seem most concerned to ensure their economic and political stability and are unwilling to risk any change in the *status quo* which might limit their freedom to do so.

In this way the apparently paradoxical situation has arisen that as the apprehension of the European governments has diminished their insistence on the *status quo* has hardened, and that as their political influence and diplomatic freedom have grown they are unwilling to risk any experiment. We will examine the different demands of this situation, and the

dangers which arise from them more closely in the following chapters. But from what has already been said, it is clear that the assumption of continued safety in the *status quo* is open to question. It has proved acceptable hitherto because it was originally regarded as a transition to victory for the West. It was to be changed, not through a multilateral agreement with the Soviet Union but through a unilateral Russian withdrawal. But while the *status quo* was regarded as transitory, the declared objective of Western policy—the liberation of Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe from Soviet control—receded more and more into the background. The approach of strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union poses the old dilemma in new form. If the West, in an attempt to strengthen the credibility of its deterrent posture, significantly reinforces its conventional forces, the Soviet Union will most likely try to bind her Eastern European satellites more firmly to her than ever. But an automatic commitment to use nuclear weapons and to rely on the threat of general war to resist any pressure on Western Europe amounts today to a scarcely concealed renunciation of all hopes of relaxing the division of the Continent. It can offer no chance of political flexibility in renewed dealings with the Soviet Union. There has never been any prospect of political accommodation unless the problems raised by strategies of deterrence which depend heavily on the early use of nuclear weapons, are settled first. And if this prospect disappears, a rigid insistence on the *status quo* could, in fact, produce its opposite: a German movement towards neutralism and a desire for a separate arrangement with the Soviet Union for the sake of Eastern Germany.

In the fluid situation in which Europe finds itself today, this question of Germany needs particular emphasis. The German nation is in an especially tormenting position. At every stage of their post-war development the Germans have had to choose between their need for freedom and security and their desire for reunification. They are not prepared to abandon this hope now that they are members of the European Community, and Berlin would prevent them from doing so even if they were. Indeed, the whole trend of political and strategic relationships between the two blocs is likely to make

this problem more acute than ever in the coming years. In spite of the internal stability which has been achieved in the countries of Western Europe, in spite of the undoubted economic success of the Community and the high political hopes it still holds for the future, the position of Germany demonstrates that Europe as a whole is still in a most unstable position, and that the immobilism of the present situation conceals a number of urgent political problems, which, unless a way out can be found, will thrust themselves forward increasingly as the strategic deadlock deepens.

Europe—as long as it is divided—will remain a centre of world tension. But there are also military dangers which arise directly out of the deadlock, and which may grow within the next five years. The first of these is the possibility of a new arms race in Europe with its political, economic and moral consequences. The second arises from the first: a growing insistence by the European powers on their own national nuclear deterrents. The third, which is likely to become urgent if the Soviet Union ever succeeds in dividing Europe from the United States, is that as the arms race develops, the Atlantic powers will find it increasingly difficult, as two separate blocs, to maintain an adequate posture of deterrence, and the means of a realistic defence if deterrence breaks down.

The nature of the first of these problems—that of a new arms race in Europe—clearly reveals the ambiguities of the military deadlock. At present the European governments seem anxious to invoke the likelihood of escalation from a local conflict on the Continent to a strategic nuclear exchange, in order to prevent a war in Europe from breaking out at all. This is an attitude which was born of the old military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, when Soviet conventional strength was matched by the strategic airpower of the United States. But the strategic advance of the Soviet Union has now led to an apparent conflict of interest between the European and American concepts of deterrence. To reinforce the credibility of its deterrent, the United States must concentrate on the possibility of controlling a nuclear war. In reply to the vulnerability of American cities, the United States invokes its strategic superiority, in order to convince Russia of a common interest in controlling the course of war,

should it ever break out. But Europe has always been vulnerable, and the Europeans have a greater interest in emphasising the uncontrollable nature of nuclear war, in order to preserve the credibility of such deterrent power as is available on the continent. They fear that the American emphasis on control could on the one hand induce the United States to go to war too easily, but on the other that American caution, if it is misinterpreted by the Soviet Union, may conceivably invite a Soviet attack in Europe. So it is believed that the risks of any attack must, in full view of the Soviet Union, be consistently raised (the official German view) or that European powers must possess their own nuclear deterrents, which, whatever the cost, could inflict a high degree of destruction on Russia itself (the official policy of the French Government).

In these circumstances the American insistence on raising the level of conventional forces in Europe, though it initially met with the greatest response from the Germans, is now regarded with the greatest suspicion in Germany. Herr Strauss, when German Minister of Defence, was reported, for example, in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 9th August 1962 as emphasising that a high level of conventional forces is only acceptable so long as it is combined with undiminished reliance on short-range nuclear weapons for all but the most minor incidents. This view is held, with differing nuances, by the majority of European governments and commanders. It is an issue on which the United States finds herself opposed to all her European allies, and her efforts to elicit a greater contribution to the conventional forces of the alliance from the European members of NATO are hampered by their fears that by so doing they would be helping the United States to begin a 'nuclear disengagement' from Europe. If the European nations believed that their functions in the alliance were restricted to raising and equipping conventional forces, and if American nuclear weapons were withdrawn, then the military and political relations of the European countries could be very strained indeed, and one immediate result might be to encourage national nuclear forces. If, on the other hand, nuclear weapons are freely supplied by the United States, a new arms race may develop in Europe; slow at the level of conventional forces, much faster at the level of tactical nuclear weapons. It

is even conceivable that in such circumstances the Soviet Union might one day give tactical nuclear weapons to its satellite forces.

The presence of nuclear weapons in Europe is also an incentive to the NATO governments to build up a nuclear interdiction force, in order to deter attacks on European military bases. NATO's present nuclear interdiction force is composed of aircraft; but anxiety has long been expressed at SHAPE that these are becoming obsolete and will shortly have to be replaced by medium-range missiles. The American Administration does not support this view, but the Federal German Government has considered it sympathetically in the past, partly as a means of preventing the possibility of an American nuclear withdrawal from Europe. The nuclear strategy of NATO is a potentially divisive force in the alliance on the question of interdiction as on that of battlefield nuclear weapons.

European reluctance to become the source of manpower for a strategy based primarily on conventional defences is founded on the fear of a Soviet threat to use Europe as a hostage while sparing the United States. This fear is compounded with ambition. The economic and political resurrection of Western Europe will be regarded by some as incomplete until it has regained full independence—which today appears incomplete without an 'independent nuclear deterrent'. This view, long accepted by Britain, has now been adopted by France. In Germany and in the other European countries which have no articulate ambition for national nuclear forces and no desire to encourage any form of American withdrawal, there is nevertheless a certain sentiment that a limited European deterrent is both desirable and feasible.

It is nevertheless uncertain whether such a combined force could be realised in the near future. Whatever the prospects of technical co-operation between Britain and France—and the technical problems are formidable—Western Europe as a whole is a very long way from creating a unified political system which would permit a multilateral system of command and control of nuclear decisions. In these circumstances the creation of an integrated European nuclear force would be a long-drawn-out affair. Meanwhile, France will presumably

continue to build, and Britain to maintain, a deterrent force which could in certain circumstances jeopardise European security by inviting a forestalling blow from the Soviet Union.

This is the second military danger that arises from the present situation in Europe: not the spread of nuclear weapons *per se*, nor the growth of an eventual 'European deterrent', but the rise of national nuclear forces, at least in the interim period, which because they appear to threaten the Soviet Union with sudden attack, but could not survive a first strike themselves, invite destruction rather than offer any real deterrence and are more likely to have a provocative than a stabilising effect.

The third military danger is that if the European members of NATO concentrate a large part of their effort on an apparatus of nuclear deterrence (just because they fear change in the military *status quo*) they will have no other means to defend themselves without recourse to all-out war, should this deterrent fail. And if European nuclear power is as ineffective as seems likely at the present time, it is hard to believe that it would present a fully credible deterrent to the Soviet Union. So that it is possible in the end that a rigid insistence on maintaining the *status quo* could lead to deliberate limited aggression which could decisively tip the balance in favour of the Eastern bloc.

An arms control policy for Europe must set out to stabilise this military confrontation, but it must not impair the prospects of political stability. Military stabilisation and political stability cannot be considered apart, and we have seen how unstable is the political situation beneath the present military deadlock. What, then, should an arms control policy attempt to achieve?

It must be recognised at the outset that the form of stability with which we are concerned—a less vulnerable military system, and more open communication between the two halves of Europe—depends upon a Western concept of international politics which is not shared by the Soviet leaders. The Western concept of a stable international situation is one in which opposing powers are prepared to make mutual concessions in order to avoid war or avert drastic political

upheavals. Conversely, Soviet policy contains no such concept, but conceives of stability in a given area as a local deadlock which leaves the U.S.S.R. free to alter the balances of forces in other areas of the world and free to change the situation in Europe itself when it seems advantageous to revert to conditions of instability. There is therefore little sense in seeking a poised equilibrium of all the military and political forces in Western and Eastern Europe between now and 1970. The aim of an arms policy should be the more limited but more realistic one of achieving a military stabilisation which will provide better opportunities for negotiating on the changes which either side might desire—and at the same time offer the West a better capability of defending itself, if the Soviet Union should after all decide that instability and the threat of nuclear war offered it greater advantages in Europe. For until an effective system of collective *security* has been established and an international peacekeeping machinery has been set up, collective *self-defence* will remain the mainstay of international stability. An arms policy for Europe must seek to make the system of Western defence as secure as possible, to strengthen and not impair the present balance. Ultimately it should aim at reducing the military balance to the lowest possible level of armaments, but in the meantime it might mean an increase in some categories if negotiations for an arms control agreement are to be conducted on a more equitable footing.

The terms 'arms policy' and 'arms control' need some clarification here. The military confrontation in Europe is part of the world-wide confrontation of the two nuclear super-powers. On both sides, weapons of mass destruction are held ready for use at a few minutes' notice. *Arms policy* is the most comprehensive term for the human efforts which underly the establishment of such a gigantic armoury. It embraces not only the nature and the amount of weapons and forces in being or under development, but also their threatened use as means of coercion or of the resolution of conflicts by means short of war.

In the sense used in this study arms policy comprises the whole spectrum of armament policies, the production and deployment as well as the reduction or elimination of arms,

the control of arms and the improvements in the peacekeeping machinery which are the ultimate goal of arms reduction and disarmament. An arms policy can be—and today amounts to—an arms race between powers which consider that they cannot afford to halt the development and deployment of increasingly destructive armaments for fear that they could be left at the mercy of the enemy. But arms policy can also mean restraint, or even a halt to the arms race. *Arms Control* is concerned with the ways and means of restricting the arms race within limits acceptable to both sides. The term implies that the security of each of the nations involved can be improved by adjustments of at least some armament capabilities to reduce the risks of war and restrict destruction in case of war. An arms control policy is therefore an ensemble of measures of military adjustment designed to achieve a military stabilisation which will give better chances of political stability. It is important at the outset to distinguish the English term 'arms control' from its literal translations into French or German (*côntrole des armements*, *Rüstungskontrolle*) which mean 'arms inspection'. Inspection systems, based on international agreements, can be an important part of arms control. They are not the whole of it, and to avoid confusion the term 'arms control policy' will be used to describe the complex of adjustments which we have indicated.

It is also important to distinguish clearly between an arms control policy, as we have defined it, and disengagement, which has been so often identified with a certain idealism in the British approach to the questions of European stability. Disengagement in the past has been presented largely in terms of a political settlement (usually involving the neutralisation of Germany, even if German reunification was not the essential aim) as a preliminary to a military withdrawal. This is no longer considered feasible by any body of informed opinion either in Britain or in Germany. Political negotiations may ultimately be possible, but they are scarcely conceivable in the near future, and they could only follow from a reduction of tension and the achievement of a basic military stability. It is to this that an arms policy should be addressed. It should not be regarded as a first step to disengagement; but if military stabilisation can be achieved without the sacrifice of political

stability, it is reasonable to hope that ultimately it will be possible to reduce troops and armaments in Europe.

Nor should arms control in general be confused with general and comprehensive disarmament which can only come about through a much wider agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Disarmament is, however, the more difficult in Europe because of the differing approaches of the two Great Powers to the problems of European security. It is here that arms control could be a valuable method of narrowing the gap between the two approaches. It can also illuminate those differences, which, as will be seen in the next chapter, have not always been clear to the protagonists themselves.

The two blocs have been engaged in intermittent negotiations on general disarmament for over ten years, without any practical result. The seventeen-nation conference on general and comprehensive disarmament has been sitting at Geneva since March 1962 without making significant headway in the reconciliation of the alternative Soviet and American proposals for a comprehensive plan. These negotiations might in the long run produce some very important by-products, but they can scarcely be expected to produce universal disarmament by way of a tidy packaged treaty to which all the 110 nations of the world, great and small, have set their signature.

Among the many overt disagreements between the Communist and non-Communist powers on the approach to be adopted to disarmament two are well known. One concerns timing: the Soviet proposal is for the total abolition of all forces and armaments within three years, beginning with the total abolition of all nuclear weapons over fifteen months: the American proposal is much more cautious in proposing a one-third reduction of nuclear and conventional armaments in three stages, each lasting three years. To the West, the Soviet proposals seem quite unrealistic: to the Russians the American proposals smack of procrastination and insincerity.

The other concerns the familiar disagreement over inspection, where the Russians regard the Western insistence on the necessity of inspecting the level of retained armaments in each stage as 'legalised espionage'. The West regards the Soviet insistence that the inspectors must take a nation's declaration

of its original inventory on trust and only inspect the destruction of those armaments which it declares as a ready-made formula for cheating. So far the Russians have refused to consider the ingenious ideas of Professor Louis Sohn of Harvard, now embodied in the American proposals, for a system of inspection by zones which would give the inspectorate some opportunity to assess whether a nation was carrying out its obligations, without laying bare all its defence secrets during the disarmament process.

The Russian view on inspection may change, perhaps as American reconnaissance satellites begin to lay bare the dispositions of bases and forces whose secrecy it has assumed it could protect indefinitely by political means. The Americans, in their turn, may accept a more adventurous time scale for the disarmament process. But one must remain sceptical, for two major reasons, as to whether these grandiose schemes for comprehensive disarmament have the smell of probability about them.

The first reservation concerns the nature of the central peacekeeping machinery, the International Disarmament Organisation, which would become the world's policeman in the place of national forces. We now have some experience of international forces operating under the aegis of the U.N. and a most important role they have played. But given the nature of the East-West cleavage, given the number of sovereign states that now exist, is it wise to expect that we could, in this generation, create a body under central direction which could act with the independence, speed and ruthless disregard for national susceptibilities which would be required of such a peacekeeping agency?

Secondly there is the difficult question of the differing security requirements of the Western maritime coalition and the Eurasian land power during the transitional process of disarming. Not unnaturally the Soviet desire is to break up this coalition which—on the whole successfully—contains and confines the expansion of its own influence and power. Soviet disarmament proposals are therefore always couched in terms which would mean the almost immediate folding of the American umbrella of deterrence, the return of American forces to their own soil, and the abolition of the ships and

aircraft which are the military cement of the coalition. Western proposals, equally naturally, are couched in terms of percentage reductions of the forces and weapons of both sides, which would preserve the coalition intact until the disarmament process was completed, but would markedly diminish Russia's power to protect herself against the United States if anything should go wrong during this same time span. When coupled with the differing attitudes to inspection, the differing requirements can scarcely be bridged by any schematic approach to the problem of disarmament.

Negotiations are bound to be slow and many years may pass before any progress towards general disarmament is achieved. Meanwhile, there is an urgent need for an arms control policy which will prevent a further expansion of the arms race and stabilise the military situation in Europe without closing the way to a settlement of the political issues which are at the roots of the deadlock there.

II

Since much of this study will be concerned with the potential use of force in Europe, it may be useful to have in our mind's eye a broad picture of the nature of the strategic balance in the northern hemisphere and in particular of the levels and kinds of force that are deployed in Europe or are trained upon it.

The Soviet Union and its allies are weaker over the whole spectrum of force than the aggregate strength of the NATO alliance. Thus in terms of the Soviet-American strategic balance, that is the ability of the Soviet Union to strike the United States and of the United States to retaliate against the Soviet heartland, there are estimated in early 1963 to be only 200 Soviet long-range bombers and less than 100 ICBMs, as contrasted with 630 American long-range bombers and over 210 ICBMs (400 by the end of 1963).¹ In addition the United States now has 9 *Polaris* submarines at sea with 144 missiles, as well as strong naval air units which can reach targets in, though not necessarily deep in, the Soviet Union.

¹ Statement of the Secretary of Defense before the House Appropriations Committee, February 6, 1963

The NATO powers possess an overwhelming naval superiority on the surface of the oceans (37 aircraft carriers to none, 29 cruisers to 20, over 700 destroyers and escorts to about 100), which the Soviet Union has sought to neutralise—how successfully no one can estimate short of the test of war—by developing a two to one superiority in conventional submarines.

Even in mobilised manpower, the advantage lies with the NATO powers, who maintain about 5,900,000 men in uniform as contrasted with 4,750,000 in the Warsaw Pact—a superiority of well over a million men. Though comparisons of defence expenditure are difficult to make across artificial exchange rates and with different bases for statistics, at a very rough equation it is probable that in real terms the defence outlay of the NATO powers is about double that of the Warsaw Pact powers—\$70,000 million as against \$35,000 million.

But in European terms these aggregate figures lose some of their meaning, for, in recent years, a marked contrast has developed between the level of the threat which the Soviet Union has created against Western Europe as compared to her threat to North America. Thus, although American long-range striking power may be larger than the equivalent Soviet power by a factor of four or five, the Soviet Union has built up a force of 600 medium-range missiles in Western Russia which can cover every form of target—cities, air bases, installations—in NATO Europe, and which still appears to be growing in size. To reinforce this she has 1,000 TU 16 medium bombers for which a replacement appears to be under development. Apart from the 180 V-Bombers of Britain's R.A.F. Bomber Command and the 50 French *Mirage IV* light bombers (which will be ready in 1964–5), whose penetration capabilities are open to question, there is no strategic nuclear retaliatory force in European hands or even on European soil (except for some obsolescent American B 47 medium bombers in Britain and Spain) to offset this Soviet threat.¹ It is this imbalance which enables Mr. Khrushchev to describe Western Europe as his 'hostage' and which makes every European leader aware that the security of

¹ The 60 *Thor* missiles in Britain and the 45 American *Jupiter* missiles in Italy and Turkey are being dismantled during 1963

NATO Europe is still based upon the American guarantee.

The same applies to a lesser degree to the balance of ground and tactical forces in Europe. It is true that in terms of overall military manpower there are about as many men under arms in NATO Europe as in the Warsaw Pact countries and Western Russia, some 3,300,000 men on either side. The 2,200,000 NATO ground forces in Europe are almost exactly the size of the Soviet army. It is also true that it is misleading to compare the total number of divisions in the Soviet army—about 160, of which only a proportion are at war strength—with the 60 divisions in NATO Europe, for over 20 per cent of these Soviet divisions are stationed east of the Urals; and the ground strength that the Soviet Union could safely deploy against NATO Europe as a whole represents an advantage of considerably less than two to one, which is by no means an overwhelming threat. But the chief problem, with which NATO military planning has had to grapple for many years, is that the Soviet Union could hope, by concentrating its centralised forces against one sector of the NATO perimeter, while using East European troops to neutralise the others, to achieve a decisive local superiority. Thus, were it not for the collective security provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, the 11 divisions in Greece, the 16 divisions in Turkey or the 2 brigades in Norway, could be overwhelmed on their own territory by forces several times their size.

But it is in Central Europe that the balance has always seemed most equivocal. Here the local balance of ground power is not unfavourable to NATO. Some 24 NATO divisions, with some 5,500 tanks, in Germany and the Low Countries confront 25 Soviet divisions with about 7,500 tanks in Eastern Europe (20 in East Germany, 3 in Hungary, 2 in Poland), although the latter have the aircraft to achieve local air superiority. But if, in war, the 60 divisions of the East European satellites could be used to neutralise any threat from the NATO flanks and to safeguard Soviet communications, the Soviet army could reinforce its forward 25 divisions with some 75–80 at the rate of about 40 a month. By contrast, the NATO powers could reinforce the central front with only some 12 divisions in the first month. Moreover, this arithmetic, unfavourable to NATO as it is, takes no account of the

difference in quality and flexibility between the homogeneous forces of one nation in attack and the problems of a force drawn from eight nations, of whom two must reinforce their troops across the width of the Atlantic, in defence.

It was the knowledge of this imbalance and of Western Europe's lack of depth which led to the introduction of the short-range nuclear weapon into the NATO forces from 1957 onwards. Today some 600 fighter-bombers, capable of carrying nuclear bombs, stand dispersed across scores of European airfields for the purpose of 'interdicting', that is destroying or disrupting Soviet airfields, communications or troop concentrations, in the event of war. And in the Mediterranean the U.S. VIth Fleet can discharge nuclear strike aircraft against Southern Russia and the Balkans. In the ground forces, most of the NATO divisions have short-range *Honest John* missiles as an integral part of their structure, with the warhead in the custody of an American team. In addition, the U.S. VIIth Army in Germany has the *Davy Crockett* atomic mortar. In corps reserve are the *Corporal* and the more modern *Sergeant* nuclear missiles with ranges of 75–85 miles, and in army reserve stand *Pershing* missiles with a range of over 300 miles. In Germany there are also three squadrons of *Mace* missiles, one of which has missiles with a range of 1,380 miles. On both sides of the Iron Curtain the skies are laced by an increasingly complex system of radar and anti-aircraft defences.

The weight of Soviet short-range nuclear firepower is harder to assess. The ground launchers, short-range missiles and artillery exist in abundance, though they are more centrally organised. In the air perhaps 2,000 fighter-bombers might be available for nuclear interdiction. Though Soviet doctrine has laid less stress upon battlefield nuclear weapons than has NATO doctrine, she has not neglected the weapons.

Between the Irish Sea and the Urals there are over 6 million men in uniform, over 30,000 tanks, and units of nuclear delivery that are numbered in thousands. In Western Europe alone there is the greatest accumulation of nuclear firepower anywhere in the free world outside the borders of the United States, greater perhaps than in the Soviet Union itself. Europe, the world's cockpit since the end of the Crusades, is today the

most highly armed camp the world has ever known.¹

Comment by the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère

The Soviet Union is unlikely to believe that she could be threatened by a sudden attack from the British or French nuclear forces, since she could inflict immediate and devastating punishment. French policy has aimed at the build-up of a deterrent force. Should deterrence fail and an aggression be launched against them, the London or Paris governments would have to choose whether to abstain or launch an action that entailed the risk of annihilation for their countries. But that they should choose this risk through their own initiative in attacking the Soviet Union must look as improbable to the Russians as to themselves.

There would thus be no pressure on the Soviet Union to feel compelled to strike a forestalling blow. However, should this not be the case the United States' commitments to her allies would seem to deter the Soviet leaders from such an initiative. If the United States stood by and did nothing while France and/or Britain were attacked with nuclear weapons it would mean that the alliance had disappeared and, in that case, much of what is written in the present book would be nullified.

¹ The figures used in this section are drawn from the I.S.S. publication *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances—The Military Balance 1962-63*, except where more recent figures have become available

Chapter 2

The Search for Solutions

I

EVEN before the advent of nuclear weapons the United States had become the strongest military power in the world. She did not need the nuclear bomb to assure her own defence, but she maintained it to sanction her diplomacy and to protect her threatened allies. Today nuclear weapons serve as an answer to themselves, but they can no longer achieve the objects of American policy. Americans have been the first to question the wisdom of relying on them for the defence of Europe, and the present Administration is anxious to give more prominence to other forces in the interests of a more flexible strategy and diplomacy for the Alliance. And although a common interest in stable deterrence may eventually prove the best basis for an understanding between the two giants, weapons of mass destruction have hitherto only helped to perpetuate the deadlock between them.

It was possible to rely on nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy only so long as the overwhelming superiority of the United States was unchallenged. At first, indeed, in the period of an American monopoly, the United States did not seek to exploit her secret knowledge at all. She was forced to do so by the Soviet threat to Western Europe, and by the clear refusal of the Soviet Union to negotiate any project for placing these weapons of mass destruction under international control. It was, in fact, the expansionist nature of Soviet policy, together with the Soviet challenge to the American monopoly, that induced the United States to emphasise her superiority both in weapons and the means of their delivery, and to use this superiority as a protective screen round the periphery of the Soviet Empire. After the Korean War this policy found its most forceful, though most misunderstood, expression in the doctrine of 'massive retaliation'.

But as a result of these policies, as a result of the system of

collective security which the Soviet advance in Eastern Europe had forced on the West, the political problems of Europe became inextricably linked to the progress of nuclear technology. There have been frequent negotiations between Russia and the West for disarmament in conventional forces, for nuclear control, for a political agreement on Europe. All have shown that these problems must be considered together before any of them can be solved; their relationship is so complex that no solution is yet in sight, and it has been continually confused by the different pace of development in each field. Political questions have developed sometimes more slowly, sometimes a great deal faster than the progress of nuclear technology, and the possibility of agreement in one sphere has time and again been shattered by reverberations from the other.

An arms control policy for Europe must take all these problems into consideration. If not, it may 'stabilise the military environment', but make the political atmosphere more volatile. It could substitute one set of risks for another. It could reassure the enemy, but destroy the alliance.

Some study of the attempts to reach a political settlement in the past fifteen years may help to clarify these dangers. What follows is not an account of negotiations on arms control, or a history of post-war Europe, but an attempt to clarify the relationship between military developments and negotiations for a European settlement.

Military developments from the end of the Second World War to the late nineteen-fifties show three broadly distinguishable phases. During the first (1945-52) the United States held first a monopoly and later a marked superiority in strategic nuclear weapons and in the means of delivering them, which at that time were aircraft alone. The Soviet Union possessed an overwhelming preponderance in conventional forces which particularly threatened Western Europe. During the second period (1952-5) both the United States and the Soviet Union acquired the thermonuclear bomb. Thanks to its greater reserves in manpower and its proximity to the European theatre, the Soviet Union still possessed a superiority in conventional strength—but also began with its developing nuclear capabilities to be able to inflict fearful destruction upon Western Europe. The United States, still outside the

reach of Soviet strategic weapons, developed tactical nuclear weapons as an answer to the Soviet challenge in Europe. Strategies of 'graduated deterrence' began to become a subject of expert discussion in the West, but the United States continued to rely ultimately on a strategy of 'massive retaliation'. The third period from 1956 to 1958 witnessed greater fluctuations. There was a major change in Soviet foreign policy with a new emphasis on 'peaceful coexistence' that bore witness to the fact that the Soviet leaders had now accepted the implications of nuclear warfare for their own policy. But the Soviet Union also launched the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile in August 1957 and the first *sputnik* two months later. The 'missile gap' became a major preoccupation in the United States, and agreement was reached, at least in principle, to station Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles in Europe at the NATO heads of government meeting in December 1957. The dualities within Soviet policy had already been seen in 1956, when the Russian leaders threatened European capitals with their missiles for the first time during the Suez crisis. After 1958, it became increasingly apparent that although Mr. Khrushchev was determined not to risk war, and was even apparently hopeful of reaching certain agreements with the West (largely on his terms, as in the Berlin negotiations of 1959), he had also yielded to a certain euphoria in his possession of intercontinental missiles armed with thermonuclear warheads. The Berlin ultimatum of 1958 was the first real evidence of this, and it was confirmed in changes of Soviet defence policy in 1960, after a complete impasse had been reached in all attempts at agreement in Europe. The two sides had negotiated on the possibilities of arms control in Europe, but, in fact, after 1958 the division of the continent had been hardening, while the space revolution has now added a new dimension to the conflict of armaments.

II

1946-52: THE COLD WAR AND THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The first negotiations on general disarmament after the war coincided with the political offensive of the Soviet Union in

Europe. Between May 1945 and April 1947—the time of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow—three facts became clear: first that the war-time alliance had scarcely lasted until the war was ended and that the world was now split into two irreconcilable ideological camps; second that the Soviet Union had no intention of accepting any international authority over nuclear production, such as that proposed in the Baruch Plan; third that the rate of American demobilisation had left the United States helpless and her allies and friends in Europe almost defenceless in the looming power struggle for the dominance of Europe.

By the end of the war the Western Allies had made a profound technical breakthrough which, in combination with its strategic airpower, seemed to assure the United States of a lasting position as the dominant world power. The American Government was committed to the establishment of a new system of collective security based on the United Nations. Compared with this paramount task, all local or regional problems seemed unimportant and Washington looked with reserve at any move from London or Paris which seemed like a return to the policies of the balance of power or the division of spheres of influence.

It was hardly surprising that the Soviet Union should strive to catch up with the United States and that her effort should, in the first place, be devoted to nuclear technology and long-range bombers. She could not hope to match the United States in airpower, but it was essential to develop her own atomic bomb if her conventional preponderance in Europe was not to be neutralised by American technological prowess. For there was in Soviet eyes a balance between Soviet landpower and American air and seapower; but whereas Soviet power could be brought to bear only on Europe, the United States could strike directly at the Russian homeland. In the case of conflict, a threat to occupy Western Europe might not be enough to deter the United States from turning nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, and might even encourage her to do so unless the Soviet Army were withdrawn from the occupied areas. Russia would have to be able to threaten Western Europe with nuclear devastation to assure her own security from an American attack.

Moreover, the American proposals in the first disarmament negotiations aroused distrust among the Soviet negotiators. These proposals contained clauses (permission for the United States to retain her stockpile until complete international control of nuclear production had been established; the staffing of the international organisation by Americans) which, though they were necessary to ensure American interests until a comprehensive agreement was reached, were bound to excite Russian suspicion. The United States, on the other hand, was not concerned with the security of Europe as such. The essential task for the United States in the immediate post-war period was to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union—first on maintaining world peace, secondly on disarmament.

The Potsdam Agreement, the demilitarisation and international control of Germany seemed in American eyes to be a foundation for agreement with the Soviet Union and the maintenance of world peace. The old intra-European balance of power was no longer of any importance and even seemed detrimental to stability in a disarming world. The demilitarisation of Germany and its exclusion from all alliances for a period of twenty-five years was proposed by Mr. Byrnes, the American Secretary of State, at the Paris Foreign Ministers' Conference in April 1946 and the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, proposed the extension of this neutralisation under Four-Power control from twenty-five to forty years, until 1986. While the Soviet Union was already committed to a limited arms race in the interests of her own security, the United States was actively demobilising and attempting to eliminate nuclear weapons from the international scene. But both powers were interested in the neutralisation of Germany.

The demobilisation of American forces continued rapidly after the war: there was no question of holding troops in readiness to confront the Russians in Europe. This did not change even though the Soviet Union refused to submit to international inspection for the production of nuclear weapons, and Mr. Molotov had hinted in 1945 that a Russian bomb was on the way. The reason lies in the now astonishing fact that there was no connection whatever between the negotiations in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission for the

elimination of nuclear weapons and those in the Commission for Conventional Armaments (created as the result of a Soviet initiative long *after* Mr. Molotov had indicated Russia's intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons). Yet in view of the military perspective of the United States at the time, this was a natural order: the nuclear revolution had not been assimilated in political practice, nuclear weapons were seen as a distinct and separate problem in the relations between the two Great Powers, and conventional forces were a problem common to all nations in the pursuit of peace. The ultimate guarantor of peace was the airpower of the United States, which was actively developed while other American forces were being demobilised, and Russian land superiority in Europe hardly seemed yet to present any outstanding difficulty. Nor would it as long as both seemed to agree on the neutralisation of Germany. Although both powers became more and more antagonistic in Europe after the Potsdam Conference, there was no real change in American global policy.

It was in 1947 that the decisive change occurred. In January, convinced of the failure of his plan, Mr. Baruch resigned from the Atomic Energy Commission; in March the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference revealed that there was no hope of an agreement on Germany, and at the same time the Truman Doctrine of military aid to Greece and Turkey proclaimed that America had begun an active policy of containment. In June the Harvard speech of General Marshall marked the turn of the tide. It could not be long before the West began to consider the rearmament of Germany. In the military containment of Soviet expansion, the rearmament of Germany had to fill the power vacuum that had been left in Western Europe. In the first half of 1948 German rearmament had not yet been officially discussed, but it was clear that, unless Soviet policy changed, this could only be a matter of time. The neutralisation of Germany had been conceived as a basis for disarmament and for a system of collective security in which the United States would co-operate with the Soviet Union. If an arms race were to follow instead, and if Western Europe were to be rearmed, West German rearmament was—in Western eyes—a necessary

element of stabilisation. For, as James Warburg wrote of the period of the Berlin Blockade:

American policy in Europe was drifting rapidly into a dilemma composed of two alternatives: either the programme for rearming Western Europe would involve the remilitarisation of Western Germany, or else it would turn out to be the most cruel hoax ever perpetrated . . . we should be rearming Western Europe merely to fight a delaying action, to be once more overrun and occupied and perhaps eventually to be once more liberated.¹

In fact, it has been the constant and overriding concern of both the American and West European governments that if 'containment' was to succeed, the Russian forces must never be given the chance to occupy Western Europe. It was not enough for them to know that they would eventually be driven back; it must be made impossible for them to overrun the Western countries in the first place. These countries had all recently experienced the horrors of occupation and liberation: if they were to rearm and support the United States' drive for collective self-defence to supplement the ineffective system of collective security, they would at least have to be sure that they would not be required to go through it all again. In order to ensure that this would not happen, that a 'forward strategy' could be built up, the Western allies began to consider the rearmament of Germany. This danger was equally clear to the Russian leaders. Even before the Berlin Blockade, before Stalin had decided to risk an open conflict in Germany, the Soviet Union had suggested a common withdrawal of troops from the country. These fears were clearly prompted by the beginnings of the European Recovery Programme and the prospect of a restored and independent Western Germany. Mr. Molotov's strictures on Marshall Aid at the London Foreign Ministers' Conference in November–December 1947 made it obvious, that, though he wilfully misinterpreted the motives of American assistance, he plainly understood the logic of the Western position. Then, and in June 1948 (through

¹ James Warburg: *Germany, Key to Peace*, p. 69, quoted in Eugene Hinterhoff, *Disengagement*, London, Stevens, 1959

the Eastern Foreign Ministers' Conference in Warsaw), the Soviet Union proposed a common withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany. It was clearly unthinkable. The Oder is 40 miles from Berlin. In Europe the Western powers had only 12 scattered and understrength divisions, the Soviet Union 25 which could easily and quickly be reinforced. Without partial mobilisation the United States would have had a total ground reserve of $2\frac{1}{2}$ divisions 3,000 miles away from Europe. The Russian proposals for withdrawal were in any case combined with the restoration of Four-Power government in Germany and an international control of the Ruhr: judging by the manner in which the Soviet authorities had been exploiting their local superiority in Berlin, there could be no question but that they would use any such arrangement as a base for the political conquest of Germany.

In the Soviet view this would have been a decisive victory. It would have brought the 'capital of European militarism' under Soviet control, and yet ensured that there would have been no war with the United States while Russia was still grossly inferior in strategic power. It was this above all which seems to have inspired Stalin's political tactics at the time.

Soviet power was to be extended as far as possible in Europe, but without any overt conflict—even, in Germany, under cover of an agreement with the Western powers. The Cold War arose from the failure of this policy in Germany, which followed hard upon a demonstration of its success in Czechoslovakia; from the beginning of 1948 the Western European countries were committed to rearmament and collective self-defence and the United States to resisting encroachment on her position in Germany. By the time of the Berlin Blockade, therefore, it was apparent to the governments of all Western powers, and to the Soviet Union, that the division of Europe entailed a new danger of war, that there was no hope of an agreement on nuclear weapons (in May the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission had recommended the suspension of negotiations), and that—short of a radical change in Soviet policy—the rearmament of Germany could only be a matter of time. Early in 1949, with the foundation of NATO and the promulgation of the German constitution, West Germany became a part of a Western system of security,

which the United States was pledged to defend. In the same year, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device. A new balance of forces was arising which would shortly make it more difficult than before to solve the problems of a European peace settlement.

After the blockade of Berlin had come to an end, a precarious *modus vivendi* seemed for a while to have been reached, although the German problem had been left pending. There was, as Mr. Dean Acheson declared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 27, 1949, 'no thought of bringing Western Germany into the Alliance'. While the military planners in Washington and Fontainebleau were fully aware that German rearmament was the *sine qua non* of Western collective security, the political forces opposing rearmament prevailed for the time being. In Bonn the political groundwork was laid for the emerging German Federal Republic, while in Eastern Germany the foundation of the German Democratic Republic was proclaimed. A few weeks after the NATO treaty had been signed Stalin retaliated with the decision to integrate the national forces of the satellite countries—excluding Eastern Germany for the time being—into the Soviet military machine.

After the Communist attack on South Korea, there was real apprehension in Europe that the Soviet Union was only biding its time to move westwards again. It was now that the dangers of reliance on the American air force and navy as the only real deterrent to eventual aggression were most acutely realised. The French Government reiterated its demand for a 'forward strategy' in Europe, and Dr. Adenauer offered a German contribution to the Western forces. At the same time the Korean War had another result. Addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations in October, President Truman expounded the principles essential to a successful disarmament plan within the framework of a collective security system: '... the plan must include all kinds of weapons. Outlawing any particular kind of weapon is not enough. The conflict in Korea bears a tragic witness to the fact that aggression—whatever the weapons used—brings frightful destruction.'

The United States recognised that progress on the reduction of conventional arms could not wait upon an agreement

for the international control of atomic energy. From now on, the U.N. Disarmament Commission was to work for a phased reduction of all armaments, and this appeared to have a better chance of success because the Soviet Union now possessed nuclear weapons too. Between 1950 and 1952 the chances of disarmament seemed to brighten, and a number of comprehensive proposals were made by each side after the sixth United Nations Assembly in 1951. But it was here that the question of European security complicated the issue. No proposal was made, either in the United Nations or outside it, to consider disengagement or arms control in Europe along with the technical and military questions of disarmament. And the problems of European security led to the decision of the new NATO Council, meeting in Lisbon in May 1952, to raise the NATO forces to an army capable of fighting a prolonged conventional war and to include a substantial German contribution. The contradictions between the need for collective self-defence and the need of disarmament and collective security had been plain ever since the first explosion of a Russian nuclear device, when the State Department's policy planning staff concluded that conventional forces in Europe would have to be increased to forestall the threat of Soviet aggression on the ground.¹ Now these contradictions became sharper still, and the relationship between the nuclear policy of the great powers and the rearmament of Germany with conventional weapons more confused than ever.

In 1952 it seemed that the decision to raise a large NATO army (as agreed at the Lisbon Conference), and to forge the capability of fighting a prolonged conventional defence if need be, was nevertheless intended to give the United States a continued certainty of deterring aggression through nuclear power. For on the one hand these forces were to be built to ensure that the West could continue to deter aggression or the threat of aggression in Europe after the value of the American lead in nuclear weapons had declined; but on the other there was never any intention of actually matching Russian forces in the field. The main purpose was to prevent the Soviet forces from staging a *fait accompli* under the cover of a nuclear threat:

¹ Robert S. Osgood, *NATO, The Entangling Alliance*, Chicago U.P., 1962

if a *fait accompli* could be held off, the Soviet Government could not possibly hope to threaten nuclear warfare against Europe without incurring devastating retaliation from the United States. Conventional forces were there to provide against the diminishing atomic advantage of the United States, but they were an instrument of perpetuating that advantage even though it diminished. This was the sense of Mr. Dean Acheson's testimony to the Joint Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services in 1951 when he said: 'These are the forces that would prevent Europe, in the event of an attack, from having to go through another occupation and liberation.' He made it clear that there was no intention of matching the potential aggressor 'man for man' or 'tank for tank', but this would not be necessary, since the NATO forces were purely defensive.

Yet the goals set at the Lisbon Conference in February 1952 were in reality too ambitious for such a purpose, and proved to be politically impossible of achievement. So that in the end the Atlantic Alliance came to rely more heavily than ever on an undiminished American lead in nuclear power. After the Republican victory the doctrine of 'massive retaliation' seemed for a time to be justified by the explosion of a thermonuclear device at Eniwetok. But it was rapidly called in question. It depended on the B47 bases overseas which were beginning to become vulnerable to Soviet attack; and the Soviet Union shortly thereafter herself exploded the first thermonuclear bomb to be dropped from an aircraft. Moreover, massive retaliation was a politically misguided doctrine on two counts. On the one hand it betrayed a rigidity of approach which took no account of the evolution of Europe. Between 1952 and 1954 the Soviet Union, confronted with the imminent prospect of West German rearmament, appeared to reconsider its policies in Europe, and there might have been some chance of reaching agreement on Germany. In fact, this possibility appeared unconvincing in Europe, and was not believed in by many Americans. There is not enough evidence of Soviet intentions to say that here was a chance which was thrown away; it can be said that it was never seriously considered, and that when 'disengagement' won wide support in the West some years later it was too late.

III

1952-5: TOWARDS 'DISENGAGEMENT'

We have already seen that, in the eyes of most Western statesmen outside Germany, disengagement is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the reunification of Germany. It is a policy of achieving a form of arms control, and of controlling Germany through agreement with the Soviet Union. German reunification was a welcome (or unwelcome) by-product. It is true that in all Western plans for a European settlement, self-determination in Germany has been an indispensable preliminary—and it would be difficult to renounce this basic principle without accepting the Soviet contention that a European settlement must be reached between the two Great Powers without any regard for the peoples concerned. But the problems which disengagement was intended to solve were not primarily those of the division of Germany and the repression of Eastern Europe. They were the problems of the military confrontation in Europe, and of how to lessen its dangers without making the situation still more unstable. But after 1952, such ideas had been forgotten in the Western preoccupation with achieving a 'balanced collective force' in Europe, and they were not reconsidered even when these balanced forces failed to materialise. For the Soviet Union, however, the main problem was that of preventing West German rearmament and keeping alive the chance of reunification on Soviet terms.

It is worth noting at this moment that Russian interest in German reunification was essentially a Stalinist phenomenon. It accorded with Stalin's post-war policies of extending Soviet control piecemeal through neighbouring territories, first by political subversion and ultimately by an open *coup*. The Ulbricht group of Communists, who returned to Berlin from Moscow after the war, expected to extend their control to the whole country within a few years. Soviet policy in Germany had fluctuated greatly since that time, but by 1952 the foundations of Communist power in the East seemed secure, and it was reasonable to hope that in the event of reunification

the whole country could be brought into the Communist orbit. There can be little reason to doubt the seriousness of the Soviet approach at this time, whatever the underlying motives. The Russian Government agreed to withdraw its troops from Germany, dropped the demand, which it had raised in 1951, for an abolition of overseas American bases as a *quid pro quo*, and proposed the military neutrality of the whole country.

The Soviet Note of March 1952 came too late for serious consideration by the Western powers, for the Paris agreements, restoring sovereignty to Germany and setting up the European Defence Community, were about to be signed. A supranational European defence organisation had first been suggested by the European Federalists late in 1948 as an answer to the problems of German rearmament. Sir Winston Churchill advocated it in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on the first day of the Korean War, and the French Government adopted it as official policy in 1951. The European Defence Community was intended to rearm West Germany, while ensuring that she remained subject to the control of her allies, and it was meant to proceed in step with the dismantling of the occupation régime. In fact EDC was debated for three years, and only served to delay Germany in recovering her sovereignty; but in 1952 it seemed that the Federal Republic would soon be a sovereign state, making a contribution to a European Army. And it was already clear that the Western powers would not come to any agreement with the Soviet Union that did not leave them in full control of Western Germany while the Soviet forces withdrew from the Eastern part of the country.

In diplomatic terms, American nuclear superiority meant that the only acceptable change in the *status quo* would be for Russia to acknowledge a Western victory in Europe. Until then Western Europe would continue to be reinforced. But over the next two years two developments cast new doubt on the chances of reunifying Germany on Western terms. The first was the explosion of the American and Russian thermonuclear bombs, and the official American revelation which followed, of their appalling effects. The second was that NATO abandoned the intention of creating a strong conventional

army, and decided instead to introduce tactical nuclear weapons into Europe when they became available.

Before these developments, much serious thought was given in Germany to the possibilities of solving the problem of German reunification through an agreement with the Soviet Union on a withdrawal of troops. To circumvent the risks of a neutralised and unprotected Germany, Dr. Kurt Pfleiderer, a Free Democrat member of the Bundestag, drew up a memorandum in October 1952 which proposed the establishment of a neutral zone between East Germany and the Federal Republic, which should contain Berlin. All troops would be withdrawn from this area, but NATO and Soviet forces would remain on each side of it; and on this basis negotiations could eventually be conducted for the reunification of the whole country.

Such a scheme would have met the dangers inherent in the Soviet proposal, and before the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons could have proved a workable compromise, whether it led to any further result or not. But it depended on the creation of a strong and mobile Western force behind the neutral area, capable of defending it against a Russian *fait accompli* without exposing it to nuclear devastation: it could have succeeded on the basis of the Lisbon goals; there was no chance for it once these were abandoned.

In fact, the pace of technological development was such that the only prospect of keeping tactical nuclear weapons out of the NATO forces lay in the work of the Disarmament Commission. But just at this time the Soviet conduct in the negotiations was so devoted to propaganda and so obdurate on substantive issues that no detailed discussion of arms reductions or control was possible. The contrast between Soviet proposals for Europe and Soviet behaviour in the Disarmament Commission did not demonstrate the need to consider all these problems together, but rather served to keep them further apart.

The failure of hopes for disarmament coincided in 1953 with the firing of the first atomic cannon at Frenchmans Flat. The prospect of introducing tactical atomic weapons into NATO now changed the function which was assigned in

official thinking to a German NATO force. Its purpose was now to help to *maintain* American nuclear superiority. In January 1954, General Gruenther, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, expounded the new doctrine to the American Club in Paris: 'If 70 divisions, for example, are needed to establish a conventional line of defence between the Alps and the Baltic, then 70 minus x divisions equipped with atomic weapons would be needed.' But the need for German troops was then greater than ever, in order to keep NATO's forward shield strong enough to force the enemy to 'attack in concentration and thereby offer a profitable target for atomic bombardment'.¹ Thus by the beginning of 1954 German rearmament—which had at the time of Lisbon been seen only as one component of a balanced force designed to complement the nuclear superiority of the United States—had become, in SACEUR's view, the *sine qua non* of a new nuclear strategy for Europe.

Tactical atomic weapons did not, however, make their appearance in Europe until 1957, nor did German rearmament effectively begin until 1956. There was, it seemed, still a chance of averting both, and to this end the Soviet Union made persistent efforts. The lines along which the Soviet Government was thinking after Stalin's death became known at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Berlin early in 1954. But events seemed to develop independently, so that by the time the Soviet proposals came to be discussed they were again too late. Stalin's death in March 1953 was rapidly followed by the suppression of the East German rising in June 1953 and a hardening division between the two Germanys. Two months later Malenkov warned the United States that she possessed no monopoly of the thermonuclear bomb, and it was known at the same time that a Russian long-range bomber was being developed which would be capable of mounting an attack on the American homeland. In this context there was no hope whatever that Western forces could be withdrawn from West Germany, for then the only deterrent to a lightning occupation of the whole country by the still overwhelmingly superior Russian forces would be an American threat of an all-out war, whose credibility, always somewhat ambiguous for moral and

¹ Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 109

political reasons, was now beginning to be further undermined by Soviet technical advances.

Consequently when the Foreign Ministers met in February 1954 it was almost inevitable that the West should reject the Soviet proposal—even though Sir Winston Churchill had recently called for a ‘new Locarno’ and there were public hopes of a mutual security pact between the Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Union. At Berlin, Mr. Molotov put forward a scheme, repeated in a subsequent note, for the almost complete withdrawal of foreign troops from a neutral reunified Germany whose future status would be guaranteed by a European Security Pact. The dissolution of NATO would not be a prerequisite for such a treaty. It was a new initiative, but it had been overtaken by events: the Western ministers declared German neutrality ‘unacceptable’, and hinted openly for the first time that the whole of Germany was to come under Western control before any settlement could be regarded as acceptable. The first version of the ‘Eden Plan’ for German Reunification in Freedom was put forward at the Berlin conference of 1954, and insisted on free elections throughout Germany as the only basis for reunification. In itself this was unexceptionable, but it soon became clear that Germany was also to have the freedom to choose any alliance she wished.

As long as German reunification was regarded as an *alternative* to EDC this issue was confused, but after EDC was finally rejected by the French Assembly later that year, Western negotiators came to hold the view that the only acceptable basis for a future settlement was for the whole of Germany to come under the control of NATO. In terms of ensuring security in Europe, this was a logical extension of Mr. Dulles’ strategic and political approach, which he did not change until his death. In terms of an agreement on arms control and Russian withdrawal it was patently self-contradictory.

It was never quite clear whether reunification under the conditions envisaged at that time would have involved a Western occupation of Eastern Germany. Certainly in the German plans for military withdrawal or redeployment, this was not the case. In the debate, in which the Government’s defence spokesman, Herr Blank, soldiers like Colonel Bonnin, and commentators like Adelbert Weinstein, were concerned,

the predominant view was rather that while Germany must remain in NATO, Western (i.e. non-German) troops would, in fact, withdraw to behind the Rhine in return for a Russian withdrawal beyond the Oder. Such a military redeployment was considered a means of facilitating the reunification of Germany. It was not sufficient for an agreement on arms control, nor could there be an agreement on military withdrawal without a European political settlement at the same time. But the prospects of a political solution were disappearing behind the technological progress of the arms race.

The Soviet leaders might hope still to profit from the strains in the Atlantic Alliance after the rejection of EDC, and with a show of reasonableness to reverse the trend of the preceding years towards Germany's incorporation in NATO. Soviet diplomacy attempted to prevent this before the Geneva Summit conference of 1955, but it was too late. The crisis of the Western Alliance could only be solved by decisive action to begin West German rearmament and at the same time to ensure that the scope of this rearmament was limited under the supervision of the other allies. It was this which the London and Paris Agreements of 1954 achieved.

The Paris Agreements were ratified by the French Assembly in January 1955 and by the Bundestag in May. The solution that had first appeared on the political horizon late in 1948 had at last materialised. Western Germany had outgrown the bonds of the post-war occupation and at the same time become a member of the Western Alliance. The Federal Republic promised a national contingent of twelve divisions to NATO and was in turn promised an equal voice in the Alliance, whose members pledged their support by all diplomatic means to a policy of reunification and declared the Government in Bonn the only spokesmen for the whole German people. The former occupying powers reserved their rights in the occupation of Berlin, the stationing of troops in the Federal Republic, and the ultimate responsibility for reunification. The military establishment of the Federal Republic was limited by clauses prohibiting not only German manufacture of atomic, chemical and bacteriological weapons but also of heavy warships, submarines and long-range rockets. A special Arms Control Agency was set up within the framework of WEU with the

power to inspect factories, depots (with the exception of British depots on the Continent) and budget figures. While these measures were formally applied to all members of WEU, their main purpose was obviously to enforce the restrictions on the rearmament of the Federal Republic which had been written into the WEU Treaty. However, this statement (Annexes I and II of the WEU Treaty) contains no renunciation of the possession or use of nuclear weapons, nor of their production on the territory of other countries. Germany did not renounce a nuclear strategy; she merely renounced an independent nuclear weapons industry in Germany. There is no significant group in Germany which openly advocates withdrawing from the commitments of 1954 and there is no reason to believe that any such view is widely held. But this should not be taken to mean that Germany has renounced nuclear weapons.¹

When the road to direct negotiations about Germany was closed by the Paris Agreements, Soviet diplomacy turned to the field of disarmament, where some progress had been made in 1954 in the Sub-Committee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. In June, Britain and France had submitted a memorandum which was accepted in September as the basis for future work in the Commission and Sub-Committee. It called for the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. Now, in May 1955, the Soviet Union accepted the manpower ceilings suggested by the Western powers and proposed the establishment of ground control posts in centres of communications. Nuclear weapons would be retained until 75 per cent of the reduction of conventional weapons had been completed. In the second stage of the plan the International Control Authority was to have wide and lasting powers. This was the most far-reaching disarmament proposal the Soviet Union had ever made and was widely welcomed. During these general disarmament negotiations Mr. Molotov again called for a European Security Treaty in December 1954, and the campaign for a regional arms control agreement was intensified in the fight against

¹ See Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, Chatto and Windus and Frederick Praeger Inc. for The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1962, p. 119

the ratification of the Paris Agreements. The rationale of the Soviet proposals—first only hinted at and openly proclaimed later that year—was that the German settlement that had now been established in fact could be used as the basis for an arms control agreement between the Great Powers: West Germany would remain in NATO, East Germany would remain under Russian control. The prospect of a neutral reunified Germany having been eliminated, the time seemed to have come to stabilise the military situation on the basis of the political *status quo*. Yet the scheme remained ambiguous enough to allow the abolition of NATO and even the reunification of the two Germanys at a later stage.

At the same time, the Western powers were determined to oppose a neutral area or a demilitarised Germany. At best they considered 'accepting' the demilitarisation of East Germany to assure the Russians that they would have no grounds to fear a united Germany in NATO. The limit of concession would be to revise Sir Anthony Eden's insistence on the primacy of free elections in favour of Mr. Molotov's plan for a joint Pankow-Bonn government as a transitional step. But in the West this was always linked with the abolition of the East German régime. This seemed unacceptable to Russia, but the Western powers hoped to win agreement by tying it to a limited disarmament agreement in Europe.

In 1954 the United States had abandoned her previous plans for complete disarmament, enforced by a United Nations body outside the control of the Great Powers. Nor had she any further hope of banning the means of delivery of atomic weapons or achieving a system of free inspection. She was now concentrating on the possibility of an 'international alarm system'. This was known to be favoured by the Soviet Union—which had agreed in May 1955 to a limited system of immobile inspectors. The American intention was that such a scheme should first be applied to Europe, where it would be easier to secure political acceptance than in a universal system. In conjunction with the limitations of the armed forces of all the major powers, on which all had for the moment agreed, this could provide the basis for negotiating a provisional settlement in Europe.

There were thus real hopes that the Geneva Summit con-

ference could lead to fruitful negotiations. But it met under the shadow of a Russian demand in the United Nations disarmament committee for the dismantling of all 'foreign bases' as part of the first stage of a disarmament programme. This in itself was enough to make nonsense of all attempts to achieve a European settlement as a preliminary to a wider scheme. However, the implications of the new Russian move were not yet fully clear, and it was not allowed to dim the atmosphere of the opening proceedings.

In fact, no substantial progress was made at the Summit towards reunification, disarmament or arms control in Europe. But for the first time these three areas of negotiation, sharply separated until then, were brought into contact with each other. For the first time also it was officially indicated by British and French statesmen that the demarcation line between the zones of four-Power occupation in Germany could serve at least temporarily as a basis for arms control arrangements between the four Powers.

This had a profoundly disturbing effect upon Dr. Adenauer. He surmised, rightly or wrongly, that a return to the ideas of 1949 or even 1945 was envisaged and that the Russian proposals for a European Security Treaty might sooner or later camouflage a modified four-Power control of a permanently divided Germany. This prospect was a pure hypothesis at that time, since the Western powers still maintained that political stability in Europe could only be achieved through the reunification of Germany, and the Soviet Union that reunification could only come about when the Americans left Europe. No agreement was possible on this basis. But an 'agreement to disagree' on the basis of a divided Germany appeared to be in sight and no West German leader could blind himself to the long-term consequences of such an agreement for the political stability of the Federal Republic.

This was the background to Dr. Adenauer's journey to Moscow in September 1955. Until then Dr. Adenauer had unswervingly opposed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. But by September 13 the exchange of Ambassadors between Moscow and Bonn had been agreed upon, and the Soviet Union which only a short while before had conceded sovereign status to East Germany agreed to recognise the

Federal Republic. Not only had the Chancellor thus implicitly acknowledged the division of Germany: but NATO was now committed to tactical nuclear weapons for the defence of Europe. They were soon to be introduced into Europe, and, far from leading to a reduction in men under arms, were likely to demand a moderate increase (including a German army) to make them effective and credible. The tergiversations of the Western powers in 1955 can only be understood when one appreciates the dilemma they were in: by suddenly accepting their disarmament proposals from the year before, Russia threatened to make nonsense of their strategic policy. They were naturally not all of one mind in their reaction: in general, the United States was anxious to preserve her strategic freedom of action, Britain and France to test the Russian proposals further. The history of the Western rejection of the Soviet programme is familiar and its importance has perhaps been exaggerated.¹ But it is clear now that they could scarcely have been implemented until fears of a surprise attack in Europe had been overcome, and that until these fears had been put aside, it was almost inevitable that NATO should remain determined to equip its European forces with tactical nuclear weapons.

By the autumn of 1955 the outlines of future relationships between the two blocs were emerging. The Chancellor's visit to Moscow had tacitly conceded the Russian principle that further negotiations on *German reunification* would have to start from the fact that two German states existed. But at the same time the other Western powers had hardened in their insistence that negotiations on *European security* could only succeed if the whole of Germany joined NATO; and German opinion had not wavered in its adamant opposition to the division of the country.² Sir Anthony Eden and the British Government still hoped to defer the question of what alliance a united Germany might decide to join after a system of collective security had been established. But at the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva in October 1955 both Mr. Dulles and M. Pinay insisted that the last stage of a European

¹ For a comprehensive account, see Philip Noel Baker, *The Arms Race*, London, Stevens, 1958

² See comment by Professor Ulrich Scheuner, p. 229

security pact—the stage, that is, at which provisions for collective defence against aggression could be worked out—could only be reached if a united Germany joined NATO.

There could be no compromise between this and the Russian view. But the significance of these developments was hidden for a time by the continuing debate on disarmament. The Western Foreign Ministers presented a plan at the Geneva conference in October for a reduction of troops and an exchange of radar control posts on either side of a demilitarised zone; and the British Government continued to be interested in a policy of ‘thinned out’ zones in the centre of Europe as a first step towards disarmament.

This was linked to the reduction of Britain’s armed manpower on the assumption, which was officially declared in 1957, that a nuclear guarantee was of itself enough to preserve the *status quo* in Central Europe. But the Soviet Union was not prepared to accept this assumption unless and until the NATO powers formally recognised East Germany; nor could there ever be any question of a withdrawal of ground forces from the centre without this recognition.

IV

1955–8: HARDENING POSITIONS IN EUROPE

The developments of 1955 may well have been the turning-point which led to the Berlin crisis late in 1958. The Foreign Ministers’ Conference in October 1955 showed that the policies of the two sides were directly opposed to each other, both with regard to the reunification of Germany and to European security. The remote chances of a German settlement which had appeared at the Summit Conference of 1955 had vanished, it seemed for ever, and the Soviet Union appeared determined to settle the issue to her own satisfaction and to force on the West not only acquiescence but a formal acknowledgement of the division of Germany.

The disarmament negotiations had also reached deadlock. In September 1955 the United States placed a reservation upon all the positions it had taken before the Geneva Summit

Conference, whether in the Sub-Committee, in the Disarmament Commission or in the U.N. Assembly, on questions of the levels of armaments. After that the new Western positions only emerged piecemeal in the Sub-Committee meeting in London in the spring of 1956 and 1957; but the basis was that 'comprehensive' disarmament could not yet be achieved, and that agreement should be sought on measures of 'partial' disarmament instead. Among these partial measures, the plans for a regional 'thinning out', which had first been mentioned at the Summit Conference and were further elaborated at the Foreign Ministers' Conference of 1955, became increasingly important. The nexus between the German problem, European security and first steps in regional disarmament became clearer with each new round of negotiations, but so did the political difficulties of any form of disengagement or regional arms control. While the suggestions for limited regional solutions still alternated with comprehensive disarmament proposals there seemed to be less and less connection between them. While the comprehensive plans retained their hypothetical and declaratory character, the regional measures—either as first steps to disengagement or as arms control measures—became a topic of serious negotiations. There was above all increasing interest in the idea of a nuclear-free zone.

The outline of events after 1956 makes it clear that the political and strategic relationships between the Great Powers had now reached a point where the division of Europe could not be healed by the kind of agreement on arms control which champions of desengagement desired. In January 1956 the armed forces of East Germany were integrated into those of the Warsaw Pact, and in March and June of that year Mr. Gromyko's proposal in the disarmament negotiations for a reduction of troops and prohibition of atomic weapons within both parts of Germany 'and neighbouring States', which was the forerunner of the Rapacki Plan, seemed to set the seal on Soviet determination that the division of Germany must be acknowledged before agreements could be reached to reduce the risks of war in Europe. The question of German reunification, which had dominated East-West relations for a decade had now given way to the new priority of seeking arms control agreements in Europe.

Nineteen-fifty-six was, however, a year of flux. The Polish October, and the Hungarian November rising emphasised that the de-Stalinisation which lay behind Mr. Khrushchev's new policy on Germany carried its own risks, and he seems for a short time to have reverted to the idea of disengagement as a possible solution. After the Hungarian revolt, a Soviet note dramatically offered to extend the zone of inspection in Europe to 1,000 miles as a basis for the subsequent withdrawal of foreign troops. Later in November, Mr. Khrushchev offered to withdraw Soviet troops from Eastern Europe if NATO reciprocated, and (again) if 'foreign bases' in the rest of the world were dismantled within two years.

This, however, was more than a proposal for disengagement. It amounted to a radical measure of disarmament, since the United States had at that time no means of protecting Europe from bases within her national frontiers. In terms of strategic disarmament, no Soviet *quid pro quo* was offered. Disarmament negotiations had in any case suffered a serious setback in 1955, for both the Great Powers now acknowledged that their nuclear energy programme had been running too long to uphold earlier hopes that nuclear weapons could be eliminated by accounting for all past productions of fissionable material. The development of the thermonuclear bomb had introduced too great a possibility of error for any fool-proof system of accountability. Any scheme which depended on such a system would now weaken the certainty of retaliation and so encourage a potential aggressor to a surprise attack.

These implications were the more noticeable in that the new Anglo-French phased plan, which had been laid before the Disarmament Sub-Committee in March 1956, emphasised that nuclear weapons would have to be used in response to a surprise attack. Consequently during 1957 both East and West gave up the attempt to reach a comprehensive agreement on disarmament and turned instead to a consideration of partial measures. On the Soviet side this was concerned above all with the problem of European security: on the Western side with the problem of security against a surprise attack. These discussions, in the sub-committee in London, came to an end in August 1957.

Thereafter, the only subjects on which the two sides had

not yet fully explored their differences of approach were those of surprise attack and of a nuclear test-ban. On the second, they reached an unwritten agreement in 1958, which lasted for nearly three years. On the first, a new conference was held in Geneva in 1958. But from the beginning it was clear that while the Western representatives approached the conference table with the intention only of discussing the technical problem of safeguards and inspection, the Soviet negotiators believed that the conference should work out 'practical and concrete' measures which could sidestep the political problems of disarmament, and lead in particular to the creation of a non-nuclear zone in Europe.¹ The result was that as the complications of the problem became more apparent, the Soviet representatives insisted still more on the need for a limited agreement on arms control in Europe. The withdrawal of troops or the prohibition of atomic weapons in the centre of the continent now became, in the Soviet view, the only adequate safeguard against a surprise attack. The Rapacki Plan for a denuclearised zone in the centre of Europe, first proposed in October 1957, which was put forward in a new and more extended version at the time, also proposed a reduction of armed forces in the two Germanys, Poland and Czechoslovakia, simultaneously with the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the same area.

The Surprise Attack conference came too late. By the end of 1958 the technical problems involved had become too complicated to be solved unless a new political agreement could be reached in Europe at the same time. This had been recognised by unofficial thinking in the West: while the Soviet Union was concentrating on the possibilities of a limited agreement along the lines of the Rapacki Plan, there was renewed interest in Britain and Germany in the idea of disengagement. It was stimulated by the debate in the Bundestag in April 1957 on the eventual arming of the Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear weapons, the decision to introduce IRBMs into Europe in December of that year, and Mr. George Kennan's Reith lectures on the BBC at the same time. While

¹ See Hermann Volle and Helga Haftendorn *Sicherung vor Überraschungsangriffen im Atomzeitalter*, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 1962, pp. 52-53

the German SPD was primarily interested in disengagement as a step towards German reunification, the British advocates of this course, particularly the late Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Dennis Healey, hoped to reduce military and political tensions at the same time through an agreement with the Soviet Union, and in this respect their approach did not differ greatly from that of Mr. Rapacki. Both parties, however, regarded German reunification as indispensable to the creation of a demilitarised belt in Europe. All the projects emanating at that time from the Communist bloc (of which the Rapacki Plan was only the most notable example) took the division of Germany as their basic assumption. That there was no possible compromise was revealed with complete clarity by the Berlin ultimatum of November 1958. Since then, interest in disengagement has declined. No group in Germany would today accept the objective of a neutral belt in Europe, or the withdrawal of the Federal Republic from NATO.

V

In the ensuing years some attempts were made to break this deadlock. At the Geneva conference of 1959, the Western Foreign Ministers attempted to provide a linked scheme of German reunification and European security. Although the composition of the 'all-German commission' which they proposed at this time made it clear that a reunified Germany would probably choose to join NATO, their proposals for partial disarmament, which were adapted from the discussions in the London sub-committee in 1957, attempted to provide a simultaneous system of arms control. But since 1955 the Soviet Union has consistently demanded a preliminary application of security measures which would crystallise the present division of Germany and to this the Western powers have never been able to agree. Unofficial commentators in Britain and France have attempted to provide a way out of these difficulties. In 1959 M. Mendès-France proposed as a preliminary measure the creation of a series of 'vertical strips' through the centre of Europe, within which troops and armaments would be greatly reduced. M. Jules Moch advocated a series of symmetrical rings radiating from Berlin, to

avoid creating zones of military reduction along national frontiers. Sir John Slessor put forward a scheme of 'military non-alignment' for Germany and Eastern Europe, under a European guarantee of a reunified Germany to meet the political difficulties inherent in neutralisation.¹

But the fact was that, as Soviet statements throughout 1959 emphasised, the Russian leaders were no longer interested in any project for the reunification of Germany. From 1958 onwards Soviet policy alternated between two extremes: the attempt to impose a German settlement on the Western powers through threatening their position in Berlin; and insistence that only universal and complete disarmament could provide a solution to the outstanding problem of the Cold War. This renewed emphasis on general disarmament, first announced by Mr. Khrushchev in the United Nations General Assembly in 1959, marked a change in Soviet policy. Since then, and especially since the failure of Mr. Khrushchev's policy on Berlin which became clear at the Paris conference of May 1960, universal and complete disarmament has been a concept used by the Soviet negotiators to block every Western initiative on interim issues, whether on inspection to enforce a test-ban, or even the cessation of propaganda, in the seventeen-nation disarmament sub-committee at Geneva in 1962. These negotiations became a barometer of international relations, and their stagnation through 1962 revealed that no progress had been made from the impasse of 1958.

The events that occurred since then seemed to have confirmed it. As the European Economic Community began to gather strength, Eastern Germany, the basis of the Soviet Empire in Europe, began to collapse. The wall that was built across Berlin in August 1961 was more than a temporary solution to the crisis Mr. Khrushchev had begun in 1958. It divided the two halves of Europe, and it revealed to those in the West that all the ambiguities of the post-war years, all the hopes that reunification could be won by building up 'collective security', even the hopes that it could be purchased by agreement or withdrawal, were at an end.

¹ For a comprehensive history of proposals for disengagement and arms control in Europe since 1945, see Eugene Hinterhoff, *op. cit.*

Chapter 3

Europe and the World Balance

SINCE 1958 all attempts to reach an agreement on European security with the Soviet Union have failed, and at the same time the two alliances have become more disjointed. The ambiguous peace which has been maintained by the stalemate of the two Great Powers (a stalemate arising at first from the disparity of their geographical positions and military resources, and maintained today by the nuclear missiles with which each threatens the other directly over the top of the world) is now vulnerable to military action on the ground. If the rise of the European Community, a potential Great Power on the borders of the Soviet Union, threatened to upset the balance between the two titans, Western Europe might face new dangers. The Community could, on the other hand, provide a significant new source of strength to the West and reinforce the overall stability of the European continent. When Western Europe emerges as a political Community it will complicate the whole relationship between Russia and the West, and between the two halves of Europe. It will have a great influence on the world-wide struggle between the Communist bloc and the liberal democracies. The countries of Western Europe have a great part to play in the uncommitted world, politically, militarily and economically; but their success will depend ultimately on achieving a stable system of relationships within Europe, and on the nature of their partnership with the United States. Only if the European continent achieves an enduring military stability, will the countries of the western community be able to devote their energies and resources to the aid, development and defence of the uncommitted world; and only if they achieve a close relationship of mutual reliance with the United States can the West be certain of success in its struggle with the Communist bloc. The conditions for the first depend largely on the Soviet

approach to the questions of Europe; those of the second on the West European attitude to the United States.

I

THE SOVIET INTEREST IN EUROPE

The discussion in the last chapter of the relationships between arms and European security has thrown some light on the Soviet approach to the problems of Europe. In Soviet eyes the problem of Europe has always been conditioned by that of Germany. Historically, post-war Soviet policy towards Europe has had three distinct phases. In the immediate post-war years, Stalin's policy was clearly offensive. It is hard to judge the scope of his ambitions or how far he ever entertained any serious hopes of extending his domain to the Mediterranean and the Channel. But there can be little doubt of his hopes to gain control of Germany, by working both through the machinery of four-power control and by direct pressure on the Western allies and the German population. He apparently believed he could afford a tough line in Europe because he expected economic factors to win his battles for him. Hence the crucial importance of Marshall Aid, the first real challenge to Soviet expansionism, and one which soon forced Stalin to an open struggle—the Berlin Blockade.

The second phase began with the defeat which the Soviet Union met in the air over Berlin. The Soviet Union concentrated at first on retrenchment in Europe and turned its activity to the Far East. But the Russian threat to Germany had led by now to the creation of NATO, and the West was clearly moving towards German rearmament. The catalyst for German rearmament in American thinking was the Korean War, and when in 1951 the French Government proposed the creation of EDC the possibility seemed imminent. The next few years were spent by the Soviet Union in playing for time, in attempting to put off German rearmament as long as possible, perhaps in the hope of making more gains from offering military concessions than from political intimidation, but also in the hope that even if these tactics were not successful, rearmament would be so long delayed that it would in the end be wrecked on the passive resistance of the German

population itself. During this period—from 1952 to 1954—the Soviet Union offered a series of apparent concessions on Germany and there seemed at times to be high hopes of success. The policy of concession bore its greatest fruits in 1954, when Russia agreed to a settlement in Indo-China, and a few weeks later was rewarded by the French Assembly's rejection of the European Defence Community.

But after 1955 a third phase began with a noticeable change of emphasis. After the Bandung Conference, the London and Paris Treaties, and the recognition of Western Germany, Soviet policy paid more attention to Asia. China had emerged as an influential Communist power. The new states of Asia which had hitherto been tirelessly denounced in Russian propaganda as a mere camouflage for imperialism were now regarded as the protagonists of 'positive neutralism'. On the other hand, Germany had become a member of NATO, and the search for reunification was abandoned. Russia now concentrated on undermining American and European influence in the third world, without abandoning her continual attempts to split the Atlantic Alliance, and win the European nations away from the United States. But as the strength of Germany grew, as the difficulties of the Russian position in Eastern Europe were laid bare after the Twentieth Party Congress, and as the Soviet Union seemed to gain advantages in the arms race, it became necessary to achieve some provisional settlement in Europe which would permit the exploitation of the world revolution elsewhere. Perhaps the two were not clearly differentiated in the beginning. Pressure on Iran, Turkey, Quemoy and Berlin may at first have been conceived as part of a single campaign against the West wherever it was vulnerable, choosing whatever means were to hand. But the distinction emerged, whether it was desired or not, from internal political developments—to which the Soviet Union has always given the first priority. After the fall of Marshal Zhukov, and the Twenty-first Party Congress, Mr. Khrushchev concentrated increasingly on economic and agricultural expansion at home, and on a strategy of massive nuclear deterrence abroad. The two were inextricably connected: rapid economic expansion demanded a reduction of military manpower; Marshal Zhukov and his supporters, who

were opposed to this and who in any case represented a powerful political force, were gradually replaced, until Marshal Malinovsky emerged as Mr. Khrushchev's military mouthpiece. Three hundred new generals were promoted to propagate Mr. Khrushchev's defence policy throughout the Soviet forces; and thousands of officers and men returned at the same time to civilian life, to lend their strength to the new economic course. These developments coincided with the abortive Summit Conference at Paris in May 1960.

The Paris conference was the first of a series of tactical defeats over the next two years. By the end of 1962 Russian attempts to impose a settlement on Europe had ended in failure. And even before this the need to build the Berlin wall had already symbolised the defeat of Mr. Khrushchev's policies. It demonstrated that he had not succeeded in securing Western acceptance for his terms, either in the most threatening circumstances, or through the eventual prospect of a peace treaty. The crisis he had conjured up had instead almost destroyed the East German State. His open failure stimulated new internal criticism, to the point where Molotov could emerge as its champion. He was forced to undertake a new de-Stalinisation campaign at the Twenty-Second Party Congress. China could have no better pretext for demonstrating her defiance to the world, and even Albania openly challenged him on his own ground. The last half of 1961 showed clearly that Mr. Khrushchev's policy in Eastern Europe was intimately linked to his policies in a whole range of other fields, and that his power was not so secure that he could accept defeat without endangering his position. And although Mr. Khrushchev has found himself committed to a process of de-Stalinisation, which inevitably accelerated in 1961, he has at the same time found it increasingly necessary to maintain the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the de-Stalinisation campaign was only undertaken after all earlier proposals for 'disengagement' and German reunification had come to nothing. But the internal pressures which arose from this had also impelled him to attempt a stabilisation of the European system. In his eyes the essential condition for this had become the division of Germany. Yet the Berlin crisis, which he began in order to force the West to recognise East Germany, only

exacerbated the shakiness of the Ulbricht régime to a point where the refugees from East Germany began to threaten the Soviet system throughout Eastern Europe.

Since 1961 the Soviet leaders have marked time in their attempts to secure a European settlement—and it appears that Mr. Khrushchev has resisted considerable pressure to sign a separate peace treaty with the DDR and let the consequences follow. But Soviet policy in Eastern Europe has not been immobile. There have been signs of anxiety to build up the satellite states into a separate economic entity through COMECON, before the challenge of EEC is fully felt; and the conflict with China has had wide repercussions on Soviet relations with Albania on the one hand and Yugoslavia on the other.

The economic and political cohesion of the Eastern European bloc is not nearly so secure as it might appear. It is not only that the Russian conflict with China, and the divisions within the Socialist camp have given rise to a less rigid political system which might produce a more diversified pattern of relationships than has appeared hitherto, but also that Mr. Khrushchev is leading his subjects along a difficult and dangerous path where the measures necessary for social liberalisation may conflict with the rapid growth of the economy. The necessary complexities of his own policies, and the difficulties of organising a number of different states in a tight political and economic union may be powerful inducements to Mr. Khrushchev to seek a period of relaxation in Europe.

For although the extending scope of COMECON and the tightening integration of the Warsaw Pact are drawing the countries of Eastern Europe increasingly into the economic and military systems of the Soviet Union, recent developments have shown that the political system is still precarious. So long as there is a potential focus of opposition within the Soviet Union itself; so long as the treatment meted out to different neighbours varies as greatly as it now does, for example, between Poland and the DDR; so long as the indigenous (and still small) Communist parties are subject to frequent purges, every change inside Russia can have quite disproportionate, and dangerous, repercussions in Eastern Europe. And as long as this is so, the potential

dangers resulting from a Chinese bridgehead there remain.

This would mean that the best prospects for a freely directed 'transition to communism' inside Russia lay, if it were possible, in the abandonment of her Eastern European empire. But this is at present out of the question. It is conceivable, however, that the Soviet Union may be interested in reducing discontent among the satellite populations through lowering tension in Europe and allowing a more liberal form of coexistence to develop between the two halves.

Here again, the essential problem is that of Germany. Until the division of Germany is recognised by the West, Russia is unlikely to favour such a policy. But the only conceivable basis for such a recognition would lie in a drastic liberalisation of the East German régime. This is at present very unlikely: the basis of Ulbricht's power is that the geographical position of the DDR enables Russia to encircle both Poland and Czechoslovakia. He has shown considerable skill in exploiting this, and has become the king-pin of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it is only the ruthless régime in Eastern Germany that enables Russia to permit a comparative liberalism in Poland. Yet it is in such discrepancies that the chief threat to the stability of Eastern Europe lies—and their effect will be more marked when they are contrasted with the prosperous pattern of integration in the West.

The integration of Western Europe is likely to emphasise these discrepancies, and its first effects will be felt most severely in the economic sphere. The Soviet Union and the leading countries of the Eastern bloc have at present an expanding trade with Western Europe, which is necessary, not only to import Western machinery and technical skill, but also to purchase raw materials from other parts of the world with currency earned in the West. Soviet imports of Malayan rubber, for instance, are paid for in sterling.¹ Conversely, the most advanced industrial products of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia or East Germany (such as linotypes, or building machinery) are reserved for export to the West.² As

¹ See Alec Nove, 'The Common Market and Comecon' in *New Republic*, September 17, 1961

² See Philippe Ben, 'A bâtons rompus derrière le rideau de fer' in *Le Monde*, September 22, 1962

the Soviet Union nears a surplus in the production of oil, it will need Western European markets more and more. Poland relies on the export of foodstuffs to Western Europe to maintain her present level of industrial investment. If these markets were blocked by the development or the policy of the EEC, the results could be disastrous, particularly as trade within COMECON is at present so unbalanced and the need for currency reserves so acute that exports from one Socialist country to another are frequently conducted through a Western intermediary.

To the leaders of the COMECON, meeting in June 1962, Mr. Khrushchev emphasised the opportunities that lay in the possibilities of co-operation between the two economic blocs, and even betrayed a certain hope that the rise of the western Community might in this way serve to stabilise the Eastern system. But this is a very long-term prospect, and the immediate effects, if a true western European Community is rapidly created, are more likely to be destabilising.

The reasons are political rather than economic. There appears to be grave apprehension in Eastern Europe that a dangerous political conflict will soon be engendered by the rise of the western Community. On the one hand it is feared that the unstable régime in Eastern Germany is likely to provoke a renewal of the Berlin crisis, that 'Mr. Khrushchev can afford to wait, but the DDR cannot'.¹ On the other that the close collaboration between Germany and France and the Franco-German Treaty are the prelude to the rise of a new activist and independent power in the West, which could have a dangerous influence in preventing a compromise over Berlin, or in exacerbating the tension of a divided Germany.

Whatever the conviction behind these opinions, there are some risks entailed in the rise of Western Europe. The Soviet Union sees a potential great power on her western border, which even if it never harboured any aggressive intentions, might by its very existence constitute a challenge to the interests of the Soviet empire and a threat to the stability of Eastern Europe. If this power decided to be independent of

¹ Quoted anonymously by Philippe Ben in *Le Monde*, September 20, 1962

the United States, the world balance which maintains the present precarious peace could then be gravely distorted. But there will be a gap of years before Western Europe could develop its central institutions to become a great power in the strategic sense and a similar time-lag, for material reasons, before China can claim a parallel status on the other side. In these circumstances, it is conceivable that the Soviet rulers will not recognise their true interests in working for a form of European co-operation, but decide to eliminate the challenge from Western Europe before it can make itself felt.

A Russian pre-emptive strike against a growing European military capacity is 'conceivable' only in a war-gaming sense. Nothing in traditional Russian policy or in Communist doctrine would lead one to foresee it as a possibility any more serious than is that of a Western pre-emptive strike against China, before she becomes a formidable nuclear power. It would be realistic, however, to expect a great intensification of political warfare on every level and a number of limited measures: in particular the occupation of Finland and perhaps Austria, or the fomentation of civil war in Greece.

The Soviet Government could react to the rise of the European Community by seeking closer relations with Western European countries. If it is felt that this could contribute to the stability of its system, it might see in the European Community not only a challenge but also a hope that it could contribute to Soviet political security and economic expansion. But if the Western European countries appeared to be forming an adventurous new power, with or without American support, which threatened the Soviet system in Europe, the Soviet Union might seek to scotch the threat before it was too late—certainly by all political, and perhaps by limited military means. There have been signs of both tendencies in Russian reactions to the European Community in 1962 and 1963. It is too early yet to judge which course will ultimately be chosen, for it depends greatly on the attitudes that develop in Western Europe itself. But it is clear that in either case, the Soviet Union will continue its attempts to divide Western Europe from the United States—and that if it succeeds it will win a greater freedom to choose the manner of its subsequent dealings with Western Europe.

II

THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES AND
WESTERN EUROPE

Mr. Khrushchev has often shown anxiety to slow down the arms race with the United States, and to achieve a limited settlement of the most pressing problems of East-West relations in Europe. It is true that such a settlement, involving the recognition by the West that the division of Europe is final, has been pursued by methods of the most gross intimidation; and that if it were achieved, it would be a deadlock rather than a true settlement, leaving Russia free to promote the 'world revolution' in Asia and Africa and to devote her full efforts to the dispute with China. Nevertheless, Mr. Khrushchev's intimidation has always been checked by Russian fears of a thermonuclear war. In the first half of 1960 repeated reference was made in Soviet speeches to the certainty that communism would survive such a conflict, whereas imperialism would be destroyed. This theme seems to have been dropped since the Bucharest Conference of June 1960. Instead, Soviet fears of an American first strike were repeatedly voiced in the course of 1962. '... The President of the U.S.A. himself, Mr. Kennedy, has said that in certain circumstances the U.S.A. may be the first to take the initiative and start a nuclear war against our country. This we must constantly remember, comrades. This has been said by the American President . . .' declared Mr. Khrushchev in Rumania in June 1962. 'Ponder these words,' he told the Moscow Peace Congress a month later. 'They represent not only a threat of thermonuclear war but also the imposition of a sinister competition as to who will be the first to unleash a war; they are thus, as it were, prompting other countries, "hurry up in order to forestall the enemy"'. And where can this lead to? That is clear to everyone—to catastrophic consequences.'

The pattern of Soviet response to these fears, which have been echoed by Marshal Malinovsky, and many military figures, is familiar: the Soviet Union is in a state of constant

readiness to defend herself, and if need be, to deal a fore-stalling blow at the enemy. But the fear of catastrophic consequences has been enough to inspire extreme prudence both in the Berlin and the Cuban crises, which remain the most indicative tests of Soviet reaction to a direct confrontation. And Mr. Khrushchev has shown not only a striking circumspection in facing real risks, but a continuing desire to stabilise the arms race: not only for economic reasons, but because he fears the effect of a continuous increase in armaments themselves: 'The accumulation of these types of armaments,' he told the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October 1961, 'taking place in the atmosphere of the Cold War and war psychosis, is fraught with deadly consequences . . . events might take place which would bring disaster to the peoples of the whole world.'

The most striking advances made by the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin have been in the technology of defence and space. But these have not only given the Soviet leaders an intimate knowledge of the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war; they have also imposed an enormous economic burden. It is calculated the Soviet Union is now devoting over 18 per cent of her gross national product to defence.¹ There are very strong economic and political inducements for Mr. Khrushchev to reduce this rate of spending.

This need to reduce the risks of war, is also clearly a powerful influence on the Soviet approach to the problems of Europe. There was no sign in 1962 that Mr. Khrushchev was prepared to abandon his attempt to force a political agreement on the West. But short of this, or short of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, there has been nothing to indicate that his attitude has changed since his television address of June 1961, when he said that many partial measures 'are highly realistic and promote the cause of peace'. In this passage he was referring specifically to the Rapacki Plan, and to proposals for zones of reciprocal inspection in Europe. What seems to emerge in general from this and other statements is that the Soviet Union is prepared to contem-

¹ See *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances. The Military Balance, 1962-1963* The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1962

plate limited agreements in Europe if they reduce the danger of war, or appear to help her obtain a final settlement. But it depends on her general position, on the balance between her evident strategic nuclear inferiority to the United States and the prospect of increased political pressure from China. Confronted with such a situation, she might try to ensure the greatest possible stability in Europe, for a time at least. It is, however, certain that if the European Community could be divided from the United States, or if it embarked on an independent policy and strategy, none of these influences would apply. Mr. Khrushchev would then have an opportunity to exploit its vulnerability.

III

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES

The rise of the European Community as an alliance within the alliance could therefore offer considerable interest to the Soviet Union if it thereby succeeded in splitting NATO. It is essential to the stability of greater Europe that the Soviet Union does not succeed in this; for an independent but still insecure Western Europe to which the United States, whether from caution or frustration, had loosened its commitment could either tempt the Russian leaders to a more aggressive policy, or give Moscow the option of first creating a *détente* with the subsequent intention of exploiting West Europe's vulnerability. In either case, the division of Europe can best be overcome, and a more flexible pattern of coexistence created, not by asserting a totally independent political entity, but through close political co-operation and common planning between the United States and Western Europe.

The United States government also appears to see its interest in this light. It has shown a generous interest in promoting the resurrection of Western Europe, and has given much thought to the best means of sharing the control of nuclear power with this new ally. At the same time it is clear that in an age of technological change which demands vast resources of money and scientific manpower, Europe's strategic

dependence on the United States is unlikely to diminish in the decade ahead and may even increase. Western Europe is becoming economically and politically more autonomous, but a cursory glance at the overall balance of power is enough to show that neither the European Community nor the United States can expect to flourish in complete independence of the other.

In the first place, it is misleading to hope that a purely European equilibrium can be established. Europe has limited strategic significance in the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it is the nexus in that conflict. While this continues, the countries of the Western half will not be able to concentrate purely on their relation with those of the East, for European relationships are now too closely bound up with the outside world. During 1962 the Cuban crisis revealed how far the East-West conflict had identified issues within Europe and outside it; it also showed that the Soviet Union now hoped to exploit non-European issues to apply pressure on Europe.

The nature of European power outside Europe is today essentially political and economic. In this sense, the nations of the European continent have some justification in regarding Britain as a non-European power, since she still maintains military bases in the Middle East and Far East, spends 25 per cent of her defence budget east of Suez, and has consequently severely restricted her defence commitments to Europe. Nevertheless Western Europe as a whole is deeply involved in the political fortunes of the uncommitted world. The defence policies of Britain and France today are in part an historical legacy of Europe's world-wide expansion. One reason behind their determination to acquire nuclear weapons was that, for much of the period when the decisions were being made, their manpower resources were employed in South-East Asia and North Africa. Britain is still vulnerable to disturbances in South-East Asia; and further conflicts in Africa could become a drain on the resources of Europe as a whole.

In these circumstances, an American-European partnership is as necessary in the 'third world' as it is in Europe. The European Community is as incapable as the United States of

maintaining its security in isolation. Nor in all probability, would it ever be inclined to ignore the rest of the world: it is doubtful whether Western Europe would be prepared to leave the protection of Western interests in South-East Asia entirely to the United States; and the economic and political involvement of the European countries in Africa and India is likely to grow. Nor would the United States be capable of maintaining the burden of defending the entire non-Communist world for ever by herself. Today she relies entirely on Britain as the guardian of her own as well as European interests across the breadth of the Indian Ocean between Singapore and Aden. If she became increasingly involved in the Far East, her commitment to Europe might itself be weakened. At present American power suffices to contain both the Soviet Union and China; but if a growing number of American troops were needed to preserve the stability of South-East Asia, for instance, a conflict of priorities could develop which might adversely affect the allocation of resources to Europe. Indeed, the United States needs European assistance, and American spokesmen have not hidden their conviction that Western Europe should bear a greater part of the burden of economic aid and military defence than it does at present.

Now that, with the exception of one country, all the NATO powers are rapidly liquidating their colonial past, real collaboration should be much easier to achieve. The period of mutual friction in dealings with Asia and Africa is disappearing. There is little question of outright political or economic rivalries between the European nations, or between them and the United States. Such conflict as may occur will be more probably between economic and political interests, in areas such as the Middle East, when politically unwelcome régimes may be maintained in power for economic or strategic reasons. And this will add to the difficulties which, for historical reasons, the NATO countries already face in their relationships with the newly emergent states. These are normally suspicious of the West and indifferent to its conflicts with the Communist bloc. At the same time they expect the United States and her allies to take the initiative in preventing war from arising out of a conflict in Europe. If they are to understand the problems more clearly, and if the

United Nations Assembly is not, over the next few years, to become a forum of hostility to the Western powers, it is essential for the Europeans to co-operate in the assistance and defence of the outside world.

Such collaboration might mean that the functions of the present alliance would be extended to cover regions outside Europe. The defence of the NATO area could perhaps be co-ordinated with that of CENTO; and more European countries could share in the defence of strategically important points in other parts of the world.

More than this, it might imply in the political field that each wing of the alliance needed the other's help in its own traditional sphere of influence, the United States in Latin America, Europe in Africa. Such collaboration presupposes that a significant proportion of Western Europe's growing resources should be committed outside Europe. But it also means that its political importance, both to the United States and the uncommitted countries, is likely to become greater. In an even closer alliance with the United States, Western Europe is likely to be a more effective power in the world.

It is in this light that the problem of an arms policy for Europe must be considered. The European contribution to western strategic power, the control of western strategy and the defence of Europe, the division of labour between Western Europe and the United States are questions that must be examined in a world-wide context. If Western Europe is to reduce its military vulnerability and profit from its political importance, this can best be achieved through strengthening and reforming NATO, not through any attempt to create a purely European equilibrium.

Comment by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik

It is questionable whether the view of Soviet policies on pp. 56-61 is sufficiently comprehensive, since it is based on the assumption that they are intended to build up national power in a rational way. It should not be ignored that even under Khrushchev, the revolutionary element is still very important and that therefore agreements on the consolidation of spheres of influence can never be more than episodic in character and

may possibly conceal offensive intentions. At present it is too early to assume that Russian policy in Europe has adopted a defensive posture, even if such a tendency appears from time to time in anticipating future troubles in Eastern Europe.

PART TWO

The Scope for Agreement

Chapter 4

Perspectives: American, French, German, British

I

DURING 1962 the countries of the Atlantic Alliance were engaged in a fundamental reappraisal of their future. The acute political differences between them created serious tensions which came to a head at the end of the year. The crisis then arose less from the clash of national ambition than from differing appreciations of the situation in Europe, and of the course of future strategy; and the American offer of a multilateral nuclear force was less an attempt to solve the prolonged debate which has become inevitable than to provide a political and military framework in which to conduct it. For the NATO treaty comes up for revision in 1969. The need for an Atlantic partnership will be as great then as it is now, and if it is to be effectively renewed, the differences within the alliance must soon be resolved. The cost and speed of the arms race; the need to formulate long-term decisions, sometimes years before they can bear fruit; the necessity of adapting the political structure of NATO to the changing balance of power within it, all demand progress towards a more fundamental consensus on objectives. Both the American and the European leaders are aware of this urgency, and if, for the time being, it has thrown their differences of opinion into sharper relief, it has also permitted a clearer understanding of their divergent national perspectives.

The four principal protagonists of the NATO debate, the United States, Germany, France and Britain, differ on the questions of the defence of Europe, the control of NATO strategy, on Soviet intentions and the future role of the European Community. But they themselves are also undergoing radical political reorientations which make it harder to foresee what their policies on these vital issues will be in two or

three years' time. In the United States, there are signs that bipartisan support for foreign policy is in danger of breaking down, and although it is probable that President Kennedy will be re-elected in 1964, he could have considerable difficulty in carrying Congress and the country with him in policies which could be represented as entailing a sacrifice of American interests.

In Europe, the situation is still more obscure. A gradual movement of public opinion towards the parties of the moderate Left has become apparent again, which is now associated with a warmer support for the Atlantic connection (particularly in Britain and Germany) than European conservative parties now manifest. But this trend is in itself one result of a challenge to the stability of government which has arisen in several European countries, while in Britain, an endemic economic weakness has combined with a new sense of uncertainty about the country's future role in Europe and the world.

In Germany, the approaching end of Dr. Adenauer's Chancellorship has for a time immobilised the political system which has been identified with him. His successor will not only have to reconstitute a difficult coalition which contains fundamental disagreements on many important questions of domestic and foreign policy; he will also have to re-examine Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy as a whole. This has been widely questioned in Germany since the Berlin wall was built in August 1961, and the nature of West Germany's relations with Eastern Europe as well as her relationship to France, the European Community and the United States are likely to be re-examined. The new Chancellor will at the same time have to bear in mind the prospect of a general election in 1965.

Under the leadership of President de Gaulle, French policy is more calculable than in Britain or Germany. French support for his leadership was confirmed in the elections of November 1962, and an era of prosperity is likely to reinforce the stability of the country. But the relations of France with her European neighbours are very complex, and her position in Europe is likely to be modified by the changes in the leadership of Germany and of Italy, which is also undergoing a political

reorientation with an increased emphasis on the Atlantic relationship.

In this general context the fundamental questions of alliance policy will have to be answered in the next two or three years. The different national views of these questions which are discussed in this general chapter are liable to change, but the long-term considerations that underlie them seem to be more enduring. At the root of disagreement on strategic matters among the principal NATO powers lies one fundamental question: how to prevent war, while preserving the threat of general war as a deterrent to limited attack in Europe.

II

The American view of these problems must be seen in a wider perspective than that of the European allies. It is a reflection of the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe is the most sensitive sector of a world-wide chain of alliances created by the United States when its strategic superiority was still overwhelming. In some areas, the Far East for instance, this superiority still holds good, and will not be challenged by a potential aggressor in the immediate future. In others, South-East Asia for instance, American policy is evolving more flexible means of dealing with aggression below the level of open war. But in Europe the military power of the United States is most directly challenged, and there is little prospect that a system of defence which would make a sustained conflict below the level of nuclear war into a realistic option would be accepted by the other NATO powers.

The spokesmen of the Kennedy Administration have made their ideas well known. American strategic power is once again greatly superior to that of the Soviet Union and has achieved a fair degree of invulnerability, but American cities and industrial areas are vulnerable to Soviet missile attack (a vulnerability which the Soviet Union appears intent on exploiting with its development of very high-yield warheads). There is not likely to be any reliable defence against missiles in this decade. American strategy must therefore be designed

to convince the Soviet leaders that in spite of the vulnerability of the population, the United States is prepared to fight a thermonuclear war, in the face of a nuclear attack or even a major non-nuclear attack on Europe. On the assumption that Soviet missiles are vulnerable to attack, the United States will maintain her ability to fight a nuclear war by reducing damage to herself (and, in the event of an American first strike, to her allies) to 'acceptable levels' through a series of selective strikes at Soviet bases. The probable cost of a counter-force exchange to the United States is not taken lightly, but it is believed that she would remain in possession of impressive strategic power, after the entire Soviet strategic forces had been either destroyed or used up, and that the Soviet leaders are aware of this. It is on the realisation by the Soviet leaders that the United States could raise the level of destruction, until the Soviet Union had either to sue for peace or risk invoking its own annihilation, that the Administration counts to keep the upper hand in the intricate bargaining of deterrence.

'What we are proposing', said the American Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert McNamara, in his statement to the House Sub-Committee on Defense Appropriations in February 1963, 'is a capability to strike back after absorbing the first blow. . . . By building into our forces a flexible capability, we at least eliminate the prospect that we could strike back in only one way, against the entire Soviet target system, including their cities. Such a prospect would give the Soviet Union no incentive to withhold attack against our cities in a first strike. We want to give them a better alternative.'

'This . . .' said Mr. Alain Enthoven, one of Mr. McNamara's most influential assistants, 'is the most important objective of our nuclear posture: to make thermonuclear war unlikely by deterring deliberate calculated nuclear aggression. We also seek other objectives. We want to make accidental, unpremeditated, irrational nuclear war unlikely also. And if war does occur, we want to be able to bring it to a speedy termination on military terms favourable to ourselves, and we want to do what we can to limit the damage caused to ourselves and our allies.'¹

¹ Address before the Loyola University Forum for International Affairs, Los Angeles, February 10, 1963

There is a certain conflict in American policy here. The concept of a counterforce strategy is well fitted to the deterrence of attack on the United States itself and it can be soundly based on the assumption of an American second strike. But it is more dubious as a protective strategy for Europe, unless the United States is prepared when large-scale hostilities break out, to strike first, and eliminate as many as possible of the bases from which the Soviet Union could shower destruction on Europe. Moreover, the counterforce element in American strategy may eventually die away, as the Soviet nuclear arsenal grows, and becomes more diversified and less vulnerable. Then the uncertainty inherent in a situation where the United States must threaten general war to prevent the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe is likely to grow. But it is here that the second element of the present American strategy comes into play.

President Kennedy, Mr. McNamara and General Taylor have shown an urgent awareness of the need to prevent any European crisis from developing to the point of conflict, and a reasoned conviction that this can only be done by assuring a greater flexibility in Western defence, so that it would be possible if need be to fight for a limited objective without resorting to all-out war. The course of the Berlin crisis in 1961, and general evidence from the events of both 1961 and 1962, has shown that the most effective demonstration of strength takes the form, not of threatening immediate recourse to strategic missiles, but of mobilising and deploying conventional forces. At the same time, there is a strong awareness in the United States, revealed both in the active American concern for disarmament and in discussions of a strategy for Europe, that conflict could arise by accident or miscalculation from competing demonstrations of strength. As a result, the Administration sees in continuous contact and communications between the two Great Powers the political counterpart to the military policy of providing for greater flexibility in conventional defence. They are twin objectives.

But although the outcome of the Cuba crisis in 1962 greatly heightened the credibility of the strategy of controlled strategic response in American eyes, the United States has failed to

convince her European allies of the wisdom of this course. She has not succeeded in overcoming the fear that a renewed emphasis on conventional forces could lead to an American nuclear disengagement from Europe, nor in changing the unwillingness of the European countries to raise enough conventional forces to make the strategy really workable. The American contention that her commitment to Europe is in no way weakening, but that the way in which she fulfils it must alter as the nature of the strategic balance alters, has not been fully accepted.

The increased emphasis on communications between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the open American anxiety to reduce emphasis on the early use of tactical nuclear weapons, have combined to arouse some suspicion in Europe that the United States is, in fact, unwilling to take any risks in resisting piecemeal aggression. This suspicion has been particularly evident in Germany since August 13th, 1961, and it is, in fact, exacerbated by the American determination to keep the conduct of a possible future war firmly under central (American) control. Although the American commitment to Europe and the concern to prevent a local conflict from arising there makes this necessary in American eyes, it implies the ultimate control of European politics. This could be accepted by the Europeans at an earlier stage in the balance of power, when it seemed to hold the promise that the Western Alliance under American leadership would eventually prevail in Europe. It is harder for Europe to accept if it is seen as part of a process of a continuous accommodation of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union, in which a change in the political status of Eastern Europe has been lost sight of.

This double policy, the central control of strategy and political communication with the Soviet Union may be necessary if the United States is to go on defending Europe, but at the same time it is likely to encourage some of the Western European nations in the venture of an independent strategic force, in order to defend their own vital interests which they fear American policy may be in danger of sacrificing bit by bit. And this European reaction increases the American fear that in the event of conflict, inside or outside

Europe, the Soviet Union would be able to strike first at the bases of this European force, which would be too vulnerable to deter a Soviet attack by themselves, yet whose destruction could involve the United States in war.

These fears have emphasised a dichotomy in the American approach to Europe. The American Administration desires to share its great responsibility with the European governments, and is anxious to see the emergence of Western Europe as a new Great Power with which it can deal as an equal. But this desire clashes with a continuing conviction that Western strategy must be centrally controlled in order to avoid nuclear war.

The United States has sought to meet European apprehensions, give the European leaders a voice in the central conduct of strategy, and at the same time retain the ultimate control of deterrent policy by offering a multilateral nuclear force to NATO. Such a force, if it ever comes into being, will be composed of ships armed with nuclear missiles, and manned by crews from several NATO countries. By virtue of their participation, their governments would gain a voice in drawing up the detailed plans of NATO strategy. At the same time, Britain and France have been offered American assistance in creating their own invulnerable deterrent forces, in return for which Britain has agreed to assign them to NATO (except in some hypothetical situation in which 'supreme national interests' oblige her to withdraw them). This offer has so far been rejected by France. General de Gaulle gave the reasons for his refusal in his Press Conference of 14th January 1963. They illuminate fundamental differences of conception between the United States and France, and clarify the French position on this question.

III

Referring to the American action in Cuba, President de Gaulle said: 'The means by which (the United States) had decided to face direct attack whether from Cuba or combined with attacks from another direction, were obviously not committed to the defence of Europe, even if Europe had been attacked. Above all, the deterrent in both Russian and American

hands is of such dimensions that in the event of general nuclear war, the devastation in both countries would inevitably be dreadful, if not mortal.

‘In these conditions no one in the world, and especially in America, could say where, when, how, and in what measure American nuclear weapons would be used to defend Europe. Naturally, American nuclear arms remain the essential guarantee of world peace; and this fact, as well as President Kennedy’s determination in availing himself of it, also appeared in full light during the Cuban crisis.

‘It remains, however, that the American nuclear presence does not necessarily and immediately respond to all the eventualities of concern to Europe and France. For this reason, principles, conditions, and circumstances have led us to the determination to equip ourselves with an atomic force that shall be our own.’¹

President de Gaulle does not accept the American contention that an American force, or even a NATO force under American control, is the best means of deterring a Soviet attack on Europe. Nor does he accept that a European, or a French, force would be ineffective as a deterrent on its own. ‘The French force,’ he said, ‘from the moment it is set on foot, will have the dark and terrible ability to destroy millions and millions of men in a few minutes. This fact cannot fail to influence, at least in some degree, the intentions of any possible aggressor.’

But at the same time the President believes that as long as the Western stand is firm and unequivocal, as long as the Western allies do not waver in their determination to resist any Soviet encroachment, there is no real danger of war in Europe. The Cold War has moved elsewhere, to Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Berlin problem has confirmed him in these views, which were summarised by M. Maurice Schumann, a minister in his government until May 1962, in this way: ‘As long as the U.S.S.R.—which has artificially created the Berlin problem—does not modify its basic position, negotiations can only lead to failure or to gradual capitulation. In the first case we would be aggravating international tension by trying to work towards a *détente*. In the

¹ Press Conference at the Elysée, January 14, 1963

second case, we would be clearing the way for a German-Soviet rapprochement.¹

Both to prevent a gradual capitulation, and to maintain the integration of West Germany in Western Europe, the President believes it is essential at present to refuse any concessions. The time has not yet come to attempt to modify the present situation in the heart of Europe: the actual balance between East and West is too delicate to be tampered with, and he himself has emphasised that 'any negotiations on this matter would risk bringing about a withdrawal of the West and aggravating the danger'.²

But though there is less risk of conflict in an unswerving Western stand in Europe than in possible negotiations, the President does not hide his apprehensions that, for the United States, the defence of Europe 'has passed into the background'³ and neither he nor any likely successor is prepared to entrust the survival and destiny of France permanently to the President of the United States. France has embarked on a long-term nuclear programme which is intended to provide a workable deterrent based on MRBMs armed with thermonuclear warheads, and capable of being launched either from land or from nuclear submarines by about 1970. This is not in itself conceived directly as a challenge to the American leadership of the Alliance. Indeed, many Frenchmen regard it as a means of assuring the solidarity of the alliance. '... the surest way in the long run of ruining the credit of the "Grand Alliance" in the eyes of the French people would be to let them believe that from now on there were two categories of allies: those who were the sole possessors of deterrent weapons, and those who were entitled to possess only conventional weapons.'⁴

The general view in France is that the American commitment to Europe must be maintained after 1970 and that American missiles must continue to be stationed there. But this force must be supplemented by a small but independent

¹ Maurice Schumann, 'France and Germany' in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1962

² Press Conference of May 15, 1962

³ Press Conference of January 14, 1963

⁴ Maurice Schumann, 'France and Germany', *loc. cit.*

European programme, in order to prevent the Soviet leaders from ever calculating that they could launch a surprise attack on Western Europe independently of the United States. They must not be allowed to gamble that the American President might not, after all, choose to respond, but must be left in no doubt that a European force would itself retaliate on their territory. Western Europe is not itself widely thought of in France as third force. But there may be greater support for the French President's conception of an eventual independent equilibrium between the two halves of Europe.

It is not Western Europe that is envisaged as a separate and independent power, it is rather that the restoration of greater Europe must be one day accomplished independently of the United States. President de Gaulle's attitude is an extension of his earlier approach to the question of disengagement. In his famous press conference of March 1959 he insisted that any zone of military withdrawal would have to be 'as near to the Urals as to the Atlantic'. By opposing, at the same time, the neutralisation of Germany, he made it clear that he was not contemplating a wide area of disengagement in the centre of Europe, but rather a Soviet withdrawal from the East. He did not at that stage mention a Europe 'from the Urals to the Atlantic', but merely a demilitarised zone, which, from the formula employed, appears to have meant essentially Poland. In the press conference of May 1962, however, President de Gaulle revealed the development of his ideas more plainly. On the solidarity of France and Germany, he said, depended 'the destiny of the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Because if in the West of Europe a structure, a firm, prosperous, attractive organisation, could be created, then the possibility of a European balance with the Eastern State would reappear, and the prospect would also reappear of a truly European co-operation, particularly if the same totalitarian régime ceased to poison the springs. In such a case, one could, and should, I believe, solve the German problem in an objective way. . . .' President de Gaulle apparently considered that, if the totalitarian nature of the Soviet régime were to be modified, the Russians would be encouraged to seek co-operation with a Western European bloc. Such a solution would be very far away, but other statements of the President

indicate a certain hope that, eventually, caught between China and the United States, the Soviet Union will come to recognise her true identity as a European power. If Western Europe were by then a truly independent power, not a mere adjunct to the United States, the basis for a properly European co-operation would be laid. This would not necessarily mean the end of Atlantic co-operation, but it would certainly imply that Western Europe was independent of American strategic power and American leadership, and capable of dealing as an equal with the Soviet Union.

The French *force de frappe* would then be more than a minor strategic contribution, designed to involve the United States in repelling an attack on Western Europe; it would become a major diplomatic instrument in determining the future of the whole continent. Such a course would obviously not be possible if the danger of central war appeared at all real, but it does not. President de Gaulle believes that, in the short term, the balance in Europe is secure. And in the long term, he is concerned to win for Western Europe the ability to treat with the Soviet Union for a European settlement which the Russian leaders will also recognise as being in their best interests.

In the short term, his conflict with the United States would seem therefore to be a matter of tactics rather than fundamentals. But, because he believes that, unless his tactics are pursued, the Western alliance is in danger of gradually capitulating to the Soviet Union, and so clearing the way to a Soviet-German rapprochement, he is concerned above all to bind France and Germany together as closely as possible. And he is forced to challenge the United States in the relations between France and Germany. It is too early, in the first months of 1963, to see the future course of German relations with France and the United States. But the association with France has given Germany a wider room for manoeuvre than its position in the narrow field of the Cold War had hitherto permitted.

IV

No one in any of Dr. Adenauer's governments has ever been prepared to risk the security of Germany through a separate

arrangement with the Soviet Government, even for the prize of reunification. And there has been no sign, even when the Soviet Union was wooing Germany, as at the end of 1961, that the former would ever tolerate reunification on any terms which the Federal Republic could possibly accept. At best, the price would have to be the dissolution of the military alliance with the United States and it is obvious to the Soviet leaders that this is out of the question. The SPD, which so long continued to hope that reunification could eventually be achieved through a new relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union, was forced to recognise in 1960 that Mr. Khrushchev had given up all thought of this in the interest of his wider strategy. Yet at the same time, no German has, in the interests of security, abandoned the hope of reunification, and there are signs that the Berlin crisis of the last few years has added new determination to their hopes. And the American bearing in the crisis of 1961 has increased public criticism of the ambiguities of the Adenauer policy: the promise of an ultimate Russian retreat before the growing strength of Germany made the Soviet Union more determined than ever to settle the German question, while the vulnerability of the United States induced a new caution in dealing with Russia over Berlin. As a result, German public opinion has become aware that the Alliance has brought security but can do nothing to hasten reunification; that it is still dangerous to contemplate a separate agreement with the Soviet Union, yet that it is only by the grace of Russia's rulers that East Germany will ever be freed; that a choice must be made between identification with the Western Alliance and the recovery of the Eastern provinces. But stronger than this awareness is a fear that even the *status quo* may not be safe, that if the United States does not display 'firmness' the security of the Federal Republic as a whole might be undermined in the same way that, in some eyes, the Western position in Berlin has been undermined.

The sentiment has found concrete expression in two somewhat contradictory tendencies. The first, in the strategic field, is to insist on an early nuclear response to aggression and to work towards an increasing identification of interest between the American and European sections of the alliance. The second, in the political field, is to create a particularist

European alliance within the alliance, to build a still stronger relationship with France, and to oppose Franco-German policies to those, as they are conceived, of Britain and the United States, particularly as they affect Berlin.

In the first field, the official German view has been that while the new relationship between the two giants has imposed the need for a more flexible military posture in Western Europe, this must not be allowed to degenerate into a nuclear retreat. If the theoretic vulnerability of the United States were to tempt the Soviet Union to take greater risks in Europe, the feasibility of a limited response must be increased, but the ultimate risks of Russian policy must be made plain to the Russians themselves. Thus for anything more than a minor frontier incident (whether intended as a probe or not), the chief task of the West is not to 'raise the atomic threshold', in the sense of heightening the level or intensity of conflict at which nuclear weapons would be introduced into the battle, but to raise the risks of nuclear war itself. To emphasise the dangers of escalation from a tactical nuclear conflict to general war will not reduce but increase the credibility of the deterrent. To insist on interposing a prolonged conventional conflict for fear of escalation would, on the other hand, destroy Russia's belief in the American will to act. The Western forces must have a free choice of response in any situation that might arise. Herr Strauss, who dominated German defence policy until 1962, expounded these views in two interviews with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on August 3rd and 9th, 1962. The implications of this attitude are that, since the United States is the only NATO power which produces and possesses tactical nuclear weapons, Germany will grow more dependent on her than she is now. No European grouping must be allowed to weaken the identity of interest between the United States and the Federal Republic, and the most healthy future for the European Community would be to develop into a wider Atlantic system. It is too early to tell whether Herr Strauss's successor as Minister of Defence, Herr von Hassel, will continue his policies in the strictly military field. But there is unlikely to be any change in the appreciation of a Germany's fundamental strategic interests. In spite of the disagreements that have become apparent on the most effective

means of defending Europe, these will continue to demand a close alliance with the United States.

The close German association with France that has been pursued with vigour since 1958 and which was crowned by the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, does not arise from these disagreements. In spite of the superficial resemblance between the defence policies of Germany and France, the position of Germany is in many respects closer to that of the United States than to that of France. Disagreements with the United States have arisen because the German Government felt that changes in American policy were threatening the close identity of interests between the Federal Republic and the United States, not because this identity has ceased.

But there is felt to be a clash of interests in the diplomatic field, and here the Federal Republic has found its intimate connection with France of great value. Fearing the effects of American political flexibility as much as Herr Strauss did those of changes in strategic doctrine, Dr. Adenauer has been equally anxious to shore up the *status quo*. In this his most natural partner has been the French President, whose contempt for Russian intimidation and whose confidence in Western ability to ignore it have been clear and consistent. Since 1958 it is no exaggeration to say that the French and German Governments have been continually opposed to Anglo-American initiatives in the Berlin question, and even in other negotiations with the Soviet Union. For the future, the European Community is clearly regarded by both leaders as a separate political entity, which will not always follow the lead of the United States, and could only be merged into a wider Atlantic partnership on some basis of European-American parity.

Meanwhile, the view has been gaining ground among Dr. Adenauer's governmental colleagues that the rigid policies of the Federal Republic towards the Eastern European bloc are no longer tenable. The government that succeeds his seems likely to embark on a more flexible course involving closer communications, and perhaps even diplomatic relations, with the Communist countries.¹ Neither the Chancellor nor any possible successor is willing to run any

¹ See F. R. Allemann, 'Adenauer's Eastern Policy' in *Survey*, October 1962

risk of disrupting the American alliance. But the position of Germany, a purely European power whose political and geographical situation makes her a vital partner in any agreement between the two world powers, is very difficult. The problems that arise from her situation between the two blocs were exemplified in 1962 by the recall of her two ambassadors in Moscow and Washington after both had gravely embarrassed the Federal Government—by advocating contradictory policies. Dr. Adenauer's successors may find themselves confronted with an increasingly awkward and pressing choice between greater identification with the United States on the basis of an Atlantic Community or greater independence in treating with the Soviet Union on the basis of Western European solidarity. This choice is not an immediate one: the European Community will clearly take longer to develop into a true political entity than was expected when the Franco-German Treaty was being drawn up. But if the Community becomes an independent centre of power, the choice can scarcely be avoided, and different currents of opinion are already discernible in Germany which in themselves could have a strong influence on the future role of Western Europe.

V

Thoughtful people in Germany tend to favour Britain's eventual entry into the Community for these reasons. Not only could Britain add significant political and military strength to the Community: she could also prove a valuable instrument for co-ordinating the political and strategic policies of Western Europe with those of the United States. There is, moreover, strong support inside Britain for such a role. British policy in the past has been above all anxious to avoid a choice between Europe and the United States, not only because the strategic posture and political standing of the United Kingdom have been based on intimate co-operation with the United States, but because a European challenge to the American leadership of the West is generally regarded in Britain as impracticable, undesirable and dangerous.

This readiness to accept American leadership arises partly from the fact that although Britain is rapidly becoming more

a European power, she is still accustomed to think as a world power. She is still deeply involved—with strong American encouragement—in South-East Asia, and in the test-ban and disarmament negotiations. In these and other spheres, the British Government has long recognised that, though it might discuss policy with the United States, it must follow where it cannot convince. Similarly, it does not view European problems in primarily European terms, unlike Germany, or even France; and it is widely felt in Whitehall that Central Europe is the least likely place where war might occur. But at the same time British opinion appears now to have abandoned any hope that the United Kingdom could act as a potential intermediary between the two Great Powers, independently of the views of Germany and France; and the increasing range of nuclear weapons has robbed of reality any earlier hopes that a limited settlement of European problems could be achieved by separating the opposing forces.

Britain is thus likely to play a more orthodox role in European matters than she was previously inclined to. There is little hope left even in the Labour Party for a non-nuclear club, or of a withdrawal in Europe along the lines of the Rapacki Plan, although the party still considers these ideas sympathetically. In its reply in March 1962 to U Thant's circular on the possibilities of creating a 'non-nuclear club', the British Government stressed its view 'that restrictions on the freedom of governments to deploy, or to accept the deployment on their territories of, nuclear weapons, can only be useful in the context of a wider agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union'. This was not the result of a new political caution in relations with the European Community. It seems to date rather from the failure of Mr. Macmillan's initiatives in 1959 and of the Geneva conference of that year. In February 1960, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, spoke of European apprehensions that British policy was 'too ready to compromise, and too ready to take chances with the Communist powers'. Emphasising the Government's full commitment to NATO, he declared that no discrimination against any NATO power in the interests of an agreement with the Soviet Union was tolerable, and that Germany would have to have the same weapons made

available to her as other NATO countries had at their disposal. By all the evidence, this represented a change from the tenor of the Macmillan-Khrushchev conversation a year before, and there is no question of a reversion to those ideas.

On the contrary, the British Government seems to have decided, after the Nassau meeting and the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations, that the best hope of ending the country's dilemma between the United States and Europe, and of maintaining a close association with Europe, lay in NATO. From having placed especial emphasis on her existing relationship with Washington and her developing relationship with Western Europe, Britain is becoming an enthusiastic champion of an integrated alliance. A Labour Government, which would probably abandon the development of strategic nuclear weapons, would probably also place even greater weight on NATO. Britain has not overcome all the difficulties of her position and a certain conflict is still apparent in her political and strategic policies. She has been forced to associate with Europe within the framework of NATO, but her defence policy does not yet match this. The dangers of an accidental or miscalculated explosion in Europe have been taken as seriously in the British political appraisal as they have in the American. Indeed, it is just because the United Kingdom has been a nuclear power for six years or more, four of them in close association with the United States, that the dangers of a nuclear confrontation are more vividly appreciated in London than in some European capitals. But, as a vulnerable economic power, whose continuing non-European commitments and lack of resources to meet the financial strain involved in keeping strong ground and air forces on the continent, impose the need to justify reliance on a nuclear deterrent for the defence of Europe, Britain cannot fully accept the implications of current American policy in terms of forces in Europe. The Government's public declarations repeat the view that is associated more generally with continental spokesmen that nuclear weapons in Europe suffice to deter all forms of war. Thus the Government has shown that it shares the same approach to general strategy as the United States, but is unable to help the United States translate it into practice—as many Americans noted with a certain

bitterness when Britain did not follow the American lead in significantly reinforcing her ground troops in Europe during the Berlin crisis of 1961.

This conflict between the political approach and the strategic commitments of the British Government has proved embarrassing in the past and will certainly complicate the country's relations with the European Community in the future. As long as Britain regarded the Anglo-American entente as a different political entity from NATO, and as long as this entente was based on a world-wide American strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, there was no conflict between these attitudes. Now the paradoxes will become more clear. The defence policy of the British Government relies on American strategic power which might not always suffice to deter a limited Russian aggression and for that reason is also most likely to arouse European competition. But though Britain is now attempting to bind the European Community as closely as possible to NATO, she is not yet ready herself to acquiesce in the measures demanded by the Kennedy Administration to achieve a greater flexibility of defence in NATO. At the same time she does not share the attitude of France and Germany towards the Berlin question, and although the government feels that Europe is a less dangerous field of confrontation than other areas, British opinion in general takes the potential dangers of the *status quo* as seriously as President Kennedy's advisers.

Britain is thus likely to feel the clash of interests and policies within the Alliance more immediately than any other European country. But in spite of her commitments outside Europe, and her close relations with the United States, it is out of the question that she could attempt again to play a role in the world independently of Europe. And in spite of the limited part she has at present, she could clearly have a great influence in drawing the two halves of the alliance closer together.

Chapter 5

Arms Control: The Geographical Approach

I

THE creation of the European Economic Community has greatly reinforced the internal stability of its member countries. Its advantages, the improvement of economic opportunities and social conditions, a new political security, the friendship of nations that have hitherto been traditional enemies, are clear to all the countries concerned.

The integration of Western Europe does, however, carry certain risks which have also become apparent. The underlying danger is that of a permanent hostility between the two halves of the European civilisation. In the circumstances of a strategic deadlock such enmity could prove dangerous to the stability of Europe. The military confrontation could become more vulnerable to sudden conflict, and if it did deteriorate in this way, the two Europes would be divided still more deeply. While it may be impossible to prevent the progressive integration of the two camps for an indefinite period, an arms policy for Europe should strive to make their coexistence as secure as possible and even encourage a closer understanding and communication between them.

A number of proposals were put forward during the 1950s for promoting an easier military and political coexistence through the creation of a safety zone between the two camps. Some sections of British opinion, accustomed perhaps to the concept of buffer-states, regard 'safety zones' as traditional and natural. But in fact precedents are very rare. In a very few cases they have been set up within the framework of a treaty. This was true of Belgium before 1914. Occasionally they have been self-proclaimed, as in the case of Holland and Denmark before 1940. None of these experiments proved very effective, and the memories of their failure have lingered in

Europe. This is one reason why the Rapacki proposals were in general rejected by European opinion outside Britain.

Plans for disengagement, or even more modest measures of demilitarisation, also encountered other difficulties in the 1950s. Political and technical developments, which have been considered in Part One, imposed requirements which no agreement could altogether have satisfied. But although European governments do not in general consider that the fundamentals of the situation have changed, the geographical approach to an arms control policy still merits re-examination; and many independent thinkers believe that in any case disengagement or demilitarisation could be a more fruitful policy in the 1960s than it was a decade ago.

In any event it is true that conditions now differ in one important respect from those of the mid-1950s. Europe need have no part now in the strategic confrontation of the Soviet Union and the United States. This was not true even in 1958 when Mr. Khrushchev began the era of missile diplomacy. At that time the Soviet Union was still incapable of doing extensive damage to American territory; and the United States still needed European bases for the greater part of her strategic bomber force.¹ Today the two powers face each other across the North Pole, and are directly vulnerable, on a scale unknown even in 1958, to each other's bombers and missiles.

The nature of disengagement in Europe has changed in consequence. American weapons threaten the Soviet Union directly from the continental United States or from the sea: the Soviet Union, with its intercontinental missiles and high-yield warheads, no longer relies on the threat of seizing Europe as a deterrent to American attack. In theory the United States could defend her allies in Europe without having a single soldier there.

For these reasons, disengagement would appear in theory to be a more workable proposition now than at any time in the past. The withdrawal of American troops across three thousand miles of ocean would not, as in the past, leave Western Europe helpless before a Russian attack; the military balance would in theory remain unimpaired, and Western Europe

¹ The United States had not yet installed MRBMs in Europe, although the decision to do so had been taken at the end of 1957

could itself, if it chose, develop the forces to replace the four hundred thousand American soldiers who had left. Even so, would the Soviet Union show any desire for a reunited Germany, which had strong links with the Western Alliance, which, even if its military power were no longer committed to NATO, still remained a member of the European Economic Community, and which would presumably take a full part in the political development of Western Europe? If the strategic balance were indeed unchanged, Soviet interest in any such prospect would be even less than hitherto.

But if the withdrawal of American troops were mooted without the reunification of Germany, it would command little or no support in Germany or the rest of Western Europe. There would be serious political and psychological repercussions, notably in Germany, but also in West Europe as a whole. The commitment of American troops to Europe represents a visible proof of continuing American support, and this might appear to be lost without any resultant gain. The situation would be intolerable for the Europeans, unless they themselves developed such strategic power that they could conduct their own intimate dialogue with the Soviet Union. This would mean not only that the European powers had lost their fears of being exposed to a renewed Soviet offensive while the American forces were three thousand miles away; it would also imply an understanding that Russia had developed a permanent interest in European stability and a theory of stable coexistence with capitalist neighbours, for which no evidence yet exists.

It is unlikely that any European government would feel today that the new strategic balance permitted the withdrawal of American forces. And in practice the prospect of a strategic deadlock gives the two super-powers an increased interest in Europe. Because both are open to an attack from each other, it is not enough for them to possess an armoury of strategic missiles to defend their interests all over the world. The ability to respond with the appropriate means to different forms of encroachment or attack requires the presence of ground forces in many sectors of the world, and nowhere is this more true than in Europe, where the situation has always been particularly delicate.

The presence of these forces in Europe provides, in fact, an element of stability in the relationship between the two powers. Neither of them needs Europe as a strategic base, but a stable strategic relationship between the two alliances requires not only that the two leading powers are able to deter each other's missile threats, but that they are able to choose their response to more limited threats from a diversified arsenal of battle weapons, both conventional and nuclear. The withdrawal of their forces from Europe, far from giving greater stability, could make the strategic relationship dangerously volatile. And even a limited withdrawal, if it left a vacuum in the heart of Europe, could be dangerous, unless the security of the whole region were confirmed by wider agreements between the two powers.

II

It is generally feared in Western Europe that any agreement on the limited withdrawal of forces in Central Europe would hold considerable disadvantages for the Western powers, both for geographical and political reasons. Not only does the Soviet Union have great geographical advantages in Europe over the United States, but the Russian leaders also have a greater freedom and wider room for manoeuvre than their American adversaries. In command of a centralised state and a centralised alliance, they will always be able to act more quickly and with less compunction to exploit their opponents' difficulties. Such action can no longer be resisted by threat of general war alone, but, as the Berlin crises have revealed, the readiness to fight a general war must be demonstrated by immediate readiness to fight on the ground. Indeed, the ability and determination to use ground forces for local defence is to-day a cardinal element of United States deterrent policy. And the Soviet Union has shown a similar determination never to let its ground forces in Europe be outstripped by those of the West. 'Unfortunately,' Mr. Khrushchev told the meeting which commemorated the German attack on Russia, on June 21st, 1961, 'to our appeal to compete in the production of material and spiritual values, the imperialist powers respond by increasing military appropriations, by increas-

ing the numerical strength of their armed forces. This might make it imperative for the Soviet Union to increase likewise appropriations for armaments, to strengthen and improve our defences, and our armed forces so as to ensure peace and peaceful coexistence, relying on our might'.

As long as the Soviet Union and the United States maintain large ground forces in Europe a limited withdrawal from the centre becomes more difficult. As long as the Soviet Union has greater political freedom of action and greater geographical mobility, the NATO forces will need to be kept well forward. For these military reasons, the Western powers will probably continue to oppose disengagement unless it forms part of a much more comprehensive agreement on disarmament, which would allow both American and Russian troops to leave Europe without the danger that they might suddenly return.

In such circumstances, the withdrawal of the forces of the two Great Powers could still lead to a period of instability in international relations. This would be acceptable and worthwhile if it was recognised as the precondition to a greater stability and the reunification of the continent. But in the absence of a disarmament agreement, the withdrawal of the Soviet and American armies from the centre of Europe would probably present more dangers than advantages. It would create an area of instability at the heart of the Cold War, and both sides would be constantly tempted to return. The advantage of the present situation is that the rigid confrontation of East and West prevents miscalculations which would otherwise tempt the forces of one to steal a march on the other. If this security were to be sacrificed, it would need to be for the sake of concrete gains, which could hardly be realised without a fundamental change in the relations between the two sides. For these military reasons, and also because they fear the effects of any arrangement which could lead to a Soviet-German rapprochement, the Western powers will probably continue to oppose disengagement. For political reasons too, the Soviet Union appears uninterested in any such plan. The Soviet Government is opposed to any policy of reunifying Germany, and has repeatedly demanded instead that the Western powers should recognise the existence of two German states. On this basis there is no chance of agreement on a

neutralised area in the centre of Europe, unless the two Great Powers agreed between themselves to keep Germany forcibly divided. This would imply that though they might withdraw their troops from most of the Continent, they would still be obliged to man an armed frontier running through Germany, while behind this frontier two German states would be required to disarm and renounce their hopes of reunification. Such a concerted Diktat between the two Great Powers is obviously unthinkable at present, and would in any case be completely unacceptable to Germany. It would destroy the alliance between the Federal Republic and the United States and perhaps disrupt Western Europe. Hitherto German opinion has given the claims of security and Western integration priority over those of reunification. This choice could be reversed overnight if the Western powers themselves appeared to sacrifice the possibility of reunification.

Neither a withdrawal from the centre, nor a withdrawal from behind an armed frontier would be acceptable to either side at present. Disengagement, which in the 1950s was widely thought of as a solution to the problems of the European confrontation, and is still so regarded by some people, can, in fact, only come about as a result of wider agreements. It can only be the effect, not the cause, of a change in the relations between the two camps; and until such a change occurs, a withdrawal is more likely to disturb than stabilise the international situation.

III

If the wider perspectives of disengagement are excluded, more limited arrangements in Central Europe lose much of the political interest which was attached to them in the past. Proposals, for example, for denuclearising agreed areas have been welcomed by sections of opinion in the West, and particularly perhaps in Britain, as a first step towards the ultimate possibility of disengagement. It is for this reason that the idea of denuclearised zones enjoys a certain popularity, which in 1962 was revived by the outcome of the Cuban crisis.

It is very important, said the late Mr. Hugh Gaitskell in the House of Commons on the 30th October 1962, to ex-

amine the various proposals for nuclear-free zones and possibly the reduction, at any rate of bases, always provided that this does not upset the balance of security between the two sides. We have many times urged upon the House the importance of trying to establish in Central Europe a zone of controlled disarmament. I feel that if we could have such a zone, nuclear free, with proper inspection, this would not only be a pilot scheme of disarmament under international control but would serve to reduce tension and the danger of surprise attack.

But if, in fact, there is no real chance of disengagement without a much more fundamental agreement between the two sides, proposals for denuclearised zones should be considered not for the psychological or political expectations they arouse, but for their value in stabilising the military situation. In this respect, they must be judged by two distinct criteria. In the first place, an agreement on denuclearised zones was originally proposed in an attempt to prevent nuclear weapons from being used in certain regions. These were as vulnerable as any other to the nuclear bomber, but if no short-range nuclear weapons were installed within the zones, they would at least be safe from nuclear ground attack. In the second place, if short-range nuclear weapons were removed from the forward areas on either side there would be less danger of their being used irresponsibly in case of some incidental embroilment.

When the Rapacki Plan, which in itself only endorsed earlier Soviet proposals that had been advanced by Mr. Gromyko, was first put forward in October 1957, the first of these criteria was already becoming irrelevant. In the same month that Mr. Rapacki first made his proposal, the Soviet Union launched the first *sputnik*. A Russian ICBM had already been fired. The whole surface of the earth would soon be vulnerable to sudden missile attack; and in Europe the decision to introduce MRBMs that was taken in principle at the NATO heads of government meeting in December 1957 emphasised that targets or populations anywhere on the continent could be annihilated with scarcely any more warning than in the case of tactical nuclear weapons. It was clear that

the Western European countries could be covered by Soviet MRBMs stationed inside the Soviet Union. The creation of a nuclear-free zone would not have affected them—nor the *Polaris* missile systems, whose construction the United States already had well under way, and which came into service in 1960.

By itself a denuclearised zone in the centre of Europe has never offered any real security (unless the undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against such a zone, as is proposed in the Rapacki Plan, could be so considered). The most that can be said is that such an agreement would remove a number of potential targets from specified areas and offer a minimal protection to their populations in this way. But it is hard to believe that the diplomacy of the Warsaw Pact has for so long propagated such a scheme for reasons such as this. It is clear that as long as Western defensive power is concentrated in the centre of Europe in the form of tactical nuclear weapons, Soviet diplomacy will probably continue, off and on, to stress the value of a nuclear withdrawal. And if by this means, the Western powers could be induced to ratify the division of Germany, two prime objectives would be achieved at once. Denuclearisation cannot assure absolute security from nuclear attack to any region of Europe, and the Western powers should understand the political element in Soviet motives if the proposals of recent years are revived again.

Nevertheless it is possible that a denuclearised zone for which the basis already exists could eventually offer greater stability in Europe. No part of the Continent would be safe from a nuclear attack in the event of war, and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from a large zone in the centre would hardly provide safeguards against surprise attack. The security of Europe would continue to depend on the overall relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. But it could be argued that the stability of their position in Europe could perhaps be strengthened by the creation of a nuclear-free zone. There would be less danger that nuclear weapons could be brought needlessly into play by local commanders, and there would be a better chance that in the event of conflict the supreme commander (of either alliance) could evaluate the needs and responses of the moment without initiating action that might lead to an all-out war. A de-

nuclearised zone could gain time, for evaluation and consultation, both within and between the alliances, and it would help to ensure that the decision to use nuclear weapons remained with the supreme civilian authority, and not the local commanders.

There are already stringent safeguards in the NATO system against the irresponsible use of tactical nuclear weapons. Since all launchers and warheads are American, the United States has been able to devise an effective security system. All warheads are stored in special ammunition sites, which are guarded by contingents from the NATO countries concerned, but to which only American officers on a permanent alert hold the keys. Before the warheads can be distributed to the launching crews, SACEUR must have the permission of the President of the United States. When the warheads have been distributed, the control system for their employment is still so intricate, depending on a network of coded control and notification procedures, that a divisional, or even a corps commander, would find it difficult to launch them without authorisation. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that collusion or violence among the responsible officers could countermand higher orders. This is not a very likely danger, but it is taken seriously enough for the American Administration to have requested the development of an electronic lock or 'permissive link' which would make it impossible to fire any missile until a coded electronic message from SHAPE had released the trigger mechanism. This development might cast doubt on the value of small battlefield nuclear weapons which to be effective must be used on the judgement of the local commander. In that case the defence of Europe would be based primarily on longer-range weapons and a *de facto* nuclear-free zone could come into existence.

Moreover, an unofficial demilitarised zone, a few kilometres wide, still exists between the two camps in the Central Area. No nuclear weapons are kept immediately behind the line on either: no commander would risk the possibility of their being captured in the first hours of a conventional surprise attack or in some fracas, short of war, on the line of the Iron Curtain. So that, in fact, a limited denuclearised zone already exists in Central Europe.

In 1955 an essential element of the Eden Plan was the extension of such a zone, and the idea is still worth exploring. But it is not yet a practicable possibility. The military arguments against a formal non-nuclear zone seem at present to be convincing. The forward strategy which is NATO's official doctrine depends on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, even to hold a line west of Munich and the Fulda gap. If a more extensive denuclearised zone were created it would have to be in the complete assurance that the Soviet forces were unable to mount a surprise attack; and that, if they nevertheless attacked limited objectives with conventional forces, the Western powers would be able to resist them by conventional means alone. But until these conditions are created, it would seem that Western security depends on the deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons with at least some of the forward forces (see Chapter 7).

It is equally difficult to rely on nuclear-armed aircraft alone to guard against a sudden ground attack. Enemy forces cannot be allowed the time to develop such a rhythm of attack that they could mix with the defence and so prevent defensive nuclear action. But aircraft would not be able to react quickly enough to prevent an enemy advance in this way. It is for this reason that short-range ground weapons have been developed and deployed to forward commands, in order to facilitate their rapid use. Only in this way has it been possible to create genuine direct support forces which can be adapted to the fluctuations of the battlefield. It is a preoccupation with the tactical necessity of quick reaction that has led to the introduction of increasingly light weapons like the *Davy Crockett* which may have to be deployed down to battalions. At the same time aircraft and longer-range weapons provide an indirect support: they would attack the targets chosen to destroy the rear lines of the enemy and isolate the field of battle. They could have great value in destroying the enemy reserves and supplies, but since their intervention will certainly have been foreseen, any initial attack would have been preceded by a massing of forces at the front which would be enough to throw back the defence.

If these tactical nuclear weapons were entirely withdrawn in the interests of creating a denuclearised zone it would be

very difficult to bring them up again in the event of a surprise attack, or even in a period of acute tension. If it were known that they were being brought forward, the enemy would be tempted to carry out large-scale interdiction strikes, and it would be much more difficult to limit any conflict. Unless a system of guarantees against surprise attack could be devised and implemented, the creation of a denuclearised zone, far from providing a safeguard, could lead to quicker escalation.

At the same time, however, the threat of escalation may lose some of its deterrent effect in the coming years. Tactical nuclear weapons can only be relied on to fight a limited war because the two Great Powers are so vulnerable to each other's strategic weapons. It is only because the Western powers rely on the Soviet Union to disengage herself from a limited operation—to avoid a missile exchange—that tactical nuclear weapons can be used at all. If not they would be certain to involve the destruction of the whole of Central Europe, even if the conflict did not spread to strategic weapons. Similarly, the Soviet Union could only attack if it were convinced that the ultimate threat of its strategic weapons was enough to impose a limited defeat on the West. In other words the commitment to use tactical weapons implies the risk of a strategic missile exchange, and the actual use implies that neither side is ready to accept defeat at a tactical level of conflict—but it also implies that both are probably willing to accept a stalemate. As the two powers become increasingly vulnerable to a missile exchange, it will be more difficult to imagine that either would be the first to invoke the process of escalation, even as a deterrent to the other.

But as long as escalation remains a great probability, the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons must be made at a very high level. If not, the danger persists that the enemy could seize the initiative in a long-range exchange. Yet the combat requirements of nuclear weapons demand that they be deployed as far forward, and devolved to as low a level of command, as possible. For Soviet tactical doctrine at present envisages a system of massive attacks mounted at great speed by a combination of armour and mobile forces which would enable the Russian army to penetrate in patches up to about 200 kilometres and ensure that the divisions of the two sides

were so confused that no short-range nuclear weapons could be used. The only way to prevent this danger is to maintain a system of tactical nuclear firepower which could be used very rapidly and furnish direct support from the outset.

This makes it extremely difficult to control the use of these weapons. Moreover, the introduction of low-yield nuclear weapons is beginning to create an unbroken spectrum of missile firepower, which extends from the *Davy Crockett*, which is thought to have explosive power of $\frac{1}{4}$ kiloton, through *Honest John* of several kilotons, and *Sergeant* of 20 kilotons and a range of 85 miles, and longer-range missiles like *Pershing* to interdiction weapons such as *Mace* which can carry warheads of several hundred kilotons more than 1,000 miles behind the area of engagement and invite the responsive use of MRBMs. Thus, as it becomes easier to introduce nuclear weapons into the combat, so it becomes more difficult to arrest the process of escalation from the *Davy Crockett* to the MRBM. Military experts differ in their appreciation of this risk, but they are all conscious that it exists.

According to the context of the conflict in which they are used battlefield nuclear weapons can thus be seen as the surest agents of escalation or as the most effective means of fighting a limited war. But their very effectiveness is the most powerful argument for the creation of a nuclear-free zone. As the distinction between short- and long-range nuclear combat becomes more difficult to draw it becomes the more imperative to preserve as a safeguard against the dangers of beginning an all-out nuclear exchange. If the differences between the categories of weapons are no longer sufficient to impose such a distinction, there are good reasons for using a geographical basis. In fact, a nuclear-free zone, of limited depth, would be the best protection against the dangers and ambiguities of the present situation in which the Western powers are forced to rely on nuclear firepower. But it is at present pointless to contemplate a simple proposal of the Rapacki type as a solution to these problems. The withdrawal of weapons from the Western side would obviously be a much greater concession than an equivalent gesture in the East. As long as the battle-worthiness of the NATO ground forces is low, and the Soviet Union is able to reinforce its European positions as speedily

and as massively as it still can, the Western powers would always be exposed to the threat of sudden ground attack which they would have no means of preventing except by deep interdiction in Eastern Europe. A large denuclearised zone is in consequence only practicable when it forms part of a wider system of safeguards against surprise attack. Purely as a safeguard against accidents, which can in any case be prevented by other means, the price outweighs the gain.

IV

The connection between denuclearisation and the prevention of a surprise attack must be clearly appreciated. Unless the Western powers can be sure that there is no danger of a surprise attack, they cannot be expected to sacrifice their own security in return for a nuclear-free zone, which would mean no great sacrifice to the Soviet Union, but could be highly dangerous to the West. Those people and parties in Western Europe who support a denuclearised zone along the lines of the Rapacki Plan do so precisely because they believe that any realistic enforcement plan would impose a limited disengagement on Central Europe, not because they believe that in itself it ensures the security of Europe, or because they regard the Rapacki Plan, as those who framed it perhaps did, as an alternative to disengagement.

It is probably true that the creation of a denuclearised zone would impose an almost complete demilitarisation within its limits, if it were to be at all effective, since the confidence of both sides in any arrangement for denuclearisation would depend on a very thorough system of inspection, and this would make it almost impossible to maintain effective military defence systems within the zone at all.

The problem of inspection is becoming more complex as nuclear weapons become smaller and more diversified. To verify the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from any particular region, it would be necessary to set up teams of inspectors with wide powers. Even if they were armed with the power to inspect all units at any time, they could still not be certain that no nuclear arms were concealed. But they would be certain to acquire a very thorough knowledge of the

deployment and disposition of the opposing armies, including all conventional forces. It would be almost impossible for the commanders to hide their combat arrangements from them, and this is a risk that, even with an unimpeachably neutral inspectorate, neither allied command would be prepared to take.

It is possible that the techniques of inspection by sampling which have been proposed by the United States in connection with general and complete disarmament might be applicable to the more limited problem of Europe, but short of this, the effectiveness of inspection would depend on its object. For given a system of inspection which is compatible with national security, it is only possible to be completely sure of the absence of large missiles, of which there will shortly be none left in NATO Europe. The kinds of aircraft based in NATO and Eastern Europe are for the most part dual purpose, and, in the case of many interdiction missiles, the difficulties of inspection would be considerable, while at the battlefield level there are some types of artillery that can fire either chemical or nuclear explosives. Short of a new technical development—some sort of long-range Geiger counter of great sensitivity—it would seem almost impossible to be certain that nuclear arms had, in fact, been withdrawn from a denuclearised zone without demilitarising it.

There would also be certain difficulties in defining the area to be inspected. If the denuclearised zone were to include medium-range missile sites, this would have to embrace a part of the Soviet Union—notably the Baltic provinces and a part of South West Russia. There is at present no prospect that the Soviet Government would agree to this, particularly since the counterpart of this force, NATO missile ships in American or allied hands, could elude normal inspection procedures.

A nuclear-free zone, it is clear, will become more valuable, but it could only succeed as part of a wider scheme, which involved a system of inspection against surprise attack as well as against the concealment of nuclear weapons. It could, in fact, be no more than part of an agreement on demilitarisation, not a solution in itself to any of the problems facing Europe today. Any agreement on demilitarisation would demand from the Soviet Union a sacrifice of hitherto unvarying prin-

ciples, and particularly of the Soviet opposition to any inspection of her territory. On the Western side it would demand greater efforts from the European powers than from the Soviet Union if they were to be strong enough to contain and repel a conventional attack without recourse to nuclear arms. There is no reason to abandon this aim. The introduction of new anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles with conventional warheads may one day give enough power to the defence to halt any initial attack. But it would probably demand a greater increase in the forces at present deployed in Europe than it is sensible to contemplate.

Such an arrangement could confer greater stability on Europe than has been known since 1945. The introduction of the tactical nuclear weapon, which was so long regarded by its champions in the West as the best guarantee of the Western position, has brought it more security, but greater risks in case of actual fighting. These weapons are still necessary; but as long as this is so, the situation in Europe will be unstable, and it will be impossible to agree on even a limited measure of geographical withdrawal with the Soviet Union.

A geographical solution to the problem of Europe cannot be imposed by itself. It does not represent the political, military and psychological breakthrough which has been expected from disengagement, or in a more limited sense, from the creation of nuclear-free zones. The reduction of tension cannot be brought about in this way, but must be preceded by adjustments in military policy, which at best would take several years to accomplish. While a geographical solution is necessary eventually, if Europe is ever to achieve a genuine military stability, it cannot be acclaimed as a panacea for the present.

Comment by the Deutsche Gesellschaft

The proposition that a 'geographical solution', meaning a nuclear-free zone, is likely to be more necessary in the future, if Europe is to achieve a genuine military stability, is at present definitely a minority view in Germany. Once the possibility of surprise attack had been removed or diminished by, for instance, a working system of mutual inspection, the proposition might indeed appear in a more favourable light. Another

problem is whether the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe could be acceptable as a corollary to a general peace settlement in Europe. In this case it would be a military price paid for clearly defined political advantages such as the reunification of Germany or a relaxation in Eastern Europe. But creating a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, while leaving the political problems of the continent unsolved, and the military environment outside this zone virtually unchanged, would make neither political nor military sense. In the case of Germany, the protection of the country could no longer be locally assured, but would depend solely on the ultimate deterrent. All Germany would then be in the position Berlin is in now; it would increasingly be exposed to Soviet pressure and, hence, to political instability.

Chapter 6

Arms Control: The Functional Approach

I

TODAY the Cold War may be waged more actively outside Europe than within it. But in Europe, the two sides still stand face to face, in the positions they took up more than seventeen years ago, and neither is prepared to withdraw. This confrontation has become a part of the whole strategic balance and political conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we have seen that in this general context, there is little chance that a geographical approach to the problems of Europe could of itself provide a solution. Disengagement depends on reaching a political agreement among the United States, the Soviet Union and Germany and on securing the consent of the other European members of NATO. There is little chance of this until the nature of the strategic confrontation has changed. At the same time, more limited measures, such as demilitarised or denuclearised zones depend on creating a system of safeguards against certain specific dangers. Only when these safeguards are established could a zonal arrangement have any hopes of success. It would be an effect and not a cause of reducing tension in Europe; and if it were regarded as a solution in itself, a geographical approach would be quite inadequate and might prove dangerous. If the opposing armies were merely separated without any settlement, even of a provisional kind, of the political problems of a divided Europe, a dangerous clash could be invited rather than averted, and could involve the strategic forces of the Great Powers as easily as any frontier clash between the ground forces today.

Today the presence of ground forces in Europe serves not only to maintain the political division but also to contain the political hostilities of the Continent. These forces can scarcely be withdrawn completely until a political agreement has been reached which both Great Powers are interested in maintain-

ing. But as long as their political hostility continues, their military forces help to stabilise the situation in Europe.

We have seen, however, that the military situation is itself unstable, that the slightest clash could too easily spark off a general conflagration, and that a major common interest of the two alliances is to find ways of making their military confrontation less dangerous. It may be that measures designed to stabilise the military situation not only demand the most pressing attention, but also offer the best hope of finding a path to a solution of the political problems of Europe.

Because the objectives of military stabilisation and the problems of political stability are so intimately connected, there is a certain clash of interests between the United States and the European members of NATO in approaching these questions. The State Department is anxious to find common ground with the Soviet Government on the best means of controlling the dangers of the military confrontation in Europe. European foreign offices are more anxious that no Soviet-American agreement should endanger the Western position or reduce the American commitment to Europe. They also fear that a limited agreement between the two Great Powers could have a disturbing effect on European opinion. If public opinion, particularly in Germany, lost its belief in the guarantee of the United States, neutralist sentiment in Europe might grow, and the Soviet Union might after all succeed in the prime objective of its post-war policy: to separate Europe from the United States.

Political analysts in Western Europe are themselves divided on the degree of this danger. Not all the European countries are equally exposed to Soviet pressure or Communist infiltration, and some are more likely to be affected by a possible Soviet-American agreement than others. But there is a real danger that unless an arms control policy for Europe were clearly seen to be in the genuine interest of both sides, the Soviet Union could exploit European fears to its own advantage. For though the United States, the European governments and the Soviet Union all have a common interest in reducing the risks of war, they do not have the same interest in dissipating the fear of war. The Soviet Union could well find it in its interest to maintain tension, to impress the Western

European populations with the dangers of their position, to exploit fear as a diplomatic instrument. In this situation an arms control policy should have two objectives: it should take account of those political dangers which it can alleviate while making clearer that others can be met only with a political response: and it should be seen to reduce the actual military risks, rob the Russian leaders of their power to bluff, and thus make the game of brinkmanship more difficult.

II

This connection between political and military dangers is felt more keenly today because European leaders are aware that beneath the level of the strategic deadlock, the Soviet Union is developing a greater tactical freedom of action. It is still true that defeat in Europe can be avoided only by the threat of a world war. But it has been obvious since the Berlin crisis of 1961 that if the Western governments were faced with the danger of attack in Europe, their first concern would be to limit the resultant conflict. President Kennedy's television speech of 25th July 1961 showed his anxiety both to localise the conflict and to retain the effectiveness of threatening a world war. It showed, indeed, that it was only an evident concern to limit a conflict in Europe which made the threat of general war credible at all. But the evidence of this concern is liable to have different effects in different parts of Europe. On the one hand it is beginning to be accepted in Europe that a credible defence of the Central Area depends on an improved ability to meet possible aggression on the ground with an appropriate response. NATO is beginning to forge the ability to fight a conventional engagement in the Central Area, at least for a short time. But in the Northern Area and in South-Eastern Europe this ability is generally lacking. The evidence of American concern to protect Europe without the immediate menace of a missile attack could expose these areas to Soviet intimidation.

Norway and Denmark are in some ways more open to Soviet pressure than the other European members of the Alliance. Finland remains a hostage to the Soviet Union. The

Soviet leaders have shown that they will threaten Finland whenever they fear a change in the balance of power in Northern Europe, whether because Norway and Denmark or even Sweden might join the European Economic Community, or because NATO's Northern Command might be strengthened or missile bases established in Norway. The permanent threat to Finland and the perpetual need to consider the political effects on Norwegian opinion itself have imposed great restraint on NATO's policy in the North and will certainly continue to do so.

In South-Eastern Europe the position of Greece and Turkey also exposes them to political guerrilla action. The threat of a selective attack on these countries, which Mr. Khrushchev brandished during the crisis of 1961 was not in itself very credible, but it could certainly be used to stimulate political discontent. Western missile bases have been withdrawn from Turkey (not in response to Soviet threats but as part of a general policy of stabilising the strategic position), yet even without them, both these countries are likely to be more vulnerable than the other members of NATO to political subversion. The deterrent capacities of the Sixth Fleet would hardly be able to prevent the incitement of political upheaval and in the case of emergency, a stronger mobile NATO task force than that which exists at present might be needed to reinforce the strength and determination of the local forces.

At present such eventualities are unlikely. The Soviet leaders publicly refuse to accept the idea of a limited war in Europe. As long as Soviet deterrent policy is based on the threat of an avowedly uncontrollable nuclear offensive against the American population, it will obviously be in their interests to reject the possibility of a limited conflict. To admit it would be to concede that the United States can indeed protect its Allies by a limited response. Mr. Khrushchev has emphatically denied this. 'If a clash does occur between the two giants, the United States and the Soviet Union,' he said in a speech on August 7th 1961, 'it goes without saying that neither side would be ready to admit defeat without using all weapons, including the most destructive ones. . . .' These words were echoed the following month by General Zhadov, who de-

clared that any conflict involving the nuclear powers was bound to precipitate a nuclear war.¹

Nevertheless the Soviet Union will probably continue its attempts to divide the Atlantic Alliance by all means short of war, and where it feels that it enjoys the kind of local advantages which the Americans had in Cuba it could conceivably risk military action. Moreover, the political exploitation of this threat could reap greater rewards than action itself. An arms policy for Europe must be seen to make the threat of limited military action just as incredible as that of general war. It must be designed to protect the whole of Europe, to embrace the specific political and military problems of the North and the South-East as well as the Central Area, and it must be seen to reduce the risks of war itself. The whole of NATO Europe must be regarded as a single area with interdependent sectors, and an arms policy must be designed to meet the specific dangers of the different areas and take account of the differing political reactions in the member countries of NATO.

III

In a situation where the strategic confrontation of the two blocs has such wide political implications and where the different members of NATO vary so widely in their political perspectives, an arms policy should be directed, not so much towards securing a political agreement between both sides as towards the reduction of common dangers. It is only on this basis that a more stable military system can be created and that progress can then be made towards a political relaxation.

An acknowledgement that these dangers are common to both sides and that both have a common interest in reducing the risks of war is perhaps as important as agreement on points of detail. It may be that after the *dénouement* of the Cuban crisis, and with the long record of the Berlin crises to emphasise the fact, a favourable time has now been reached for such a recognition. In a speech he made during Marshal Tito's visit to the Soviet Union in December 1962, Mr. Gromyko seemed to hint at this: 'The overcoming of the

¹ *Red Star*, September 21, 1961

Cuban crisis was a triumph of peaceful coexistence . . .,' he said; 'if there is co-operation and trust between the Soviet Union and the United States there will be peace.'¹

The military dangers which the two sides have to face in a divided Europe cannot all be foreseen: but there are three particular kinds of danger which can be identified, and to meet which particular measures of arms control can be proposed. There is, in the first place, the danger that a military accident, whether from a technical or human failure might trigger off a nuclear exchange: the danger of a war by accident. Second there is the possibility that uncontrolled military movements or political gestures, lack of information, misrepresentation or misunderstanding under the stress and pressure of a crisis, could lead to grave errors of judgement and incur the danger of a war by miscalculation. Behind these risks, which are inherent in the present situation in Europe, there persists the fear, which is common to both sides, of a premeditated surprise attack. It mounts and recedes with each political crisis, but it is also associated by the general public with the nature of modern strategy and the structure of armaments.

IV

The danger that casts the longest shadow in Europe is that of surprise attack. It still has a strong psychological hold on both Eastern and Western Europe; and it looms the largest among the range of possibilities which, whether based on realistic calculation or not, create a permanent mistrust and help to prevent communication or agreement. In framing a functional approach to the military problems of Europe, the dangers of surprise attack, both of all-out nuclear war and of a sudden ground assault, must be considered first. The fear of all-out nuclear war arises from the nature of modern armaments, and the history of recent deterrence policies; that of ground-attack from historical memories which are still comparatively fresh.

The United States enjoyed its greatest strategic superiority over the Soviet Union at a time when the NATO forces in Europe were still extremely weak on the ground. For most of

¹ Speech of December 13, 1962

the 1950s, a policy of pure deterrence, based on the strategic forces of the United States was a rational, indeed inevitable, one to adopt in protecting Western Europe from Soviet attack. It has now been understood, however, that this was a transient and extraordinary condition: that the development of the long-range bomber and the thermonuclear bomb, on which this policy depended, in themselves foretold an end to it, which the advent of the ICBM only made more dramatic. It was already apparent in 1956 that the end of this period was in sight, and as it drew to its close the leaders of the Western governments were forced to consider the dilemmas, which they had so long been spared, of the relationship between the deterrence of attack by offensive means and organising the direct defence of Europe.

In 1956 there was some hope that NATO could have built up its ground forces in Europe to a position where they might withstand a Soviet attack without recourse to nuclear war. This might have been possible if the 30-division goal of the NATO plan MC-70, which was adopted in 1957, had been achieved. In the same year, however, two developments occurred which reversed the tendency towards a realistic defence based on Europe that had been gathering strength in the previous two years. In the first place the reduction of British forces on the continent, and the continued absence of French divisions in Algeria, emphasised that the European governments still depended on the American nuclear arsenal to prevent war in Europe. Without tactical nuclear weapons, the Supreme Allied Commander was still able to do no more than assign a modest function of identification to the shield forces in the Central Area. In the second place the Russian announcement of the successful launching of an ICBM, and the spectacular success of the earth's first satellite which followed it, raised American fears of a 'missile gap'. As a result the American leaders at the NATO heads of government conference in December 1957 pressed their allies to accept MRBMs in Europe. So that in fact, although the ICBM should have shown that the period when it was possible to rely on a pure deterrent strategy was over, it seemed for a time to confirm that reliance.

Although the problems of this reliance were being

considered by professional students even before 1957, it was only in 1961 that the equivocal nature of a policy of nuclear deterrence alone was fully demonstrated to general opinion within the Alliance. It then began to become clear that a strategy of pure deterrence was either too convincing or not convincing enough.¹ If, in a warlike situation such as the Berlin crisis almost became, the Soviet leaders were convinced that the United States intended to make use of her strategic nuclear weapons, they would have been tempted to strike the first blow, and the race for pre-emption would have brought about the war that the nuclear arsenal was designed to deter. If on the other hand the American commitment were disbelieved, aggression would have been encouraged. In reality, American deterrent power, and the flexibility of the Administration's response to the Berlin situation, were enough to ensure that the United States could still protect Europe. But the crisis demonstrated how uneasy was the position of Europe, poised as it was between deterrence and a defence system which could not, for example, protect Berlin.

Even so, the real problems of this situation have scarcely been understood by European opinion. The major reason for the Administration's emphasis on revising the strategy of pure deterrence and creating a more flexible means of meeting aggression on the ground, does not lie in the new vulnerability of the United States but in the permanent vulnerability of Europe. As long as the United States is not drastically surpassed in technological development (and in the fact she appears to be maintaining her technological superiority over the Soviet Union) a policy of pure deterrence would suffice to protect both herself and Canada. North America cannot be successfully attacked below the level of general war. But as long as she is involved in Western Europe, it is not enough either to protect herself completely or to protect Western Europe. It is because the United States is involved in Western Europe, and Western Europe is permanently vulnerable, that a posture of pure, American-based, deterrence could either be too credible, and invite a sudden thermonuclear attack *on*

¹ See Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice*, Harper and Bros. New York, and Chatto and Windus, London, 1960, p. 47

the United States, or not credible enough and allow Western Europe to be overrun.

These fears have a new significance today. The United States is seeking to keep the upper hand in the strategic balance through a strategy which is designed to offer the Soviet Union an incentive not to use, or threaten to use, horrific weapons against the American population. The Soviet leaders are doubtless aware of the deficiencies of an horrific deterrent against the United States: but they already have a counterforce capability against Europe, and the American strategy cannot protect Europe except through an American first strike, which would eliminate most of the Soviet MRBM bases as well as those of their intercontinental force.¹ A counterforce policy, however, is bound to lose its effectiveness as the Soviet strategic force becomes more diversified and more invulnerable. If a true strategic deadlock does arise in this case, the possibility of a selective Soviet attack on Western Europe would be considerably greater than it is today.

Surprise attack at the strategic level will nevertheless remain an unlikely danger: NATO should have enough invulnerable strategic forces at its disposal to prevent any such Soviet calculation, well before the efficacy of a counterforce strategy is exhausted. But it is a danger that, however remote, will remain as long as bombs and missiles are available; it will be present in the imagination of the general public on both sides; but, if it cannot be eliminated without an agreement on disarmament, it can at least be clearly distinguished from other dangers of surprise attack, and shown in this way to be unlikely in itself. Of more immediate moment to the European populations on both sides of the Iron Curtain are two other kinds of surprise attack: either in the form of a concentrated assault on a limited objective at a single point in

¹ 'By contrast with the small number of ICBMs, the number of MRBMs has been augmenting steadily and has now reached a figure of about 700. These are deployed in sufficient numbers to deal with strategic and semi-tactical targets—such as fighter airfields—in Western Europe, including Britain, and in the Far East. It is likely that this build-up is continuing. It is clear that Soviet policy is to site them near the western, southern and eastern borders of the Soviet Union, on the Pacific coast and in Siberia.' *The Military Balance*, *ibid.*, I.S.S. p. 3

Europe, or of a massive ground attack along the whole front.

The first of these dangers—a surprise assault by the mobilised forces in one of the two Germanys against a single point near the frontiers—is at present as hypothetical as that of a full-scale strategic onslaught. As long as the defence of the West relies primarily on the early use of nuclear weapons, it is impossible to attack a limited objective without risking general war. Whether it becomes an actual danger in the foreseeable future depends on the development of NATO's own policies. Here two issues need to be clearly separated: that of actually planned surprise attack, and that of accidents or miscalculations which could lead one side or the other to expect a surprise attack, and react accordingly. Whether or not the Soviet Union actually decides to risk a surprise assault on an isolated point depends on the adequacy of NATO's defence. But whether the fear of surprise attack could itself lead to a nuclear exchange—arising perhaps from some technical accident, or the misinterpretation of military moves—is a different question. The dangers of accidents are clearly greater as long as both sides continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their forward defence; but if they rely primarily on conventional forces, the possibilities of a surprise attack may be higher—and so, in consequence, will those of misinterpretation or miscalculation. Whether this will in fact be the case depends on conditions that will be discussed later in the chapter. But it cannot be forgotten that any defence policy is linked to certain dangers, and that one aim of an arms control policy should be to produce the most secure mixture of arrangements that is possible.

If the NATO powers were to reduce their emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons either as part of an agreement for arms reduction or as a unilateral measure in the interests of a more stable confrontation, the question of surprise attack would have to be considered. And if the Soviet Union does develop a sufficient number of strategic nuclear weapons to achieve real parity with the United States, then the possibility of a *coup de main* against a limited objective would have to be borne in mind.

This problem is not peculiar to the West. If the West fears that, at some future time, the Russians might calculate that

the strategic deadlock was now so complete that they could attempt a *coup de main*, so the Soviet Union has reason to fear that, when her own cities and bases are covered by some thousands of bombs and missiles, NATO or some of its member nations might consider the risk of upsetting the political system of Eastern Europe by military force. A recent Soviet book which sets forth current military doctrine has emphasised that this possibility is taken seriously:

Simultaneously with preparation for determined combat with an aggressor in the course of a world war, the armed forces of the Socialist countries must be ready also for local wars, which can be unleashed by the imperialists. The experience of such wars, which have occurred more than once in the post-war period, shows that they are waged by means and methods different from those of world wars. Therefore Soviet military strategy is called upon to study the methods of waging such wars too, without permitting their escalation into world war, and swiftly achieving victory over the enemy.¹

Each side will have cause to fear that the other could exploit a momentary weakness arising either from political upheaval or military shortcomings. The opinion is sometimes expressed, moreover, that if NATO changed the emphasis of its defence policies from nuclear weapons (which because of the high level of destruction they involve are plainly defensive) to conventional forces, then Soviet fears of a Western attack might actually increase. It is argued that, in the Soviet view, large NATO conventional forces, with the major contribution coming from Western Germany, could be designed only for an attack on Eastern Europe, and particularly East Germany. In this case the Soviet Union might, in a situation of high tension, be tempted to use its great counterforce capabilities against European targets or even to invoke the threat of maximum damage to enemy populations, not only by strategic means but also by direct conflict in Europe.

This is an extreme view of the danger of surprise attack. In

¹ Sokolovsky *et al.*, *Voennaya Strategiya* (Military Strategy), Moscow, 1962, p. 214

fact it is unlikely that the Western European governments will ever consent to such large conventional forces that the Soviet Union could ever be genuinely afraid of their offensive capabilities. But it does make clear that in the present situation no danger can be wholly avoided without inviting others. As long as Europe remains divided, and the opposing armies of the world's two Great Powers confront each other there, neither the danger of actual surprise attack, nor the additional danger of accidents and miscalculations inherent in the fear of surprise attacks, can be finally banished.

Between the two points of a general strategic onslaught and a limited assault is the danger of a general ground attack in Europe. This was a keenly felt possibility in the Europe of the 1950s, and one motive behind President Eisenhower's 'Open Skies' proposal at the Geneva conference of 1955 was to avert it. Today it might appear more remote; but this fear still casts a long shadow across both the East and West, for the simple reason that public opinion does not keep pace with military reality in an age of rapid change. In the Russian consciousness, Western Europe is both the traditional highroad of invasion, and also an American bridgehead which might involve the Soviet homeland in thermonuclear devastation; and the fears that Napoleon and Hitler have bequeathed to Russia, Stalin has left to Western Europe. It is important to rid both sides of this fear if they are to develop an easier military coexistence and closer human relationships.

It is only when this risk is finally resolved that it will be possible for either side in Europe to consider wider ranging measures of arms control, such as a withdrawal of troops or a denuclearised zone. Though the general fear of a surprise attack will remain until far reaching measures of disarmament are agreed by the United States and the Soviet Union, there is some practical prospect of effective measures against massive ground attack which will be discussed later in this chapter.

V

Until both sides need no longer fear the danger of a surprise attack in Europe, both will maintain a defensive system which is designed to deter one. This deterrence will depend on a

direct link between the forward defences and strategic reserves. Whether the front lines are geared to the early use of nuclear weapons, or whether they are prepared to hold an assault by conventional means, the prevention of attack will still depend on the strategic nuclear weapons in the background. It is this which creates the danger of the explosion of a nuclear device by accident and the triggering of a nuclear exchange as consequence of such an accident. Both possibilities are commonly taken together in the term 'accidental war', but the prevention of 'accidental war' depends both on the prevention of technical accident and on the establishment of adequate means of verification and control to prevent any such accident from triggering a nuclear exchange.

In an area as small as Europe, where the forces of each alliance are constantly prepared to repel a surprise attack, the danger of accidental war is real. It is perhaps less likely to arise from an incident on the ground (where the forward command and control of weapons likely to produce rapid escalation is strict, and where there is a small and unofficial demilitarised zone on each side of the demarcation line, in which no army units are stationed) than from a clash in the air. It is impossible to estimate the chances of such an event; but technical and human failures will certainly occur, and in some particular situations, such as those of the Berlin air corridors, must be expected. The ability to prevent a conflict will then depend on communications between the two sides—and this not only at the highest level, but also at lower echelons of command. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

All forms of operationally dependable missiles are theoretically accident prone. It may well be that the two major powers will have assimilated the full effects of the missile revolution before Western Europe can expect to build a significant missile force. This would mean that the administrative and physical safeguards, which are now being developed with great care by both countries will have made a Soviet-American war more unlikely. It will then be all the more important to create a similar system of safeguards in Europe if the countries of Western Europe embark on a programme of strategic weapons. A Western European missile force would make the links still closer between the forward

defences and the strategic weapons in the background. And since it is hardly possible for Western Europe to provide both the very expensive weapons required for a modern conventional defence, and an adequate nuclear armament, there would probably be a still stronger emphasis on nuclear weapons than there is now, and a corresponding increase in the danger of nuclear accidents. The need for communications, between the two alliances, would thus grow if Western Europe pursued strategic independence.

But if the European members of NATO decided to accept a multilateral NATO strategic force instead, there would be a greater risk of confusion in the event of accident. In that case, the creation of a multilateral force would give the American Administration an added incentive to retain a tightly centralised control over the whole Alliance system of command. In either event the need for centralised control is likely to grow in the years ahead.

VI

The political and military leaders of the two alliances have to live under continual stress, under conditions where any incident on the frontiers of the two blocs or in Berlin might set off a chain reaction of events which could get rapidly out of control, and where, at the same time, it can never be assumed that an apparent 'accident' or 'border incident' is not, in reality, the first stage of a deliberate attack. It is impossible to be absolutely certain that the deterrent policy of the Alliance will prevent either a surprise attack or a local military conflict. Such uncertainty and strain give rises to the possibility of war through miscalculation: to the fear that war might break out, either because a confused incident at some point on the Iron Curtain might lead to rapidly mounting tension, or because a deliberate attack, though limited in purpose, could lead to general war.

In the first instance, it is feared that, in a period of acute tension following or preceding a clash of forces, the opposing governments would do all in their power to prevent a general conflict from developing—but that these efforts would only be pressed to a certain point. After that point, if the conflict was

still unresolved, either or both might conclude that the other was determined in any case to attack and so embark on the race for pre-emption that could destroy the world. The Cuban crisis of October 1962 seemed to show that such a point is not reached so easily as might have been feared; but this was perhaps an extraordinary example. By reason of the local military superiority of the United States the clash of military forces was in fact avoided. But in Europe the armies of the two and of all their allies are in a permanent confrontation backed by the threat of tactical nuclear weapons. Even if the race for pre-emption on a strategic level was avoided, it would be almost inevitable on a tactical level, if the situation were even so mildly confused that the American President and the Soviet Prime Minister were not in constant touch with events. In these circumstances, the field commanders, or even the supreme allied commanders of either side, could be exposed to radical misinterpretation of their opponents' intentions or striking power. Under nuclear battlefield conditions it would be extremely difficult to obtain an accurate appraisal of the firepower which the enemy was bringing to bear; and the temptation to reply with much more powerful weapons would be almost overwhelming.

The present American strategic policies, moreover, might encourage such a process. There would be no guarantee that the weapons used would mount gradually in range or power from front-line mortars like the *Davy Crockett* through interdiction weapons like *Mace* to MRBMs and ICBMs. The present emphasis on the possibilities of controlling a strategic response to selective attack provides an incentive to reply to a limited (possibly misinterpreted) conflict in Europe with strategic weapons from the United States.

In the second instance, that of a deliberate though limited and selective attack, the incentive to use strategic weapons would clearly be greater still. It is just such an attack which the policy of the flexible response is designed to deter. If this deterrent failed, and if the NATO forces in Europe even *appeared* to be incapable of withstanding it, a selective strategic strike would be almost inevitable. But the dilemma between repelling an attack of this nature and starting a world war in fact appears less acute in such a case, because the threat of

escalation to a world war is regarded as the most effective safeguard against a deliberate attack. There are, however, two strongly opposed views of the safest and most convincing way of demonstrating the threat.

It is argued, on the one hand, that the best deterrent even to a limited attack is to make sure that it can be met at once with a nuclear response and probably will be met in that way. In this view, which is identified chiefly with official German opinion, the question is political rather than military. There can be no real question of miscalculating so long as the automatic nature of escalation is firmly kept in view. If the Soviet forces decided to attack, they would in any case have decided to risk a world war for the sake of their objective; or they would not be prepared to risk a world war, and as long as the West confronted them with this risk, they would not be prepared to attack. It is pointed out in defence of this view that the Soviet Union has hitherto acted with great caution whenever the risk of general war was apparent. This, it is argued, has shown that the best means of deterring an act of aggression below the level of strategic conflict is to exclude any miscalculation as to whether or not it entails the risk of thermonuclear war.

The opposite view is that of many Americans who now have an influential voice in Washington, namely that there should be as many strategic options as possible, and the greatest possible flexibility in their execution, in order to protect the nuclear powers from having to take 'all or nothing' decisions. A wider choice of strategies implies the hope that instead of automatically picking the strategy which would do most damage to the enemy, the United States should take account of the common interest of both sides in preventing an all-out war, and select a more limited response.

The first view has been forcibly expressed by the former German Minister of Defence as follows: '. . . a potential aggressor should not be able to calculate the risk he faces, but in the case of aggressive intentions he must be confronted with uncertainty, which would force him to renounce the use of armed force. The second aim, but by a long way the second, should be to end any conflict which broke out for any reason in spite of this, and to restore the status quo ante . . . with as

little damage as possible. Military efforts should then be directed to create a balanced system of defence, consisting of both strong conventional and differentiated nuclear resources, both as modern as possible and graduated from the front to the rear. Such a system should give the defence freedom to choose the means of repelling an attack and in spite of this not give the aggressor any chance to work out the level of risk beforehand.¹ In Herr Strauss's view this freedom (which does not imply a necessarily automatic use of nuclear weapons) can only be assured if the field commanders are able to decide themselves whether nuclear firepower is necessary.

This view is opposed, by a number of British and Americans in particular, who argue that it imposes too great a psychological and military strain on the defence, and that while the Western governments would be prepared to invoke the risks of escalation in defence of the Central Area, it is doubtful whether they could continue to do so in order to safeguard some Baltic islands or a portion of Thrace. Such a policy might still work, but cannot be expected to do so indefinitely. In order to prevent piecemeal aggression, it must be made plain that any aggression would be resisted on the ground and at the front where it occurs, and that then the Soviet army would be given the choice of accepting defeat or pressing on to the eventual destruction of the Soviet homeland. The risk of escalation cannot always be used to prevent a war from starting, but it can and should be used as a bargaining-counter once war has begun. As long as escalation is relied upon to deter war, the onus of invoking the process will rest upon the defence—and this might eventually encourage attack; but if the risk is used to *limit* war, the onus will be upon the attack, and this, it is hoped, should induce a withdrawal. In this case, indeed, the certain knowledge that a quick victory would be precluded should be more effective in deterring attack than the risk of a world war—from which the aggressor might otherwise hope that the Western powers would shy away at the last moment.

The threat of escalation is thus seen as a means of preventing the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe, either

¹ Franz-Josef Strauss, interview with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 9, 1962

by preventing war altogether or by ensuring victory in a limited war. But the first view rests on the assumption that the Soviet leaders act rationally and in complete control of events; the second on the assumption that they might lose control of events but can be brought to reason by a process of nuclear bargaining which would re-establish control. One of the foremost exponents of this argument Professor Thomas Schelling of Harvard has expressed it in this way:

One can question whether we ought to use nuclears deliberately to raise the risk of general war. But unless we are willing to do this, we should not introduce nuclears. This is so much of what nuclears do that to focus our planning attention on the battlefield may be to ignore what should be getting our main attention (and what would, in the event, get it). Once nuclears are introduced, it is *not the same war* any longer. The tactical objectives and considerations that govern the original war are no longer controlling. It is now a war of nuclear bargaining and demonstration.

If we wish to convey that we are making very restricted use of nuclears for well-defined tactical purposes, and decide to hit only troop concentrations in particular locations, our primary concern should be whether we get this message across rather than whether we actually destroy the troops. If we wish to convey that the war is getting out of hand, that it will shortly become locally very destructive in spite of efforts to confine it to military targets, we should pick military targets that caused destruction commensurate with the notion we want to convey. Whether we destroy a rail junction or a regiment of troops is less important than whether we detonate some nuclears, whether we hit or miss cities, and whether we provide a clear-cut or confused picture to the enemy. In a nuclear exchange, even if it nominally involves only the use of 'tactical' weapons against tactically important targets there will be a conscious negotiating process between two very threatening enemies who are worried that the war will get out of hand.

. . . If nuclears are introduced, the war may never run its course. Even without the introduction of nuclears, a main function of resistance forces is to create and prolong

a genuine sense of danger, of the potentiality of general war. This is not a danger that we create for the Russians and avoid ourselves; it is a danger we share with them. But it is this deterrent and intimidation function that deserves *at least* as much attention as the tactical military potentialities of the troops. . . . The important thing is to preclude a quick, clean Soviet victory that quiets things down in short order.¹

The practical conclusions of these arguments are that nuclear weapons should be kept under central control, and indeed that in order to make Western objectives clear to the Soviet leaders, the nuclear-armed forces should be kept physically distinct from conventional forces, and be used for a war of demonstration and bargaining. The purpose here is essentially the same as that of the proponents of the opposite view: it raises the level of danger until the war is too painful to continue. The real issue between the two is the fighting role that is assigned to tactical nuclear weapons. In the first, these are intended to *fight* a limited engagement; in the second, to be introduced into the combat as a means of bargaining at a selected stage. In the first, they are intended to prevent miscalculation by the immediate threat of a world war; in the second to prevent the calculation of a quick victory from succeeding by steadily raising the risk of a world war.

Both these opinions regard nuclear weapons as a chief instrument of preventing miscalculation, or of saving the world from its effects. But a third regards them as the most dangerous agent of miscalculation itself. For if it is believed that the Western powers are able to reply to an attack only with nuclear weapons then the enemy may feel confident that they will not respond at all.

We shall have lost more by incredibility than we shall have gained by way of inspiring dread. . . . In present circumstances (it is) probably fallacious to suppose that the deterrent effect upon the Russians will be decreased, on balance,

¹ Thomas C. Schelling, 'Nuclear Strategy in Europe', in *World Politics*, April 1962. For a discussion of many practical problems involved see also Henry Kissinger, 'European Defence' in *Survival*, September/October 1962

by indicating by our posture that we should respond conventionally to a conventional challenge. It is true that this is much a lesser threat; but then, on the other hand, there is a far greater probability of our actually carrying it out. What is wanted is not so much a form of declaration that the West will in no circumstances use nuclear forces first, as a revision of NATO doctrine and posture such as would make it clear that the West had acquired the option of responding to a conventional challenge by conventional means.¹

According to this argument the military capabilities and industrial resources of the West make it not only safer but also distinctly advantageous for the West to fight even a full scale war at the conventional level and to place the odium of escalation upon the other side. 'In the nuclear age there is no substitute for adequate conventional forces.'¹

It is unlikely that this view will prevail in a divided Europe, when neither side can be completely certain that the other will not at some stage launch a nuclear surprise attack. As long as the defence of Europe rests primarily on nuclear weapons, the risk will persist that a deliberate or accidental clash could begin a world war; but it is feared in Europe that, if the defence were allowed to rely primarily on conventional forces, the Soviet Union could prepare a surprise attack which would leave no alternative to world war but that of total defeat. Though the fears of a surprise attack have greatly decreased in recent years they could be easily revived by a change of NATO policy.

The differences in these views allow little hope that they can easily be reconciled. They are not only the conclusions of differing experts, but represent diverging national interests and varying geographical as well as historical perspectives. There have been some rapid changes in American concepts and attitudes over the past ten years, and though European thought has in general followed the major American currents from 'massive retaliation' to controlled response, there has

¹ From John Strachey, *On the Prevention of War*, London, Macmillan, 1962, pp. 113, 114-15, 116. For a similar view, see Helmut Schmidt, *Defence or Retaliation*, Edinburgh, Oliver & Boyd, 1962

normally been such a time-lag that criticism was often directed at doctrines which have already been given up by their authors. All the time fears and counter-fears are reflected back and forth between East and West 'like images in a room of mirrors'.¹ While this process goes on—and it is difficult to see when it will stop—the problem of preventing a 'war by miscalculation' becomes essentially a problem of time and of timing in the process of making decisions.

If one side knows that the other side may have reasons to react hastily and has forces capable of inflicting severe damage on his strategic capability, the first side will itself become super-alert and prone to just the same kind of over-fast reaction it anticipates from the other side. This in turn will cause the other side to tighten its grip on the trigger. And so on.

The only way to break this cycle of 'reciprocal fear of surprise attack' is to move to a situation where at least one side has time—that is, a situation where, for one side at least, an enemy first strike will not be decisive. This means assuring that retaliatory forces, even if caught with little or no warning, will survive the attack. The key word here is 'survivability'.¹

The problem of miscalculation is in part, therefore, a problem of general policy and strategy; and an arms policy implies here a stable system of Western defence which will allow time to detect and revise miscalculations; but it also implies devising means of communication between the two camps that will give them the opportunity to signal accidents and limit their effects. This is one of the most important aspects of an arms control policy for Europe today.

VII

We have seen that a fruitful arms control policy for Europe

¹ John T. McNaughten, General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense, 'Arms restraint and military decisions', speech for the International Arms Control Symposium, Ann Arbor, Michigan, December 19, 1962

should be directed in the first place to certain identifiable dangers. At the same time, the military and political problems of Europe are so intimately bound up with each other that it is at present fruitless to attempt a geographical breakthrough; disengagement or nuclear-free zones can only follow from, and not lead up to, a system of military stability. But equally, the present uncertainties of the situation give the Soviet Union great opportunities to create and make the most of tension in Europe; and if the Western powers can imagine no better policy than that of 'standing firm' and refusing to negotiate on any issue with the Soviet Union, they will encourage the Soviet leaders to exploit tension and succeed in just the kind of 'salami tactics' that the advocates of 'standing firm' most fear.

Both in order that the Western powers can withstand piecemeal aggression in Europe, and in order to reduce the risks of war, it is important that the Atlantic Alliance should explore the possibilities of agreement with the Communist bloc on safeguards against surprise attack and unintentional war. It may be that such agreements would be impossible to reach; informal and unilateral arrangements could prove more effective and these too must be considered in every arms policy for Europe. But the possibilities of multilateral agreements should not be rejected in principle, nor should the need for mutual reassurance between the two alliances. An arms control policy which takes account of the dangers that have been discussed will depend both on creating a stable system of Western defence and on reaching agreement with the adversary. And even if no formal agreements are reached at first, Western defence arrangements must by themselves be able to do much to guard against these dangers.

The first one to which an arms control policy must be addressed, for psychological and political reasons, is that of surprise attack. The scope for action here is limited. Of the three forms of surprise attack that have been outlined in this chapter, the first—a strategic surprise attack—will be a danger that will remain inherent in the situation as long as missiles with nuclear warheads exist. Only the abolition of missiles and bombers, in other words a radical measure of disarmament, could eliminate this danger; and there are no half-way mea-

sures that could be completely effective. The working-paper on measures against accidental war which Mr. Arthur Dean, the chief American negotiator at the Geneva disarmament conference, presented in December 1962 implicitly acknowledged this. Among the measures he proposed were those of overlapping radar screens, which would be designed to give both alliances security against a surprise blow from the air. But such a scheme would have no more than a symbolic value: it could serve only to provide timely warning of attack by manned aircraft, which is hardly the danger that is most to be feared today. Radar posts could only be properly effective if they were extended to a grid within the territory of the principal adversaries, where they could be used to monitor missile launchings. But this would imply such a far-reaching political *détente* that it would be almost as easy to agree on a disarmament treaty. Short of such sweeping measures, it is impossible to remove the possibility of strategic surprise attack, and this question will continue to influence relations between the two Great Powers. The European nations can play little part in this relationship—apart from participating in a search for a means of arms reduction in Europe itself.

Nor, at present, can much be done to meet the second danger of surprise attack: a concentrated assault on a limited objective. It could become a pressing question if nuclear weapons were pulled back; but we have seen that denuclearisation is tantamount to demilitarisation in the forward areas of the two Europes, and, equally, safeguards against a surprise punch would, to be effective, involve a large-scale military withdrawal. Plans have indeed been prepared for inspection as a security measure, which would not be linked to any military withdrawal. It is known that plans have been under consideration by NATO for a zone of inspection comprising the two Germanys, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and parts of France and the Low Countries. (It is also suggested that the Soviet Union and the United States should demonstrate their willingness to participate in such measures by opening up parts of Alaska and Siberia.) Within the zone, inspection and control procedures would be tried out, both by air surveillance and through mobile ground teams. There could be an exchange of military information between the two alliances,

on the installations they maintain and the forces they station within the zone. But it would involve neither the withdrawal of nuclear weapons nor a reduction of forces. This scheme could be expected to give advance warning of the movement or concentration of troops, artillery and tanks within the inspected area, and so prevent secret preparation for surprise attack. But in practice, it is hard to imagine that a scheme of this nature could prove effective without imposing a military withdrawal, as was generally felt when the Soviet Union made proposals similar to these to the Surprise Attack Conference in 1958. Inspection would almost inevitably lead to a form of demilitarisation. The commanders of either side could hardly allow their troop movements and training methods, the disposition of their stores and ammunition, their most powerful and sometimes secret weapons, to be examined at will by the roving members of a neutral or even hostile inspectorate. The most valuable military installations would in all probability be withdrawn from the open zone, and it is unlikely that any government would agree to the principle of inspection unless it were prepared to contemplate withdrawal.

The danger of a concentrated assault by the divisions which are already stationed in the two Germanys, can only be offset by creating the maximum probability that it would fail. It cannot be finally dispelled by means short of military withdrawal. Inspection against limited attack and inspection for demilitarisation would be likely to go hand in hand. If, from an overriding fear of miscalculation or accidental escalation, both sides decided that it was necessary to withdraw nuclear weapons from forward areas in Europe, that is to say diminish the disincentives against local attack, then the whole question of the inspection and control of a demilitarised zone would have to be reconsidered. One multilateral measure that could be undertaken, however, would be the notification in advance of major military movements or manoeuvres. It would remove the element of surprise in a sudden assault if the normal observations of military intelligence were not confirmed by notification; at the same time, the need to notify one's intentions (in some detail if the information was to be regarded as trustworthy) would inhibit the practice of demonstrative manoeuvres like those which were held in East Germany in

1961. This in itself would be a real gain. In general, however, the dangers of a limited surprise attack can only be guarded against by unilateral defence systems.

The third form of surprise attack, between the two extremes of a strategic strike and a limited assault, is that of a general ground attack in Europe. Opinions are divided as to whether NATO or the Warsaw Pact has enough forces stationed in Germany to stage a surprise ground attack across the frontier. There are some 22 Soviet divisions in the DDR and Poland, and 24 NATO divisions in the Central Area. Inasmuch as the Soviet forces in Germany are supported by large reserves that are only a few hundred miles away, they do suffice to launch a limited surprise attack, but each side would have to build up its forces considerably before any large-scale operation could be mounted; and any furtive attempt at reinforcement could be monitored by a limited form of inspection. Because it was limited and static, an inspection system designed to check build-up would be more likely to command early agreement, it would not work to the disadvantage of either side, and it would serve its purpose effectively.

To be effective, static inspection teams would need to be stationed at three types of installation: airfields which are capable of taking heavy transport traffic; main roads, and railways. (Ports could be included if the representatives of either side felt that a comprehensive system was essential.) In Western Europe, the inspection system would need to concentrate primarily on airfields and roads, which would carry the most significant reinforcements for the NATO armies—the American, French and British reserves. The number of airfields which are capable of handling large quantities of such traffic is limited, and it would not be difficult to check whether the volume exceeded the normal flow. In Eastern Europe, although roads and airfields are relevant, the greatest volume of reinforcements would probably arrive by rail, and these too are comparatively easy to supervise: there are a limited number of gauge-change points on the borders between the Soviet Union and Poland and Rumania, at which it is possible to check the numbers and loads of all passing trains. In both halves of the Continent, the main roads junctions and bridges

would give static inspection teams an opportunity to watch the flow of traffic. Inspectors would be able to report whether the flow was normal, or whether unusual movements were afoot. Inspection of this kind would require no sanctions—it would serve its purpose merely by providing SHAPE and the headquarters of the Warsaw Pact with adequate warning. Inspectors would need to be drawn from the opposing alliances. There is no virtue in drawing representatives of the unaligned nations or of the U.N. into this plan.¹

It has been suggested that air surveillance, as President Eisenhower proposed in 1955, might still be of value. It could be a worthwhile supplement to ground inspection, but it would not provide an adequate substitute. It is not a wholly reliable method of obtaining information in the northern half of Europe which is covered in cloud for about half the year, though developments in radar photography may overcome this problem. But it is also unlikely to win assent from the Soviet Union, since observers stationed in aircraft cannot help seeing more than is desired of them in clear weather, and the difficulties of limiting the scope of the solution to the problem that was set would be very great. But if agreement were reached on an air inspection system, it could provide a means of quickly checking suspect information which would add to the security of both sides. The American proposals at the Geneva conference in December 1962 included observation posts at air bases, railway centres, roads and bridges, as well as additional air observation, and radar screens.

Overlapping radar screens have also been proposed as a European system. But such a scheme would appear to have even less value than an instrument of strategic warning. Any such lines, along the Rhine and the Vistula for example, would be most unreliable. Like other intelligence sources on enemy territory, they would be subject to fraud and feint; and to man them effectively it would be necessary for their operators to have a precise knowledge of the complex flying patterns of all aircraft, civilian as well as military, over the territory they covered. Europe's air-lanes are daily becoming more complicated and crowded—and warnings of attack

¹ See comment by Le Contrôleur Général P. Genevey, p. 229.

could be identified only when the patterns of air traffic diverged. Co-operation to this extent presupposes a political *détente* between the two sides which would make radar screens virtually unnecessary.

It is more important to work out a system of mutual inspection which could establish normal standards of military activity within the areas of the two alliances than to devise technical systems on which it is impossible to rely without a strong degree of political co-operation. Static inspection would do much to create mutual confidence, and there is no reason to suppose that it would prove unacceptable to the Soviet Union. As long as it covered Eastern Europe, including the railway gauge-changes on the Soviet border, the Western powers would be secure against any sudden build-up; and as long as it did not embrace the territory of the Soviet Union (the gauge-change points are, with one exception, outside Soviet territory) the Russian leaders might perhaps accept it. They have given some indication of their willingness to accept inspection of Eastern Europe, in their earlier proposals for denuclearised zones.

A scheme of this nature would have two great merits; it would create norms of military activity and movement which would inhibit the game of war-like moves that were once a standard diplomatic manoeuvre, but have now become too dangerous to play with. At the same time it would do much to remove the reflex of fear and insecurity which every European on both sides of the Iron Curtain has grown up with. It could help both to relax the military confrontation and to create a greater sense of security.

Measures to give warning against a massive build-up are the necessary first step in creating a scheme of mutual safeguards which will make the situation more stable. This kind of surprise attack may not be the most urgent danger confronting us today, and miscalculation may indeed prove a more likely cause of war. But its possibility must be eliminated before further progress can be made, and by reducing the fear of surprise attack it would remove one of the most patent forces for miscalculation. Thereafter it could prove possible to create a more comprehensive scheme, embracing for the most part informal arrangements.

VIII

The first measure that should be taken in building up a scheme of mutual safeguards appears to be, not that of opening territory to inspection, but of supplementing normal intelligence by exchanging information. This would provide a certain insurance both against surprise attack and against miscalculation. Obviously the mere exchange of information is not enough to ensure a common sense of security, and it would need to be supplemented by the normal workings of intelligence. But as long as freely proffered information on the strength and deployment of troops tallied with the observations of intelligence, it would have great value in promoting mutual confidence, and in providing real safeguards against error or surprise. It would certainly be possible to abuse this system: to attempt, by communicating enough random and inconsistent information, and by arranging that it should bear out intelligence, to create so much 'noise' that all the trustworthy news was drowned. This is a risk that must be faced. But the greater the amount of information that the two alliances exchange, the less would be the risk. If they imparted detailed accounts of strengths, deployment and movements, it would be easier to check them from intelligence sources, and much harder to confuse the issue.

Such an exchange would not only make it impossible to prepare a sudden unexpected blow; it would also in this way reduce the risks of miscalculation. We have seen that the most serious dangers of miscalculation in Europe at present are two. The first is that the forces of one side should strike preemptively on the mistaken assumption that the opposing forces were preparing a similar attack. A comprehensive system of exchanging information would do much to eliminate this danger. The risk of pre-emption would otherwise remain latent, almost unimaginable in normal periods, very real in times of tension.

It would be particularly necessary that both sides should maintain communications in a crisis—a revolt in an Eastern European country for example where the local commanders feared Western intervention. (Nor is this as heartless as it

seems: if the Soviet Army had no cause to fear Western intervention, and did not for this reason have to suppress any revolt as quickly and ruthlessly as possible, it might be easier for the Western powers to mitigate the severity of the repression than if they hovered silently on the edge of the conflict, willing in appearance to wound but still afraid to strike.)

The second possible danger of miscalculation is that the forces of the Eastern bloc might, on some unforeseen provocation and in a period of discord within the Western Alliance, choose to strike at a limited objective, hoping that the NATO powers would be unable to react quickly or effectively. The United States and her allies would then have to choose between accepting defeat or beginning a war whose course they might not be able to control. This is not at present a serious danger. In any form of limited attack, the Soviet forces would presumably be prepared to accept a limited defeat rather than carry the conflict further. But if, in the interests of diminishing the danger of nuclear accident, short-range nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the forward areas in Germany, a sudden threat to a limited objective might be a real danger, since Western prudence might become confused, in Soviet eyes, with Western weakness.

The system of communication that would be necessary needs to be studied in detail. It is clear that means should be provided for the exchange of information not only between the capitals of the great powers, as was widely suggested after the Cuban crisis, but also between the supreme commanders of the opposing alliances.¹ It would be more effective and give greater assurance if each could keep in touch with his opposite number in this way, and it would be harder to break off communications, or to deliberately mislead, if any action was contemplated. Above all, in times of crisis it would prevent local commanders from beginning a conflict through miscalculation or anxiety.

¹ See President Kennedy's statement of December 12, 1962, and the American proposals to the Geneva disarmament conference of the same date which envisaged an exchange of military missions between the headquarters of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. agreed on June 20th 1963 to establish a direct Moscow-Washington link

This form of communication is all the more necessary if the Western powers still hope to modify the situation in Europe. If they were resigned to a permanent *status quo*, there would be little fear of crises, and little need for the tacit alliance against war which is a necessary part of political hostilities. It is precisely because the NATO powers continue to hope for changes, which in favourable political circumstances they might bring about by pressure short of war, that it is important to insure against unnecessary conflict.

It is also a necessary part of Western defence: the Soviet Union has no greater interest in maintaining the *status quo* as such than have the Atlantic powers. If the latter were to commit themselves to maintaining the present situation in Europe, they would invite 'salami' tactics from the other side. The best safeguard against this threat is to make it constantly and consistently clear that it could provoke dangerous crises. The example of Korea is significant in this respect: a clear demarcation line between the two blocs did not suffice to prevent miscalculation and aggression. The American posture in Korea was ambiguous and inconsistent, and this made the precision of the demarcation line, an artificial frontier held by forces of doubtful value, a temptation to aggression. If it is true that as the likelihood of general war decreases, local and limited war might again break out in Europe, a similar situation could arise at some point of the European front. The declared determination of the senior commanders, if effectively communicated to their opposite numbers, would then be the best safeguard against miscalculation.

IX

The dangers of miscalculation arise from the mistrust and lack of communication which separate the opposing camps. For this reason, proposals for inspection and surveillance are unlikely to be effective in themselves. They must be preceded by less comprehensive arrangements in which the two adversaries can come to understand each other's fears and intentions. Without these, formal arrangements, like an exchange of military missions, would be of marginal value. In fact, it is probable that in the immediate future communica-

tions between the two sides are more relevant to stability than a formal instrument like a non-aggression pact, and that informal arrangements are likely to prove more effective than formal treaties.

The effectiveness of informal arrangements against miscalculation depends on the recognition that this is a common danger. In other words, informal arrangements do not provide a guarantee against betrayal; they do provide safeguards against a mistake. The criteria by which informal arrangements should be judged are not those of ability to enforce them, but the ability to see whether both parties have a common interest in observing them. In this respect a tacit understanding between NATO and the Warsaw Pact might be more effective than a detailed treaty agreement even if the latter were enforced by reciprocal teams of inspectors. (Any form of U.N. inspection is, of course, hardly relevant here.) It would, moreover, be very difficult in the present context of international relations to frame an agreement of this kind which could be limited to the objects which it is intended to serve, and yet did not give one side an undue advantage over the other.

The kind of difficulties that would be involved in reaching a precise agreement have been shown in recent negotiations for a nuclear test-ban. To be enforceable a test-ban demands at least a small number of on-site inspections: but this, so the Soviet Union claimed, was not designed to enforce a test-ban but to open up the military secrets of the Russian homeland to foreign spies; and even when the Soviet negotiators gave way in February 1963 on the principle of on-site inspection, they made it clear enough that this should be taken as a symbolic rather than a practical gesture. It is certainly true that large-scale inspection would work to the advantage of the United States by robbing Soviet deterrent power of the mystery which helps to make it invulnerable. Yet it is clear that as long as both of these powers seriously desire to avoid further nuclear testing, a moratorium is sufficient. The time that has been spent at Geneva in trying to cast a desire to slow down the arms race and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons into treaty form illustrates the difficulties of translating a private identity of interest into a formal agreement; at the

same time it is not yet proven that a formal treaty would prevent them from beginning tests again if the military necessity to do so was sufficiently urgent.

Similarly in Europe, if miscalculation were recognised as a real and distinct danger, informal agreements could be reached more speedily and more effectively than solemn treaty commitments. These measures should aim at assurance against false alarms and rash responses, and at the same time should improve the system of communicating threats or warnings. These objectives would necessitate a number of unilateral measures of restraint in Western Europe which could be communicated to the Soviet Union, and a system of European defence which will make the military balance more stable and deterrence more effective.

X

The communication of reassurances both about NATO policy and about alterations in it depends on developing an overall policy which will convey to the Soviet Union that the Western Alliance is aiming not at overwhelming military superiority but at a stable military relationship. This can best be pursued through a number of distinct agreements, not all of which are exclusively concerned with Europe. In the first instance these may take the form of tacit Soviet-American arrangements. One step which was taken in this direction after the Cuban crisis of 1962 was the decision to dismantle the vulnerable American first-strike weapons in Europe, the *Jupiter* missiles in Italy and Turkey which were a hangover of the 'missile gap' years. Perhaps the elimination of the equally vulnerable Soviet IRBM sites in the Baltic states may follow. In the wake of Cuba, there is still room for a great power understanding on the use and misuse of foreign bases in spite of subsequent setbacks in Soviet-American relations.

But the problem of mutual restraint also has important European implications. What is the Soviet Union achieving in terms of its own security from attack, by its steady build-up of IRBMs in Western Russia, other than strengthening the military arguments for replacing the NATO medium bombers in Europe, which they have rendered vulnerable, by mobile

MRBMs which are more accident prone than aircraft? Conversely, though at a different level of importance, what are the Americans achieving by the introduction of the *Davy Crockett* atomic mortar in their forward units in Germany, other than strengthening the military arguments in Moscow for a decentralisation of Soviet tactical atomic weapons which are now held under tight central control? With the disappearance of any axiomatic connection between military firepower and national security, measures of mutual self-restraint become more urgent.

For at present, each alliance in Europe fears different threats. Because of the nature of Western defence, the chief apprehension of the Warsaw Pact is the short-range and long-range nuclear weapons which the NATO forces threaten to bring into play almost at the outset of fighting; but these are in present circumstances a practical necessity in the defence of the West against the conventional power of the Soviet forces. Until the fear of Russian mechanised forces is minimised, the Soviet forces will continue to fear Western nuclear weapons—and prepare to respond to them.

If restraint within the two alliances is to broaden into agreements between them, the active co-operation and participation of the European powers will be needed. At the same time, it will be necessary for the Soviet Union and the United States to demonstrate to each other their control of their respective allies. In this respect, the Soviet Union has a considerable advantage over the United States: her control over the other signatories of the Warsaw Pact is for all practical purposes absolute. No one in the West has much cause for apprehension from the adventurousness of these small powers. The United States, on the other hand, has neither the desire nor the ability to achieve this sort of control within NATO; and in certain circumstances the Soviet Union might have reason to fear that she was being dragged into war with the United States through the activities of a lesser European power. This is difficult to imagine, and Soviet propaganda against the Federal Republic is most unconvincing; but in circumstances of exceptional tension, it is possible that one or other of the European powers might attempt, or appear to attempt, to involve the whole alliance in a private venture.

There is no contradiction between the need for both the Great Powers to demonstrate their control of the situation, and the need for the European powers to participate in any arrangements between East and West. The only way to remove Russian fears is for NATO to show that it is a strong and united alliance; the only way to remove European suspicions of a Russian-American agreement 'over their heads' is for the Europeans themselves to participate more fully in an active search for relaxation in the field of tension between the two camps. And only in this way can they begin to create an alliance against war and progress from there to practical measures of arms reduction in Europe.

XI

A negotiated reduction of armaments would be to the advantage of both alliances in Europe, as long as it was consistent with a stable military balance. It could free large numbers of men and significant economic resources for more inspiring purposes than holding the line across the Continent, and would make it more difficult for any minor conflict to begin a new war.

Europe is, moreover, an area where a reduction of armaments could prove workable. It is a clearly-defined geographical region, unlike, for example, South-East Asia, where the balance of forces is extended over an area that includes China and Australia. The countries between the Soviet border and the Irish Sea form a homogeneous geographical unit; and each alliance is well aware of the nature of the particular forces which are stationed within the other's borders.

In the absence of an agreement on general and comprehensive disarmament applicable to the whole world, Europe could perhaps provide a model for regional disarmament, and for the techniques of verification and inspection that would be needed to enforce it on a wider scale. And since the security of the whole of Europe depends in the last resort on the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States, since the forces that each of these powers keeps in Europe do not represent so much a threat to each other as an attempt to stabilise the overall balance, it might be that each could contemplate a reduction in the forces of the alliance it

leads, without impairing the balance that has been established. It is possible that ultimately such a reduction could reinforce the balance, by making a localised attack below the level of general war more difficult.

If it is true that the defence still has a significant superiority over the attack, and if the forces in Europe were equipped in the first place to fight a conventional battle, this could well prove true. It is of course true today that the NATO armies are intended to fight conventionally in response to a conventional attack, but they are not for the most part equipped to fight any prolonged conventional engagement, and the most immediate cause of the insecurity of the present military balance is that a heavy assault would soon involve the use of nuclear weapons and the danger of a world war. The immediate need in reinforcing the stability of the European balance is to give the Western armies the ability to fight without recourse to nuclear weapons; but the purpose of arms reduction would be to make a heavy conventional attack impossible.¹

The forces of the opposing alliances in Europe today are in fact nearer parity than is generally realised. Because of the unsettled nature of the Far East and the possibility of conflict there, the Soviet Union today maintains about a fifth of its forces east of the Urals. It is estimated that the Soviet army has 160 active line divisions, most of which are below full strength. Of these, some 75 are in European Russia and 26 in Eastern Europe. A lightning secret reinforcement of the divisions in Europe would not be easy if the system of static inspection, outlined earlier in the chapter, were once set up. To confront the 26 Soviet divisions in Europe itself, the NATO powers have 24 divisions in the Central Area, in general of rather greater firepower. The Soviet forces do have a certain preponderance in tanks, of which it is estimated some 14,000 are available in Western Russia and Eastern Europe. The Central Area of NATO can muster some 6,000.

This indicates that one major advance over the present position could be made if the number of Soviet tanks available in Eastern Europe were reduced. The Western armies would then have to rely less on forward nuclear weapons to repel a

¹ See comment by Le Contrôleur Général P. Genevey, p. 230

heavy armoured assault. Although the withdrawal of front-line nuclear weapons in return for the reduction of armoured forces would need working out in detail, and a real correspondence would be more difficult to establish than some of the advocates of such a scheme claim, it would be worth study. It could reduce the possibilities of a concentrated punch from the East and the need for recourse to nuclear weapons in the West.

But this scheme, like the general prospect of arms reduction in Europe, would imply that the Russian leaders no longer regarded the threat they still hold poised over Europe as a corrective to the imbalance in strategic forces between the Soviet Union and the United States. It would mean that they no longer held Europe as a hostage, liable either to destruction by medium-range missiles, or conquest by ground forces, against a strategic attack by the United States. And this would imply that both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted a strategy of 'minimum deterrence' *vis-à-vis* each other, or at least that neither sought strategic superiority over the other. Present American policy is opposed to this; but a counterforce strategy has been adopted, as we have seen, not so much because of the increased theoretic vulnerability of the United States, as because of the permanent vulnerability of its European allies. If the vulnerability of Europe were diminished by the reduction or elimination of the Soviet medium-range missile threat, a strategy of minimum deterrence (which the Soviet Union has accepted in principle in the early stages of general disarmament) could prove more acceptable.¹

It is clear that the reduction of armaments in Europe could only come about by a rather wider agreement between the leading powers of the two alliances. It is equally clear that it would need the positive concurrence of all the European governments, and would depend on the continuing support of European public opinion. At present, no Western European government favours such reduction. But it remains a possibility that will repay study for the future, even though it might have to be preceded by changes in the structure and level of armaments before the situation was secure enough to permit any change of policy.¹

¹ See comments by Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, p. 230 and by Professor Léo Hamon, p. 231

PART THREE

A Stable Western Defence

Chapter 7

The Defence of Western Europe

I

THIS study is concerned with the relationship between the political stability of Europe in the decade ahead and the military policy which the powers, great and small, pursue there. First it has examined whether what was originally a military deadlock has now acquired the characteristics of a stable equilibrium. It seems that it has acquired some of them, but that, since Soviet policy accepts no concept of stability in international relations, since Western Europe is becoming an area of such dynamic activity, and since technological developments are constantly altering the strategic relationships of the two Great Powers, this equilibrium could be upset or undermined. The corollary is that a form of co-existence, from which more human and normal personal and national relationships between the countries of East and West Europe may emerge, can only be assured by deliberate acts of policy on both sides.

The second part of the study has discussed the scope for multilateral agreements between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, intended not so much to dismantle the military equilibrium in Europe—for no one can yet foresee the political circumstances which will make this possible—as to remove the principal dangers which are inherent in it. The range of proposals that are realistic in the sense of being enforceable, and effective in the sense of reducing tensions and dangers in the area, has become narrowed by the march of political and military developments. The room for manoeuvre, which appeared to exist five or ten years ago, for the evolution of more far reaching and imaginative schemes for the joint control of arms within the framework of the East-West military confrontation in Europe, has been reduced.

It follows, therefore, that we must examine closely those actions to enhance European stability and the 'balance of

prudence'¹ which it is within the West's own power to initiate. Historically, most arms races or hostile military relationships have not been ended by multilateral agreement: they have either ended in war or they have died away as a result of unilateral acts of prudence and restraint as the political conditions, which gave rise to them began to change. So it may be with this, the most titanic of arms races, and the most highly armed state of peace the world has ever seen.

There is nothing novel about unilateral measures of arms control. Measures to restrain or lower one's own level of armaments, or to place them under stricter control, are not acts of grace, but acts of self-interest intended to communicate the defensive nature of one's own preparations or the firm control of one's own forces. The military planning of a nation or an alliance is necessarily conducted with an eye to its effect on the plans of the potential adversary. Crude military power, whether measured in bombs, weapons or men, has never been a true measure of a country's security, and there are many steps which a nation or an alliance could take to enhance its military strength, which would at the same time diminish its security by leading to intensified preparations or pre-emptive attack by its adversaries. Deterrent strategies obscure the relationship between military power and national security still further.

At the same time, there can be no such thing as a unilateral act of policy designed solely to reassure one's adversary. Such action may have been conceivable in days of simpler technology and greater ease of communication between adversaries, when foreign offices were all staffed by men of similar backgrounds who spoke a common language. But if one adds the difficulty of distinguishing between the defensive and the offensive purposes of modern weapons and strategies to that of communicating intentions across an ideological barrier, it would be idle to pretend that any unilateral action on the part of NATO is likely to have an immediate effect upon Soviet plans and decisions. Nevertheless, it is possible to choose options which strengthen the men of moderation in the Soviet hierarchy—those for instance who wish to divert resources from the military budget to the civil

¹ The phrase is that of Professor T. C. Schelling of Harvard

economy, or to lower the tension between Moscow and the West as the tension between Moscow and Peking rises—rather than those which play into the hands of the irredentists.

There is a broad consensus among the NATO allies that military planning must conform to certain political requirements. The first is to avoid triggering off a major increase in the level of forces and weapons on each side, which would not only frustrate the political objectives of the alliance, but create considerable psychological and economic strains within NATO itself. Allied with this is the need to provide convincing evidence that NATO is designed and organised as a defensive alliance. This policy cannot be pursued in any hope of quickly influencing Soviet propaganda statements, but in order to eliminate certain doubts and confusions on the part of those who take policy decisions and draw up military plans in Moscow.

A third requirement of NATO policy, that is directly linked with the other two, is to convince public opinion in the Alliance itself that military planning is subordinated to political objectives. The Alliance is not 'one equal temper of heroic hearts', but comprises fifteen nations of widely differing national psychologies, historical experience, political attitudes and physical power. If the Soviet Union is to be convinced that NATO is a defensive alliance, that it has an effective defence, that it can take and enforce decisions within its own ranks, and that the American commitment to the defence of Europe is not weakening, then public opinion within the NATO countries themselves must be equally convinced. The external strength and the internal self-confidence of the alliance are inseparable.

The policy of the Alliance has two different aspects as it affects the stability of the European balance. One concerns the decisions which it reaches in the years immediately ahead about the control and purpose of the military force which it possesses, and particularly the control of nuclear weapons and strategy. The other concerns the levels of force and kinds of weapons which it decides to maintain in Europe and the adjacent seas. The two problems interact upon each other: for instance, European pressure to retain nuclear weapons on European soil is closely connected with the fact that European

countries have had little voice in the planning which concerns these weapons and the decision to use them. Conversely, European anxiety to obtain some control of nuclear decision-making is increased by divergencies of view between Washington and the European capitals about the correct structure of European defence. Broadly the political problem of the control of strategic planning and decisions governs the military question of the design of the NATO defences in Europe. But because it raises so wide a complex of issues it has been decided to leave the problem of control until the next chapter.

II

The policies and the dispositions of the two great blocs constitute, in so far as they affect Europe, a 'balance of prudence'. Since the foundation of NATO neither side has made any military *démarche* in the area, or has risked upsetting the balance by attempting, through military or diplomatic pressure, to make a territorial gain. Such *démarches* as have occurred have been in other continents, in Asia, in the Middle East and in the Caribbean. However, as the earlier chapters of this study have shown, and indeed as most Europeans are instinctively aware, this balance is not a natural one. It has been based on a complex strategic deadlock involving most of the Northern Hemisphere, and not on any reciprocity of local strength or mutual interest in Europe. At the same time, it is clear that as time passes what started purely as a hostile military confrontation in Europe is acquiring some of the characteristics of a political equilibrium. It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that if the prudential characteristics of this stalemate can be reinforced in the decade ahead, a more normal political relationship between the two halves of Europe may gradually begin to develop.

The acceptance of the *status quo* in Europe cannot fail to distress many people in the West who feel that an alliance of the strength and vigour of NATO should not be governed by so negative an ambition. There is an intelligent minority of opinion in several countries of the Alliance which argues that, through a radical reorganisation and strengthening of the

NATO forces in Europe, it should be possible to restore fluidity to the European political scene and bring about a reunion of Germany by more direct means than this has been considered possible in this study.¹

It is important to be clear what it would mean in military terms to give credibility to such an allied posture in Europe. It implies the ability on the part of NATO to threaten the occupation of the whole or part of Eastern Germany, either as a deliberate act or in response to Soviet pressure on Berlin. This would involve first of all the maintenance of a very large American strategic superiority so that the Soviet Union would be deterred from threatening or using its great European strength in medium-range bombers and missiles in response to local Western attack for fear of the consequences to Russia itself. It would involve the development of local air superiority by NATO which would mean roughly doubling the size of the tactical air forces in Western Europe. It would mean the stationing of a ground force in Western Germany of a size which potentially could defeat the 20 Soviet divisions in Eastern Germany, and occupy, say, Saxony and Brandenburg, before the large Soviet ground forces in Western Russia could be mobilised and deployed against it. If the lessons of the last war, that a homogeneous mobile force such as the Russians have in Eastern Germany, has a three to one advantage in defence, are still relevant, this would involve the stationing of a force of the order of 60 divisions in Western Europe as compared to the present 24 divisions. But if nuclear weapons were to be used tactically to improve this ratio then a firmer agreement on the possibility of limited nuclear

¹ See, for instance, the speech at West Point of December 5, 1962, by Mr. Dean Acheson, the former United States Secretary of State: 'In my judgement to accept the division of Europe along the Helmstedt line is dangerous and unnecessary. Here I believe that political policy and military policy should go hand in hand to accomplish important political and security results. Soviet domination of East Germany is largely based in the preponderance of Soviet conventional power on their Western front. If this did not exist Soviet intervention to support Ulbricht's authority might become increasingly impracticable. A policy of the solution of the German question by Germans, restrained by membership in a United Europe and an Atlantic alliance, might end the dilemma of Berlin'

war would have to be achieved, in order to give any credibility to such a plan. Finally, it would involve a very close harmonisation of political and military objectives among the NATO allies in order to give the Russians cause to fear that such a force might be used in such a way, something which would not be easy to accomplish when the risk of failure might bring such catastrophic results.

NATO, simply because it is an alliance of many different countries, and because its most powerful member is separated from Europe by three thousand miles of sea, does not have as wide a range of initiatives as some of its most energetic spirits could wish. And one choice which it does not possess is to alter the map of Europe by developing dominance over the forces of the Warsaw Pact, or to tilt the European balance of power in its favour, independent of the strategic strength of the United States or of the global balance of power.

To some this still seems a debatable proposition. After all, the population of Western Europe is higher than that of the Soviet Union and its resources are comparable or even superior to Russia's. The total mobilised manpower of the NATO countries exceeds those of the Warsaw Pact countries by a third, and the combined wealth of the NATO powers vastly exceeds that of the opposing coalition. But these general comparisons can be misleading, for they overlook the differences between a dispersed maritime coalition and a centralised land power which enables the latter to get much greater military value out of each soldier; in particular, they overlook the relative ease with which the Soviet Union could concentrate a superiority of force at any one point along the perimeter of the NATO defences, including the Central Area of Europe where the NATO forces are at their strongest.

This situation might change. Economic pressure might at some point in the ten years ahead, force the Soviet Union to reduce the size of the Soviet army, or political pressure in Eastern Europe might make it less possible to station large forces of troops and aircraft in East Germany and Poland. A reorganisation of priorities within NATO, perhaps as a result of a better system for reconciling the political and military planning of the allies and for resting the responsibility for the defence of Europe more firmly on European shoulders, might

lead to a decision to create somewhat larger European ground and tactical air forces. But if the trends in both Soviet and Western policy over the past five years are to be extended into the immediate future, it seems realistic to assume that there will continue to be a disparity in the military strength which the two blocs will maintain or could quickly augment in Central Europe.

This is not an easy prospect to face, for it means that Western Europe must continue to be more dependent on the United States than the pride of its nations can readily accept, and that its security must continue to be more dependent on the availability of nuclear weapons than the United States can now easily accept. However, neither condition is intolerable and since the fruition of so many of the promising developments both in Western Europe and in East-West relations depends upon a long period of peace, they are worth bearing. But the NATO alliance will have the worst of both worlds if the years ahead are dominated by continuing friction between the United States and her European allies about the formula for achieving the most stable system of defence and deterrence in Europe. It would be unable to present a firm and confident face to the Soviet Union in crises or negotiations concerning Europe. And if one side or other in the current intra-allied disputes becomes firmly convinced that its interests are being neglected—the European allies sensing that the United States is prepared to agree to some semi-neutralisation of Europe in the interests of a general *détente* with the Soviet Union or of limiting her own liabilities there, the United States feeling that the allies are not pulling their weight or are holding it committed to a dangerous dependence on the early use of nuclear weapons—then it is almost certain to lead to the growth of either neutralism or isolationism in one half of the alliance.

III

Some of the differences between the European and the American view—or more correctly between the European military leaders and most of their political superiors on the one hand, and, on the other, the strong civilian team which

now dominates the Pentagon and those of the American military leaders who agree with them—have been explored in Chapter 4. Essentially they centre around the relationship of defence to deterrence in Europe. The reaction to a full-scale Soviet nuclear attack on Europe at present raises no argument: it would kill up to half a million Americans, destroy vast quantities of American war material, and involve immediate American retaliation—whether counterforce or counter-city, controlled or all out is irrelevant to this argument. It is the proper allied reaction to some Soviet threat or act of aggression short of full-scale nuclear attack which is the source of controversy—a major or minor conventional assault, intervention in some situation of civil disorder, or the less likely contingency of Soviet aggression with a highly selective use of nuclear weapons.

It is in considering these sort of situations that American thinking has become disenchanted with the short-range nuclear weapon as a means of defending Europe, or of offsetting the disparity between Soviet and NATO ground and tactical air power. Intensive study, through war games and manoeuvres, has cast grave doubt—and not only among Americans—on the original hypothesis that its use favoured the defender, and indeed has convinced many that the defender might lose all control of a battlefield dominated by short-range nuclear weapons without being able to hold his ground.¹ Their first purpose, in the current American view, is now not so much as a weapon of repulse as a kind of signal gun—a shot across the bows—to warn an aggressor who has engaged NATO's conventional defences that his violation of Western territory has reached a point where, if he does not halt his forces or retreat, he stands in immediate danger of a punishing though controlled strategic blow, which will first destroy his forces and then confront him with the option of humiliating surrender or the destruction of his own civilisation. But this warning nuclear shot may fail and prove merely the prelude to a strategic exchange in which the United States will herself suffer vast casualties. Once the level of

¹ For a non-American view see 'Judgement and Control in Modern Warfare' by Sir Solly Zuckerman in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1962

conflict had moved from the chemical to the nuclear explosive, the chances of restraining nuclear conflict below the strategic level are not now considered to be promising. The American concern, therefore, is to be in a position to thwart any minor Soviet initiative in Europe without recourse to nuclear weapons at all, and second, if serious conflict does occur, to gain the maximum time for a decision on whether to initiate the strategic nuclear action which would almost inevitably follow tactical nuclear action. In the American view such an insurance policy requires somewhat stronger and considerably better conventional forces in Europe, which in equity should be provided by the countries who would be even more devastated by nuclear action than the United States, namely those of Western Europe. To rely primarily on the firepower of tactical nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe or to defeat Soviet forces in the field, to permit their existence to divert attention from the need to build up strong conventional forces and firepower, might lead to paralysis of will and to an intense reluctance to consider a resort to force in the face of Soviet pressure. Over-reliance on nuclear weapons in Europe might thus lead to some disastrous diplomatic or military humiliation for the West. Strong conventional forces in Europe have, in the American view, become an essential part of a credible system of deterrence of all forms of attack in Europe.

Europeans do not fully share the American disenchantment with short-range nuclear weapons, and all European governments still regard them as essential to the security of Europe. No one in Europe has ever argued that tactical atomic weapons should automatically be used immediately the enemy crosses the border of a NATO country; but rather that the enemy should have no certainty that they will not be used. In the view of most European officials NATO defence policy for Europe should be framed with two objectives in mind: first, to be in a position to postpone the introduction of nuclear weapons for as long as possible, in order to avoid the unnecessary devastation of any territory; second, to prevent the enemy from making large territorial gains while the American government is making up its mind whether the aggression is grave enough to warrant the use of strategic

nuclear weapons. The only way to combine these partially conflicting objectives is through a rational tactic of uncertainty.

In European eyes this tactic of uncertainty certainly does not imply leaving the decision on the use of nuclear weapons, and perhaps the future of the world, in the hands of junior commanders. Rather the reverse: it implies that governments will continue to remain in control of the situation, and that the decision whether or not to use nuclear weapons remains a strictly political one—though based on up to the minute reports from the fighting line.

The question is which and how many governments? For this tactic to be effective, probably more than one centre of nuclear decision-making within the alliance is required. Otherwise it might become possible, or so it is argued, for Soviet planners to calculate with reasonable precision the level of Soviet pressure on Europe at which the United States would decide to use nuclear weapons, especially as the American political climate and the sheer quantity of statements made by American leaders in Congressional testimony, press conferences, speeches and interviews tends to force successive Administrations to be over-precise in their declaratory policy, and to reveal their military thinking all too clearly.¹

One difficulty is that unless NATO could achieve considerable progress in nuclear decision-sharing, the element of uncertainty about the point at which nuclear weapons would be introduced must be calculated almost entirely in terms of the thought processes of the American President. Many Europeans fear that the Russians will know that this decision must become increasingly harder to take and therefore probably more delayed as the United States itself becomes more vulnerable. Hence the proposal, which is associated with the former German Defence Minister, Herr Strauss, that, at an agreed moment in a European crisis, the United States should be prepared to delegate discretion to use tactical nuclear weapons

¹ One European objection in Europe to Mr. McNamara's Ann Arbor speech of June 16, 1962, lay not so much in the substance of his doctrine itself as in his telling the Soviet Union thus clearly how the United States would react in various circumstances

to SACEUR or his area commanders in Europe. But they could act only on the authority of the government or governments whose terrain was under attack. This is a more considered apprehension than the vulgarised version which sometimes appears in European speeches or articles, namely that since New York and Chicago are now vulnerable the United States cannot retaliate for the destruction of Paris or Cologne, or the even more extreme view that in the age of nuclear stalemate no country can be expected to protect another. Arguments carried to those extremes are, in fact, no more than a rationale for European nuclear separatism.

A more practical difficulty is that the kind of deployment required for the nuclear battlefield is very different from that needed to withstand attack with conventional weapons. One requires dispersion and protection, the other concentration and mobility: though troops may train for both roles, it is difficult for them to switch from one to the other, especially from a concentrated to a dispersed layout at short notice. It is principally for this reason that the military commanders in the Central Area, having been equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, and knowing that the Russians have them too, are now unwilling to contemplate any reorganisation of NATO battle plans. One of the most alarming aspects of the problem is the extent to which senior commanders of all nationalities in NATO have become psychologically dependent on the immediate authority to use a weapon which even their European political masters, let alone the President of the United States, may be very reluctant to give. A tactic of uncertainty could rebound on NATO and induce more confusion in its own ranks than caution in those of the enemy.

There is no way of entirely reconciling these two apprehensions: the European fear that a tactic of carefully controlled response to Soviet aggression, exercised from three thousand miles away in Washington, might lead to the drawing of a *de facto* boundary well inside Western Europe which a Russian commander knew he could reach before risking nuclear reprisal, and on which his leaders could negotiate the American insistence that centralised decision-making is the only way to avoid the risk of catastrophe through miscalculation. For beneath a conflict of doctrine there is a conflict of interest

between the two halves of the alliance. As has been said earlier, the American commitment to the security of Europe has not been modified: what has altered is the American view of the way in which the United States can afford to continue to exercise it. Apart from the special case of Berlin (where, because of its location, a Soviet gamble can only be deterred by the threat of general war or global measures of non-nuclear reprisal) the United States cannot stake the continued existence of the North American cities against a Soviet raid on Bornholm, or Finmark, Thrace or even Hamburg. She must have wider alternatives if she is not to loosen her commitment to Europe, and in the process make clear to the Soviet Union that it has been loosened: hence the American interest in a level of conventional forces in Europe that could positively defeat some limited attack, stamp out a border fire, or engage more general aggression until its size, direction and seriousness could be assessed beyond doubt.

To the governments of Europe, with its much smaller land area, with the horrors of prolonged conventional war upon their own soil still vivid in men's minds, such flexibility seems the recipe for trouble. They have therefore sought, consciously and unconsciously, to keep the United States committed to its old posture of massive retaliation by emphasis on the tactical nuclear weapon. If escalation from any level of nuclear conflict to strategic nuclear war is now regarded as a prime danger in American contemporary thought, it is considered by many thoughtful Europeans as the surest safeguard Europe can possess of Soviet prudence.

The trans-Atlantic debate, which this apparent conflict of interest has generated, reveals the limitations of strategic analysis. American analysts can clearly prove to their European colleagues that dependence on the tactical atomic weapon creates a high probability that, in the event of war, Europe will be destroyed whatever happens to the Soviet Union and the United States; that if Europe knew its true interests it should encourage a pattern of defence which held promise of confining war there to conventional weapons, and of ending it by the threat or use of strategic weapons by the two super powers upon each other's strategic targets. To this European analysts reply that they are concerned to deter war

not to fight it, that Americans do not understand the full ramifications of the deterrent strategies which the Americans themselves pioneered, that Europeans believe that the two super powers have too much to lose ever to resort to strategic action against each other, and that therefore the only safe way to deter war in Europe is to maintain a chain of risk that runs direct from the outposts to the very nerve centre of the Alliance.

IV

It will probably never be possible to achieve a complete reconciliation of the interests of a country which is protected by two oceans and is the centre of a world wide system of alliances, with those of the densely populated and exposed nations of NATO Europe. Nevertheless, if no attempt is made to resolve this argument on European defence the danger for Europe lies in a new form of American isolationism, with American forces withdrawn from Europe and a revised American strategy designed primarily to protect the North American continent; the danger for the United States is that Europe may decide to develop its own system of nuclear deterrence, tactical as well as strategic. What, therefore, is the framework of a possible compromise?

The first fact which should be faced is that the NATO ground forces in the Central Area are never likely to exceed the 30 ready divisions which has been the official NATO target since 1957. In fact there is no sign as yet of this target being achieved. The present forces in the Central Area total a little over 23 divisions and will, on present plans, only reach 26 divisions when the German build-up is completed in 1970. There is no doubt that in terms of population and national wealth the West European countries have the resources to present a much more formidable challenge to the conventional forces of the Soviet Union. A comparatively small proportion of their resources is allotted to defence, not much more than half the proportion which the United States devotes to it, between one-third and one-quarter that which the Soviet Union devotes: indeed less than 1 per cent of the increase in the output of the Six between 1954 and 1960 was

allocated to defence spending. The Community countries could afford a very large increase in defence expenditure in a short time if they set aside any appreciable part of their yearly increment in output to defence: it is estimated for example that the Six could double their combined defence expenditure in five years if they devoted only one-fifth of the yearly *increment* in their combined national product to defence.

But it is unlikely that their resources would be spent only on creating larger conventional forces, and it would prove difficult even if all the governments desired it. European governments are committed to a considerably wider range of public expenditure on services other than defence than the United States government. There is a serious shortage of skilled manpower in the industrial societies of Europe, and as the industrialisation of the backward areas of Europe—large regions of France and Italy in particular—gather momentum this shortage will be felt still more keenly. Although the Six have an average of less than 4 per cent of their male labour force in uniform, as compared with 5.7 per cent in the United States, a large diversion of manpower to the armed forces would have serious economic and social consequences throughout Europe.

Even if it were possible to augment the military manpower of Western Europe serious practical difficulties would remain. If these forces were to be deployed for a prolonged conventional defence, they would need for the most part to be stationed on the territory of the Federal Republic. But it is difficult to find adequate accommodation and training grounds for the troops already stationed in Germany, where the narrow territory presents serious logistic problems. Even the government of the Third Reich—with all its disregard for civil rights—never found it feasible in peace time to station more than about 30 divisions in what is now the area of the Federal Republic. The German frontier may be too long to be effectively defended by 26 or even 30 divisions, but Germany itself—one of the most densely populated countries in the world—is too small to hold any more.

These considerations apart, it is an open question whether anything short of a very substantial increase in NATO's

forces would materially alter the nature of the military situation in Europe. A relatively small increase in manpower levels would certainly make some national contingents more efficient than at present, but this would not sustain a conventional defence of Europe. One is forced to the conclusion that, short of a substantial measure of disengagement and mutual withdrawal, only a force of some 50 to 60 divisions in the Central Area, supported by perhaps 6,000 instead of 3,000 aircraft (and double the number of airfields) would, at present, enable NATO to dispense with the close support of nuclear weapons based in Europe.

But forces of this size would clearly create their own problems. For the first time, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would find themselves confronted with a large conventional army, including a major German contingent, capable perhaps of beginning an offensive action in Eastern Germany. It is hard to imagine that the Soviet Union would let their challenge pass unacknowledged. If a race in mobilised manpower ever developed in Europe, the NATO countries might win; but short of such a lunatic situation, it would be comparatively easy for the Soviet Union to outbid increased Western forces and move Soviet divisions forward from Russia and base them in Eastern Europe, especially in Czechoslovakia where there are none at present. The consequences for the Eastern European countries might be tragic, while the West would have gained nothing in comparative ground strength, and it would still be impossible to dispense with short-range nuclear weapons.

The basic framework of the European situation in the 1960s is that the European countries are not willing to increase their ground forces to a point where a sustained conventional defence of Europe becomes possible, particularly as it is impossible to calculate with any precision the level of forces at which this would be feasible. At the same time, the European countries must continue to depend, more perhaps than they might wish, on American strategic and conventional strength to assure this defence, and this dependence is made harder for them to accept because they find themselves in disagreement with the prevailing American conceptions of European defence and of the role of the American nuclear weapon on

which the Europeans rely. Both halves of the alliance are dissatisfied; neither can oblige the other to give way, except in such a way as to weaken the alliance as a whole.

V

Nevertheless a number of practical and limited steps could be adopted which would alleviate their disagreement and give both the United States and the Western European countries greater assurances—both that deterrence in Europe will continue to be effective, and that if it should fail, a flexible and realistic defence will still be possible. Without demanding greater efforts from the Western European nations than they are able to make, NATO forces can be greatly improved, and the level of conflict at which it is necessary to introduce nuclear weapons into the battle raised very considerably.

The ground forces in Europe could, in the first place, be made into a more effective fighting force without any great increase in numbers. A close study of the ground suggests that the military leaders are quite correct in insisting that there should be a force of 30 divisions in the Central Area, for with only 25 or 26 it is impossible for the Commander of the Central Area to have any reserve in hand to influence the course of operations. But preoccupation with numbers of divisions has mesmerised NATO in recent years, and too little attention has therefore been paid to the quality of troops, commanders and equipment. Their quality has been neglected by the European countries, partly for economic reasons, partly because, under rapid changes in American doctrine, which has tended to be synonomous with NATO policy, it has been hard to understand what function the ground forces fulfilled. In 1952 they were to defend Europe by conventional means alone: in 1954 they were assigned the function of a 'trip-wire' which would unleash Strategic Air Command: in 1957 they were told to enforce a 'pause' until tactical nuclear weapons were brought in to do the real fighting: in 1961 their combat rather than their symbolic functions began to be stressed again. The improvement of these forces depends on agreement on their functions, and this cannot happen until NATO itself becomes an effective centre of combined

military planning, rather than a platform for unilateral national assertions about what alliance doctrine ought to be. To start with, it is essential to rid NATO thinking of the habitual duality of 'shield' and 'sword'. 'Shield' is a gross misnomer for the ground forces of the Central Area, implying a stable and comprehensive system of defence on a solid front. But the forces in Germany have never been capable of holding an extended front in this fashion. The word was coined to point the contrast to the 'sword' of American strategic power rather than to describe the functions of the ground forces, but it has confused opinion into thinking of them as symbolic or garrison forces and for symbolic purposes one does not require troops of the highest quality.¹

No lasting agreement on the functions of the ground and air forces in the Central Area is possible until the NATO allies finally decide that the strategy of the alliance must be centrally evolved and can no longer be an amalgam of different national views. But even now a broad consensus is beginning to emerge, in Europe as well as in the United States, that these forces can no longer be regarded solely as the 'trip-wire' for nuclear reprisal, and that they have a genuine function of their own to perform. They are not there merely to test Soviet intentions while the United States decides whether and when to use nuclear weapons. This is one of their functions, but they must also now plainly be able to fight and rapidly repel any attack whose initial scale does not justify the use of nuclear weapons and the risks of escalation. This involves considerable changes in three characteristics of the ground forces and tactical air forces, their operational efficiency, their mobility and their non-nuclear firepower.

The operational efficiency of these forces is primarily a matter for national governments: for no amount of inter-allied nagging can convert a bad, or badly led, national contingent into an efficient one if the national government concerned is not prepared to take the matter in hand. However, one reason why there has been so great a variation in the quality of the

¹ Analogy and symbolism are, in any case, double-edged tools in international politics, and the new American fondness for referring to ground forces as the 'sword' and the strategic nuclear forces as the 'shield' is just as confusing

different national contingents derives from the belief, which became so firmly implanted in European minds during the 1950s, that the NATO ground forces were a symbolic rather than a battleworthy force. Many considerations enter into the quality of a fighting formation which are outside the scope of this study, but there is one objective yard-stick of battleworthiness, and that is whether a national contingent is at half, three-quarters, or at full strength. By this standard the 3 British divisions (which have been at 60 per cent of war strength) and the 2 French divisions fall far short of the mark, as have some of the German formations. One very reasonable complaint which the American authorities have about the contributions of the other NATO allies is that the 5 American divisions in Southern Germany are maintained, three to six thousand miles from home and at great expense, at full strength and fully battle ready, something which cannot be said of any European contributions including those of the Federal Republic. A competitive attitude towards the quality of the existing formations in Germany would make considerable difference to its defensibility, but this can only be engendered by a different system of planning and control in NATO itself (see Chapter 8).

The second factor is mobility. This is partly a matter of equipment and training: the Russian forces in East Germany are now more fully mechanised than any of their Western counterparts, except the American divisions, and unlike them can make night marches of 100 miles. Only slowly are the non-American forces getting the armoured personnel carriers and bridging equipment which gives any hope of being able to defeat some limited probe without recourse to nuclear weapons.

But mobility of the ground forces in Germany also depends on freeing them from the responsibility of trying to guard the whole line of the Iron Curtain in a crisis. With a limited force any such concept of the 'shield' must lead to the early, and probably first, use of nuclear weapons by the West, for it offers the Russians a choice of places in which to concentrate for a swift punch through a thin crust. Yet to leave any part of the line totally unguarded is to offer the Russians another kind of temptation. Static lines of defence are not the answer

to the problem, even if it were politically wise or possible to construct a Western extension of the Berlin wall along the whole line of the Iron Curtain.

The solution that has most commended itself to us involves four steps. The first would be to encourage the development of strong militia-type local defence forces in the countries most exposed to Soviet attack (Denmark, Germany, France, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Turkey). SHAPE has shown little interest in such proposals, and until recently there have been obvious political difficulties in the way of creating effective citizen defence forces in some of these countries. However, the gradual reconstruction of civil society in the Continental nations after the dislocation of World War Two, together with the development of effective small anti-tank missiles, vehicle destroyers and light automatic weapons offers a new prospect. It means that, at least in rural areas, local defence systems with an intimate knowledge of the terrain could effectively decelerate the pace and force the dispersion of attacking units and thus make possible their counter-attack by mobile regular divisions.¹ One obvious political difficulty is that only the exposed countries in the alliance would be able to contribute to this form of defence. But this does not seem an insuperable objection: countries like Britain or Canada who can make no contribution of this kind, could reasonably be expected to undertake increased commitments of another kind. (In the case of these two particular countries a strengthening of the sparse defences of the Northern area, especially Northern Norway, would be an important contribution to European stability.) At the same time it would be far more reasonable to expect Germany to supplement her 12 divisions with a strong militia force than to increase her regular forces to 16 or 18 divisions.

The second step would be to draw a distinction within the existing 25–30 divisions, between the mobile counter-attack

¹ Militia-type local defence forces do, of course, exist in a number of NATO countries and the reorganisation of the French army actually envisages using part of the regular forces as well for territorial defence. Herr von Hassel, the new German Defence Minister, has advocated a territorial defence system for Northern Germany. In general, however, local defence has not been given the priority or the equipment it deserves

forces and those which provide a pattern of strong points behind which mobile counter-attack can be organised. If there were, say, two battle groups of 5 divisions each, sited forward in the Northern and Central commands in Germany, of the best quality troops with a high degree of mobility, and trained for conventional defence and counter-attack, the risk of a lightning raid on Hamburg or Hanover would be considerably diminished. (Ten divisions are not a large enough force to create any fears of a NATO attack on Eastern Europe.) If the other formations were given the responsibility for creating a network of defensive positions in depth, including fortified strong points, then there would be less chance of any Soviet attack making any significant progress without recourse to tactical nuclear attack, which in turn would expose the Soviet Union to strategic nuclear retaliation. There would be less chance than today of the Soviet forces being able to prosecute a successful war in Germany below the nuclear threshold.

The third step would be the creation of a stronger system of reserves.¹ These have a double purpose in the age of nuclear stalemate. Their forward deployment in a period of tension is now almost the only way in which the West can register its determination to fight if the crisis deepens. Thus the despatch of two American divisions to Europe during the Berlin crisis in 1961 may have had a psychological and diplomatic effect out of all proportion to the military significance of this move. In the event of war itself, they would be essential to strengthen the depth of the defence system. The United States, France and Britain now have 13 divisions on their home territories which are not permanently assigned to NATO. (United States 8; France 4; United Kingdom 1.) But the British and French divisions are in a rather different category from the American ones. If the figure of a permanent 30 division force under the control of the Commander, Central Area, is militarily sound, and we have suggested that it is, then it is only Britain and France who can raise the present force to

¹ A comprehensive analysis of European manpower and reserve systems is to be found in M. R. D. Foot, *Men in Uniform*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961. New York: Frederick Praeger

this figure, unless Germany is to be asked to make a disproportionately large contribution which would engender intra-European friction. For France the problem is almost entirely political since such a step would largely involve the 'assignment' to NATO of French divisions that are being formed in any case and which could be stationed close to the German border. For Britain the question is both political and financial, since her forces in Germany are a considerable drain on her foreign exchange resources. To 'assign' the present British and French reserve forces would not involve asking Britain or France to relinquish control over units which they may need to fulfil some other commitment outside Europe, for 'assignment' of its forces to NATO leaves a nation quite free to withdraw them temporarily, as the sporadic use of American forces based in Germany for other purposes illustrates. What it does involve is recognising that units that have not trained with the forces currently deployed in Germany, or are not stationed well forward in Europe, could not make an effective contribution to the crucial early stages of a conflict with the Russians in Europe.

In addition to reserve divisions in being, the American government is anxious that its European partners should develop a more efficient system of reserves than can be mobilised after aggression has occurred, so as to offset the disparity between the forces the Russians can bring to bear in Central Europe in the second or third week of a war and those which NATO can muster. In pure military logic there is much to be said for such a step. But it raises, in Europe, the spectre of a prolonged conventional combat, and to give this step too high a priority might militate against public support in Europe for the kind of practical measures with which this section is concerned.

Closely allied to the question of assignment is that of deployment. It is an anomaly which derives from the distribution of the original occupation zones of Germany, that the United States maintains the equivalent of 6 full-strength divisions in Southern Germany where they are protected by a mountain wall on two sides of them, while the historic axes of advance into Western Europe, towards Cologne and the Ruhr, are guarded by weaker forces. There is not a great deal

that can be done about this maldistribution, though it can be alleviated by the deployment of more German units in the northern half of Germany. But it does lend significance and urgency to the fourth rational step which the NATO powers can take, namely the restoration of mobility to their forces in Central Europe by the development of a more unified system of logistics.

Logistic support is still a national responsibility of each NATO government, with the result that in the small area of the Federal Republic there are eight separate systems of supply lines running back to the ports and depots in France and the Low Countries. The consequence is that each national contingent could at present fight at only a limited distance from its own bases, and the NATO forces as a whole can reap very few of the advantages of mobility with which their equipment is endowing them. This is the recipe for a potential military disaster of a kind that the world has seen continually from the Peloponnesian War to 1940, where an attacker has been able to drive a wedge between different national elements of a defensive coalition.

At present American policy is directed towards creating a common logistic system between the American and the German armies, the two largest contingents in Central Europe. This appears to be a short-sighted policy conceived to meet a need that is admittedly urgent. Interdependence in weapons and production is unlikely to be successful between the two halves of the Atlantic alliance in the immediate future, though, with proper encouragement, it might proceed very rapidly within Europe. Moreover, the American logistic system in Europe is, for reasons of distance, more complex than the European countries require. It would be sounder to develop a common logistic system among West European armies, probably through a European Defence Authority whose functions are outlined in the next chapter, while maintaining an American system that is more closely integrated than at present with that of the European armies, but which remains separate.¹

A common system of logistics within Europe, but separate from that of the United States, would have two advantages

¹ See comment by Dr. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, p. 231

in addition to the greater operational efficiency of the armies. The element of common responsibility among the European powers would make it possible to extend the number of services financed in common, and thereby diminish the role of balance of payments problems in military planning. Second, if for political or financial reasons it were to become necessary for the United States to reduce the level of its forces in Europe, the degree of dislocation would be less, and the European powers could adjust their own force levels more easily, than if the logistics of the armies were based on the American system.

These four practical steps do not exhaust the sensible measures that could be taken without a vast increase in expenditure to make more efficient the flexible weapon that NATO has so laboriously forged in Central Europe. A beginning has been made with the NATO mobile force, in creating some more effective form of assurance to the countries of NATO's northern and southern flanks. At present only seven countries contribute to this force, and it will require a concerted effort to make it into a homogeneous and effective unit. There is much to be done in the field of communications, and above all in joint training. The point, however, about the four steps listed above is that they raise no fundamental disputes of interest or policy between the United States and her Western European allies (nor between NATO and the Soviet Union), while their implementation would give the Alliance as a whole a more confident stance in time of crisis.

The NATO forces today, especially in the Central Area, are, when compared with the homogeneous, alert and highly trained Soviet formations in Eastern Germany, much too like those of some eighteenth-century coalition. They lack the capacity for speedy deployment and the standard logistics which alone can enable them to offer the West a real alternative to permanent dependence on the nuclear weapon. None of their shortcomings are by themselves irreparable of redress and many of them may prove easier to deal with if a European Defence Authority is established, a common tactical procedure can be hammered out, and common logistic and production lines established in the main European countries. But the energy and resources that will be needed finally to

solve these problems are unlikely to be found in Europe until the relation of these forces to the nuclear weapon can be more intelligently defined.

VI

It is important, at this stage, to distinguish between the various types of nuclear weapons which are available to the NATO ground forces. The most numerous are the *Honest John* 12-mile missiles which now form an organic part of almost every NATO division in Southern as well as Central (but not in Northern) Europe: these are considered to be a divisional weapon. There is also available the *Davy Crockett* mortar which throws a $\frac{1}{4}$ KT bomb some 4,300 yards. These have been distributed to the U.S. forces in Europe, and the other contingents have cast longing eyes upon them. As the counterpart of corps artillery there is the *Sergeant* missile with a range of over 85 miles and under the command of Army commanders, the *Pershing* with a range of 350 miles.

Sergeant and *Pershing* are essentially intended for disrupting enemy communications and concentrations, both potentially by the threat of their use, and actually if the grave decision to employ nuclear weapons were taken. They are sited well in the rear of the NATO defence system in Germany and there would be sufficient time to assess enemy intentions before there was much danger of their being overrun. The real problem centres around the short-range weapons which have been integrated into the structure of divisions as part of their 'normal' firepower.

First, it is important to distinguish between the real and the theoretical problem. The danger of some breakdown in the 'double key' system (whereby the warhead is in American hands and is only emplaced by direct order from SACEUR) is not very serious, for every order concerning these weapons has to be cross-checked through two different chains of command, and these precautions are now being reinforced by an American electronic lock system which can only be opened by a coded signal from SHAPE. The real danger is that because these weapons have come to be regarded as an integral part of a division's (or in the case of the *Davy Crockett* of

a brigade's) firepower, the division may become unable to fight without them. Any visitor to a field headquarters will have noted the assurance with which divisional commanders of all nationalities now assume that they would be using these weapons from the start of hostilities, and that they would be helpless without them, when in fact no such assurance can be forthcoming.

One way to consider this problem is to re-examine the kinds of Soviet attack on Europe that are still conceivable. The development of the strategic strength of both blocs seems to have reduced them to two categories only. One is the desperate gamble of a full-scale attack on Western Europe, the other is a swift grab for some exposed salient or objective, possibly as the forerunner of such a full-scale attack. Now that the Soviet Union poses such a very strong missile and bomber threat to Western Europe as well as maintaining a strong threat to North America, it seems hardly conceivable that she would initiate full-scale attack without using her nuclear potential, at least in a selective fashion, to demolish NATO airfields, communications and concentrations as well as attacking on the ground, even if she left West European industry untouched. Such a desperate gamble is primarily deterred by the strategic strength of the United States and such strategic weapons as may be developed and controlled multilaterally in NATO. But short-range nuclear weapons are an essential part of the deterrence of such an attack. The divisional frontage of the NATO forces in Central Europe is of the order of 50 kilometres. Even if this can be reduced in many places by the development of local defence forces and strong points, this still leaves a wide margin between such a frontage and the 10–15 kilometres which is the effective maximum frontage of a division in defence using conventional firepower only. The geographic shape of modern Germany, with its great length and small depth, its excellent east-west communications, its lack of serious natural obstacles east of the Rhine, makes it very difficult to develop a system of ground defences which would not promise the Soviet Union the prospect of rapid penetration and acquisition of territory on a broad front, if short-range nuclear weapons were not available to the defenders in a general war of this kind.

Yet to the deterrence of some limited attack, for which the Soviet Union would almost certainly rely on the strength, mobility and firepower of its conventional forces alone (since the use of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons would involve a strong risk of invoking strategic retaliation in return for a mere tactical gain), the training of NATO troops to fight only with tactical nuclear weapons is a positive weakness. The tactics of the nuclear and non-nuclear battlefield are different, and it will prove increasingly difficult to maintain the fighting spirit and morale of the NATO mobile forces if they are conditioned to think only in terms of the nuclear battlefield.

The sensible course would be to cease regarding the short-range nuclear weapon as an organic part of all the NATO divisions, and to re-categorise it as a special form of firepower to be attached to particular divisions from a central force, perhaps under the control of a central nuclear command, according to their particular role. Thus the forward divisions designed for mobile counter-attack against any limited Soviet raid would be trained primarily for non-nuclear warfare, would have strong conventional artillery support and would only have short-range nuclear weapons attached to them in certain special circumstances.¹ On the other hand, the divisions responsible for providing the strong point defence of Germany in depth might normally have them integrated. By this means some flexibility could be introduced into the planning and deployment of the NATO ground forces, as well as assuring that the forward divisions acquire the training and determination for mobile counter-attack, which units trained permanently under the shadow of nuclear weapons can hardly achieve. If the mutual assurance against surprise attack, discussed in Chapter 6, can be negotiated, then a

¹ The provision of adequate conventional medium and heavy artillery is an important factor in the readiness of commanders to be prepared to fight without tactical nuclear fire support. The American VIIth Army, which has strong conventional fire support, is ready for a dual role. By contrast German commanders whose corps have been formed without adequate artillery, and British commanders whose artillery has been run down for financial reasons, tend to be the most dogmatic in insisting that nuclear fire support must be forthcoming at an early stage of the battle

more flexible system of this kind would become acceptable to the European countries. Moreover, as longer range weapons like *Sergeant*, under the control of corps and army commanders, become more efficient the need to depend on divisional weapons can be reduced.

In certain circumstances it is desirable that a divisional commander should have some nuclear fire support under his own control. However, many risks could result from the distribution of a weapon like the *Davy Crockett* mortar down to the level of battalions in Europe. The decision to introduce these weapons has all the earmarks of a confusion that has bedevilled Western planning over the past two decades, namely between what is technically feasible and what is politically and militarily desirable. It is not easy to conceive of any 'double key' system that would be effective with weapons deployed down to so low a level of command. To distribute such weapons in large quantities throughout the NATO forces seems likely to diminish confidence both between the two blocs in Europe and within NATO itself, and further to obscure the need for high quality conventional forces in NATO to match the quality of their opponents. These weapons should be withdrawn from the European theatre before the forces there, American and Europeans, have become in any way dependent on them.

VII

A more effective use of available resources to increase the flexibility of the ground defence of Western Europe is only one aspect of the problem of stability. Preoccupation with the dangers of escalation or defeat as a result of the clash between the opposing ground forces overlooks the fact that nuclear war could at present break out as easily, perhaps more easily, as a result of some misjudged action on the part of those responsible for the air and long-range missile forces in Europe. For, in recent years, tactical air support in NATO has become increasingly tied to the nuclear bomb, and nuclear missiles have been introduced into Europe which can fire so deep into the enemy's interior as to make a strike that is intended to disrupt military movements in Europe hard to

distinguish from strategic action, and therefore liable to produce rapid escalation.

There are four kinds of military target for the air and missile forces which are involved in planning a stable system of defence and deterrence for Europe. The first is the use of air power to blunt, disorient and disperse any ground attack on the European NATO countries. The second is the interdiction of Soviet military movements, marshalling yards, airfields and supply lines deeper in Eastern Europe. The third is the defence of West European air space, and the fourth is the neutralisation of the strong Soviet IRBM force in Western Russia which is targeted on Western Europe.

The first task must continue to be discharged primarily by manned aircraft, since the targets involved are not static and must be sought by reconnaissance and destroyed by a machine with human judgement built in. It is clearly desirable that the tactical air forces for close air support of the ground forces should have a dual capability since their most important function may be to assist in the thwarting of some limited probe or attack. In theory they have this, but, unfortunately, as aircraft have become faster, more complex and more expensive, and as densities of anti-aircraft fire have increased with the introduction of the mobile ground to air missile, air staffs have become increasingly reluctant to contemplate using high-explosive bombs—involving very accurate bombing and probably repeated attack—when a nuclear bomb is available. Thus the danger exists that, while efforts are being made to reduce the necessity for an immediate resort to short-range nuclear weapons by improving the calibre of the ground forces, air planning may become almost entirely tied to the nuclear weapon. It is true that the kind of close air support which the allied armies received towards the end of World War Two is no longer feasible. Yet to ask forward troops to fight against units of the calibre of the Soviet divisions in Europe without any air support is asking a great deal of them. And for such tactical support to be effective with non-nuclear bombs, more aircraft are required than exist today.

There is no easy answer to this problem for it cannot be overcome by technological means alone. Without entering

here into a discussion of the merits of different kinds of aircraft, it is legitimate to suggest that a certain change in the focus of allied attention is required. In the first place allied governments, and their parliaments who must vote money, should pay closer attention to air policy than in the past: for an improvement in the quality and mobility of the ground forces, without an improvement in the strength of the tactical air forces and the supply of aircraft which can carry a conventional bomb load, may be self defeating in terms of a stable Western defence. In the second place air staffs need reminding that attempts to create faster and more complex fighter-bombers may not now be as important as developing a larger number of simpler aircraft and pilots of a very high order of skill and courage. In general NATO aircraft have a higher all-weather performance and better penetration capabilities than their Soviet counterparts; but any calculation that, because the planes under one's command cost several million dollars each, they should not be risked in an air support role without nuclear bombs, might be the most expensive calculation in terms of the survival of Europe itself that has ever been made.

The second function of the air and missile forces is long-range interdiction against targets in Eastern Europe. The ability to prevent a massive reinforcement of the Soviet forces in Central Europe, to deny, for instance, the crossings of the Oder and the Vistula, is an essential part of the deterrence of all out attack on Western Europe. Shorn of this capability NATO could tempt the Soviet Union to present the Alliance with the *fait accompli* of an 80 division attack with conventional forces only, which might reach the Rhine and fan out towards the Channel ports before the United States and its allies could reach the agonising decision to initiate nuclear warfare. With a strong interdiction force the feasibility of a massive non-nuclear attack on Europe recedes further into the background.

There is no doubt that, although deep interdiction of this kind requires aircraft and missiles with a dual capability, nuclear as well as conventional, it must be considered primarily in nuclear terms since it would never be invoked except in response to a massive attack, and must be effective against

strongly defended targets. The difficulty is to know how best to maintain this form of strength throughout the 1960s. General Norstad, the former Supreme Commander, was insistent throughout the last three and a half years of his command that as the aircraft required for this purpose became increasingly vulnerable with the growth of the Soviet IRBM force, their function should be transferred to a mobile medium-range missile force based in Western Europe. Until the end of 1962 this view conflicted with that of the United States and Britain who argued that this function could best be discharged by their own strategic forces.

There are two separate issues involved here: whether this function should be discharged by missiles or aircraft, and whether it should be discharged by weapons based on continental Europe and under the control of a NATO commander, or by weapons based outside it controlled by the American strategic forces.

A number of factors must be weighed in any judgement as to whether the missile or the bomber will become the most effective instrument of interdiction. Vulnerability is one, and on this the mobile missile scores over present bombers based in Europe. Penetration is another and here the argument is still in favour of the missile. Availability is a third and the MRBM could be available several years before less vulnerable aircraft are developed. The fourth factor is judgement and accuracy, and here the argument is decisively in favour of the bomber. In the long run a short or vertical take-off aircraft with a stand-off bomb seems the superior and more stable system. One question, therefore, is whether it is desirable to introduce mobile missiles into Western Europe now, with all the apprehensions this would raise in Eastern Europe and probably in Western Europe also, or take a calculated risk concerning NATO's interdiction capability during the five years or so until S/VTOL bombers are readily available.

One way to avoid having to answer this question is to suggest that this interdiction role should be performed by American strategic weapons, the *Minuteman* and the B 52, based in the United States. This would solve the technical problems of vulnerability and availability. But such a course has considerable disadvantages. These weapons have very

large warheads and would wreak much greater devastation in Eastern Europe than shorter range weapons in order to destroy the same targets. The decision to fulfil this interdiction role by forces stationed outside Western Europe might also increase the fear of some influential Europeans that, when there are no longer any major American weapons systems based there the United States will be less ready to intervene in the event of any attack on Europe, even though this may have no basis in strategic logic. Moreover, it would be harder to evolve any system for the sharing of operational decisions, as discussed in the next chapter, if all the nuclear weapons other than the short-range tactical ones were to be physically far distant from Europe. On balance it is undesirable that the interdiction function should be simply passed over to the American strategic forces.

This view seems to have been accepted, and the outline of a solution suggested in the communiqué of the Nassau meeting between the American President and the British Prime Minister, in December, 1962, of which the wider implications are discussed in the next chapter. Here the two countries agreed to make a start in the 'immediate future' on a more closely integrated arrangement for the control of Western strategy by subscribing part of their strategic forces to 'a NATO nuclear force and targeted in accordance with NATO plans'. The form of the American contribution is not yet clear, but a month later Britain assigned the whole of her V-Bomber force to NATO. This was a sensible military move because the British V-Bombers, without the long-range air to ground *Skybolt* missile, will lose their certain ability to strike strategic targets in the Soviet Union long before the bombers themselves become obsolete. But this force, although small, has reached the peak of its efficiency and its bombers have a high accuracy and can carry large conventional bomb loads as an alternative to nuclear bombs. They will therefore continue to be well suited to interdiction bombing on behalf of NATO for many years. If the French Government should accept the view of most of France's allies, that the *Mirage IV* supersonic bomber with an atomic bomb is of limited strategic value, either to France or the alliance, but a magnificent interdiction weapon for NATO, this European

contribution could be expanded. The additional contribution of the fighter bombers in Europe of Canada, Germany, the Benelux countries and Italy, would further strengthen this force.

If the three kinds of bombers could be dispersed within Europe across a wider range of airfields than they are at present based upon, and if they could be grouped under a central operational command, then NATO would continue to have a strong interdiction force. The dispersal, diversity and warning time of its various components should considerably offset the problem of vulnerability, which continued reliance on the manned bomber for this role inevitably raises. This would create a more stable and credible method of deterring any foolish major Soviet move in Europe than that of mobile missiles roaming the crowded canals and roads of Western Europe, until such time as S/VTOL aircraft are available, nearer the end of this decade. If by that time there is no progress towards a *détente* in Europe, and if Eastern European targets become as strongly defended as Russian ones, then NATO may have to reconsider the desirability of introducing medium-range missiles, with their superior penetration capability, into Western Europe.

Considerable progress is now being made towards fulfilling the third requirement, namely improving the air defence of Western Europe through the deployment of such weapons as the *Hawk* missile. But it would be an illusion to suppose that forces based in Europe can fulfil the fourth role, namely to provide an adequate counterpoise to the very strong Soviet IRBM threat to Europe, which is large in numbers, dispersed and camouflaged, and within the perimeter of the formidable active defences of the Soviet Union. The permanent deterrence of the use or threat of this force can only be assured by the true strategic forces of the United States, together with a NATO strategic seaborne force if it comes about. Only the relative invulnerability of such forces could offset the inescapable vulnerability of Western Europe.

To summarise this aspect of the argument it is suggested that the air and missile forces of the alliance should be shaped to meet four goals. First, to help improve the deterrent effect of the NATO ground forces by providing the close air support

to ensure that any ground attack would be heavily blunted. This is a task for the fighters and fighter bombers of all the NATO countries, operating under the command system that already exists, with greater emphasis being placed on more and cheaper aircraft and on conventional fire support. The second is to help deter any major Soviet move in Europe by having the capability rapidly to destroy air and military bases and communications in Eastern Europe. Eventually this may require a force of vertical take-off bombers and perhaps of missiles, as Western European airfields become more vulnerable, but until these are available this task could be performed by existing high performance bombers welded into an integrated interdiction command in NATO. To this force the British Government is now ready to contribute; and for this purpose France has developed an aircraft, and Germany is purchasing a missile, which would be highly suitable. The third goal is to strengthen the air defences of Western Europe which requires a common effort, and the fourth is to deter the threat or use of the massive Soviet IRBM force targeted on Western Europe. The latter can only be achieved by missiles and is one of the central functions of the strategic forces of the alliance. It is because weapons which pose a threat to one half of the alliance can be permanently checkmated only by forces based outside as well as inside the threatened area, that the problems of a deterrent strategy within NATO cannot be divided.

VIII

Much of this chapter has been concerned with the place of nuclear weapons in a stable system for the defence of Europe. Enough has been said to illustrate the difficulty of dispensing with them, or removing them from Europe in the years immediately ahead. No one, however, who has a care for European civilisation, or who has any real appreciation of the catastrophic havoc which their use would create, can rest content with this situation. Moreover, with an intelligent adjustment of our perspectives and priorities it may prove possible to alleviate it.

Measured in cold terms of the ratio of lethal and destructive

power to weight to cost, the nuclear weapon in a strategic role, designed to destroy cities or bases, is unchallenged, and will remain unchallenged unless other forms of explosive—the neutron bomb, for instance—which might improve this ratio still further, are developed. But in a tactical role the nuclear explosive has many drawbacks: it is an inefficient use of fissionable material; it is dangerous to the user; its lethal or destructive effects are low in relation to its other harmful and lasting effects; it is expensive and requires special maintenance. Since it has never been employed in combat, the effect of even its most discriminating use would inevitably be wildly exaggerated and the fact that its explosion is linked by the same physical characteristics to the major strategic weapon creates the danger of rapid escalation.

Unfortunately, over the past decade, governments in NATO have become mesmerised with the nuclear weapon and have come to see its possession not only as the surest safeguard of their freedom but as a symbol of political power and prestige. In consequence, only the barest minimum of resources has been made available for research into modern alternatives to the nuclear weapon as a means of halting, decimating or dispersing enemy ground and air attack. Yet despite the relative negligence of the NATO governments in the improvement of conventional weapons since the Korean war, the materials for a radical improvement in their effectiveness may be forthcoming in the decade ahead.

The problem of deterring Soviet ground attack in Europe is no longer one of finding the means of mowing down a human sea of advancing infantry. (This is the problem of deterring attack by China in Asia and the difference in the two adversaries suggests that in the end the Western powers may have to have two different kinds of armies.) The Russian army is now probably the most mechanised in the world, and the problem of defeating it is essentially one of killing vehicles. For this purpose the atomic weapon is a clumsy instrument. France (whose inventiveness in the field of conventional weapons deserves greater respect from her allies than it has drawn) and Britain have made the beginnings of an attack on this problem with the development of light armour-piercing missiles. At the same time the American development

of rapid fire anti-aircraft missiles such as *Hawk* and *Mauler*, and small homing missiles such as *Red Eye*, may greatly diminish the military effectiveness of Soviet local air superiority. What is ultimately required is a series of cheap, plentiful and mobile weapons, whether delivered by aircraft, missiles or guns, for immobilising tracked vehicles, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, trucks, self-propelled artillery or bridging equipment. How this is to be done is still a matter of speculation and research among the military scientists, for it requires a radical re-thinking of many accepted notions about air and artillery weapons. But there seems little doubt that, if sufficient resources were put into a programme for greatly improved vehicle destruction, that an important advance could be made well within the next decade. By this means the nuclear weapon in a tactical role could be gradually down-graded in importance.

It is in this field that the real challenge to European scientific and industrial skill and resourcefulness now lies. The European allies will never, however, bend their best energies to this task until there is a more effective system of allied control in the particular field of policy where the nuclear weapon is likely to remain supreme, namely the destruction of bases, weapons and forces far behind the battle line.

Chapter 8

The Control of Strategy

I

No contemporary military problem, writes Robert Osgood, one of the most objective and penetrating students of the Alliance, illustrates more poignantly the political ramifications of military policies than the problem of the control of nuclear weapons in NATO. . . . [It] constitutes a serious problem for political reasons, most directly, and for military reasons only indirectly. For it is principally a problem of sustaining mutual confidence among allies, of accommodating vital interests, and of satisfying demands of national equity and pride—of achieving these political ends, essential to the cohesion of the alliance, by adjusting the terms of military collaboration.¹

UNLIKE other forms of defensive and deterrent military power, there has never been any requirement for a collective effort to increase the nuclear potential of the Alliance beyond that which the United States alone was capable of producing, either in warheads or means of delivery.² The problem is essentially political: the increasing reluctance of European national leaders and their electorates to leave to a government three thousand miles away the basic decisions of peace or nuclear war. Once they had begun to recover their morale and strength, the apparent dilemma between accepting the American nuclear guarantee of their security and abandoning their fate to the decision of the President of the United States was bound to become more obvious and more pressing.

Attempts to escape from it are older than the alliance

¹ Robert E. Osgood, *Nuclear Control in NATO*, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1962

² It can be argued that a co-ordinated use of European as well as American scientific and technological resources would have evolved a diversified missile programme somewhat earlier than was the case with the programmes under sole American control.

itself, for it was in 1946 that the British Government decided to seek its own solution to this dilemma by laying the foundations of an independent nuclear weapons programme. However, the problem did not reach the heart of Western debate until the years 1957-8 when four developments occurred within a short space of each other. First, the actual defence of Europe became geared to the tactical atomic weapon, whose introduction into the NATO ground forces in Germany had been decided in principle three years earlier. Since the warheads of these weapons remained under American control, the denial of European territory to the adversary became more dependent on American decisions than it had been hitherto. Western Europe with one hand accepted an apparent increase in security in return for a closer American grip upon the allied structure of command and decision-taking. Second, the United States requested her allies to accept MRBMs upon their soil, virtually under her sole control, until her long-range missile programme could offset the apparent Soviet lead in ICBMs. She was thus asking Europe to participate directly in the defence of the United States as well as of its own countries, but without offering Europe any reciprocity in the form of joint control. Third, the advent of the Fifth Republic under the leadership of President de Gaulle made it certain that the existing plans and decisions of the Fourth, namely to follow Britain's lead in becoming a nuclear power, would be accelerated. Finally, Britain, who by that time was an operational nuclear power, decided in 1957 to place increased emphasis on the importance of her own nuclear force, and in 1958 was taken into 'nuclear partnership' on technical questions by the United States, through the amendment of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act in her favour. With those four developments it became inevitable that the control of nuclear weapons and policy would become the touchstone of political rivalry and confidence within the alliance.

For the first three years after 1958, the inter-allied debate was confused and tentative, since it was by no means clear what the real dimensions of the problem were. The only concrete official suggestions came from American sources. They included General Norstad's proposals made in 1959 and 1960 for making NATO itself a 'fourth atomic power' by evolving

multinational responsibility for a system of land-based MRBMs in Europe to replace tactical aircraft. General Norstad believed that there was an opportunity to make use of a new military requirement in Europe to mitigate the divisive effects of nuclear weapons. But there are still serious doubts on the part of the major NATO governments, the United States, Britain and France, as to whether this idea is militarily as well as politically sound (for reasons discussed in the last chapter). Meanwhile the State Department, equally concerned with the divisive effect of the nuclear question and fearful that other countries might follow the example of Britain and France, had been gestating plans for an internationally controlled strategic missile force. This was originally put forward by Secretary Herter in 1960 in terms of the assignment of American *Polaris* submarines to NATO, and in May 1961 extended by President Kennedy in the form of an offer of a multilaterally owned and controlled force 'if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies, once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved'. Neither the British nor the French Governments made any proposals on nuclear control during 1961 and Bonn was the only capital where there was much serious disposition to study these American proposals.

Thus two years ago large sections of European opinion would rather have left the nuclear deterrent in American hands than have embarked upon experiments of this kind. And this argument over blueprints for international control of part of the American nuclear deterrent system might have continued for many years without being resolved, serving primarily as case material for the political scientist in illustrating the difficulties of introducing an element of supranationalism into a large alliance of nations that are theoretically equal, had not two conflicting developments, arising primarily out of a contradiction in American policy, made it certain that the question could not solve itself.

On the one hand the Kennedy Administration, when it took office, threw its whole weight behind the development of the European Economic Community, with full British membership, into an independent centre of power within the Western alliance. The idea that the Atlantic alliance

would henceforth rest on the 'twin pillars' of America and Europe, was based on an explicit American hope that the European Community would acquire the status of a new great power in world politics, and thus shoulder a much larger share of the burden of the defence of the free world than in the past fifteen years.

But, as we have noted earlier, there is an inescapable dualism in American policy, which makes it essential for her to reassure her fellow super-power, the Soviet Union, at the same time as she helps to build up the strength of her allies. Consequently, American strategic policy has been placing increasing emphasis over recent years on the importance of centralised control of all strategic decisions, in order to reduce to a minimum the dangers of accidental war, miscalculation, or escalation from one level of conflict to another. Moreover, American thought has become preoccupied with two other dangers, the proliferation of independent nuclear deterrents and the danger of irrational action on the part of the adversary. Hence the Kennedy Administration has decided to exploit the American superiority over the Soviet Union in numbers of units of strategic delivery—bombs or ground, sea and air launched missiles—in order to evolve a strategy of controlled nuclear response which would give first priority, if nuclear conflict occurred, to the destruction of the enemy's war potential while holding a substantial counter-city force in reserve. The official American view is that this would not only minimise damage to the allies of the United States if the Soviet Union irrationally resorted to nuclear war, but would introduce an element of rationality into subsequent Russian decisions by first crippling its war machine while retaining the reserve power to face the Soviet Union with the alternative of suing for peace or invoking the certain destruction of its own civilisation. This involves the maintenance of a very large, very tightly controlled American strategic force which, on present plans, will reach some 3,000 units of strategic delivery by 1965-6, where, for purpose of comparison, France and Britain combined might, at most, have some 300 such units at that time.

Whether this is a feasible strategy, or is conducive to a stable relationship between the United States and the Soviet

Union over the next decade, is still a matter of debate—not only in Europe but in the United States itself. Some aspects of it, the imposition of close political control upon all military decisions, awake a sympathetic response from many Europeans. If it is a feasible strategy it weakens any argument that the commitment of the United States to the defence of Europe, or her ability to fulfil it, is diminishing as her own cities become more vulnerable, an argument that is often put forward in Europe, especially in France and Britain, as a rationale for the necessity of European nuclear forces. The difficulty is to be sure what validity this strategy will retain once Soviet nuclear striking power has become more dispersed and protected than at present and the counterforce element in it disappears. But this may merely increase the need for non-nuclear options rather than invalidate the necessity of carefully and centrally controlled nuclear responses.

But there is an apparent contradiction between the American decision to abandon her general hegemony within the Western alliance for a 'twin pillars' doctrine and support for a unified Europe, including the only operational European nuclear power, Britain, while at the same time desiring to reassert virtually complete hegemony of power and decision-making in the strategic field. It can be justified in purely military terms: it cannot be justified in political terms. As a recent report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate has expressed it 'There is within the conflicting European and American views on strategy a core of irony upon which the dispute is now focused. Just when European aspirations to become a nuclear power are showing signs of feasibility, American strategy is calling for greater conventional forces in Europe and a greater concentration of nuclear weapons and their control in the United States.'¹

Hence it is fair to say that the whole concept of a reorganised Atlantic alliance, and any consideration of the limits within which it can promote or negotiate a more stable equilibrium in Europe, can make little progress until a fundamental accord has been reached among the NATO allies over the ownership and control of nuclear weapons.

¹ 'Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership I', Senate Document No. 132, September, 1962, p. 34

II

Before considering the alternatives that are open to the allies, it is important to try and clear away the debris of obsolete assumptions, and to attempt some assessment of the framework within which a solution must be sought.

In the first place, it must be reckoned that the American monopoly of nuclear weapons within the alliance has disappeared for ever. The two other nuclear powers in NATO, Britain and France, now differ somewhat in the importance they attach to the possession of their own deterrent systems, but neither are prepared to relinquish them in the foreseeable future.

Influential sections of British public and political opinion have become somewhat sceptical of the value of the British effort, in terms of its relevance to the security of Britain, of the influence it has brought the country with the United States and with her other allies, and of the freedom of action it has won for Britain in protecting its own interests or dealing with the Soviet Union. The attempt to remain in the vanguard of military technology had to be abandoned with the cancellation of the *Bluestreak* long-range missile in 1960 when it became clear that Britain could not keep up with the pace of Soviet and American innovation at a bearable cost. It is true that the maintenance and protection of a powerful counter-city deterrent in the form of the V-bomber force is not very costly (about £200 million a year) at the moment. However, now that the American *Skybolt* missile has failed, and Britain is to build nuclear submarines to take American *Polaris* missiles, costs are no longer solely under British control and the expense of maintaining a strategic nuclear capability, when combined with the maintenance of the existing bomber force and the development of new aircraft, may conflict sharply with other priorities in her defence expenditure, both as they affect her commitments to NATO and in the Far East.

It is probable that general agreement could have been found over a broad spectrum of British opinion, even before the collapse of the *Skybolt* project, that the possession of a

nuclear strategic force has had a diminishing bearing on her general influence on international affairs. It is felt that such influence as the British Government possesses in Washington derives from quite different sources than the ability to strike the Soviet Union with 4 to 6 per cent of the weight which the United States can muster. Ironically enough Britain had a much more decisive influence on American policy in those crises of the Cold War which arose before she was an operational nuclear power, the Berlin blockade, Korea and Indo-China, than those which occurred after she had become one, Quemoy, Laos or Cuba. Consequently, there is a minority of opinion in the Conservative party and a majority of opinion in the Labour and Liberal parties which advocate the abandonment of the attempt to maintain a strategic nuclear force and greater emphasis on a conventional contribution to NATO.

However, despite general scepticism about the value of what is now officially called 'the independent contribution to the Western deterrent' as a means of influencing the United States, it is very unlikely that either a Conservative or a Labour government would in fact relinquish its nuclear capability altogether. As far as the general public is concerned, opinion research shows that the British nuclear weapon programme is still supported by rather more than half the British electorate. As far as official opinion is concerned, scepticism about the political and military value of an independent nuclear effort, is offset by the importance attached to the role Britain can still play in nuclear disarmament negotiations, by reason of her special status as a nuclear power. Therefore, even if there is a change of government in 1964, it seems likely that Britain will seek a less onerous or more specialised nuclear role rather than abandon it altogether.

Moreover, if France remains a nuclear power then Britain is even less likely to relinquish her programme entirely, except in return for some special advantage. But France is determined to remain a nuclear power. The decision to undertake a nuclear weapons' programme ante-dates the Fifth Republic by several years and it is unlikely that it would be reversed simply by the retirement of President de Gaulle. Though

ardent European federalists like M. Pflimlin and others may contend that the French programme should be conceived solely in a European framework, and though considerable concern has been expressed from many sources in France at what the achievement of independent nuclear status may cost, there appears to be broad support for pressing ahead both with the nuclear processing plants and the means of delivering nuclear weapons.

The French programme is at the moment cast in more ambitious terms than the British and envisages progressing from the semi-tactical force of 50 *Mirage IV* bombers, which will begin to become operational at the beginning of 1964, to a solid fuelled IRBM and possibly missile firing nuclear submarines by the end of the decade. Whether France can actually achieve this goal is an open question. British experience would suggest that she will find it difficult and costly, but then Britain entered the missile field in the early stages when many technical and financial factors were unknown or underrated, and France may benefit from the greater knowledge that has been accumulating about fuels and guidance systems. Nevertheless, with no testing-ground closer than her Southern Pacific islands, and with a high density land area to discourage plans for the simpler form of land missile bases, the financial cost cannot fail to become a serious consideration in France's plans. Whether she, or Britain, can remain a true strategic nuclear power, that is, have weapons that can inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union itself, or will become a strategic power only in the European context, that is, maintain weapons with ranges that could have important influence on the course of any conflict in Central or Eastern Europe, is unclear: much depends on American policy, much depends on technological developments. But their innocence has been lost beyond recall, and nuclear powers they will remain unless their programmes are absorbed into an Atlantic or a European one.

In the second place, there is no inherent reason why the continuation of the British and French programmes should lead to similar independent nuclear deterrents in other NATO countries. Much of American thinking on the control of nuclear weapons in NATO, whether the proposals for

a NATO deterrent or for a form of allied control of policy separate from ownership, is derived from a fear that since France was partly inspired to become a nuclear power because Britain had become one, so if the two of them remain nuclear powers then Germany and perhaps other countries in NATO will follow suit. This view does not withstand close scrutiny, at least as it applies to the next ten years.

There are only three other countries in NATO that have or could develop the resources, industrial, scientific and financial, to consider becoming independent nuclear powers, Canada, Italy and Germany.¹ Canada has possessed the technical knowledge and resources to become a nuclear power at any time in the last ten years or more. She has not exercised the option for obvious reasons derived from her geographical position and her relations with the United States. There are still no signs of any political or military pressure to develop an independent nuclear capability, and there has been considerable public resistance even to the stationing of American nuclear warheads on Canadian soil.

Italy has the largest power-reactor programme in Europe, and from 1963 will be accumulating significant quantities of plutonium, though under strict international control. She also has a rapidly expanding technical and industrial base. What she lacks is an incentive to undertake the costs and risks of becoming an independent nuclear power. Geography affords her greater protection from attack than almost any country in the alliance: she has urgent demands, in terms of economic expansion and welfare, upon her resources: and she has accepted since the beginning of NATO the status of a middle power within the alliance. The psychological impulses to exert a powerful influence upon the course of Western policy as a whole, so evident in Britain and France, are not felt in the same way in Italy, and Italian influence is directed more towards stabilising or ending the arms race rather than sharing in it. Unless the climate of Italian politics and public opinion changes radically during this decade, it seems im-

¹ For a fuller discussion of this question see *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* by Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, Chatto and Windus and Frederick Praeger Inc. for The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1962

probable that Italy will even seriously debate the question of becoming an independent nuclear power.

The country on which most doubts have centred is Germany. It is true that the Adenauer governments have shown no interest in making Germany an independent nuclear power, and that there is no significant political pressure to consider such a course. Moreover, logically German policy in NATO is often more concerned with achieving some better system of control over the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons in Germany rather than with the control of strategic nuclear decisions. But Germany has a natural desire to be treated with the responsibility and seriousness to which her exertions entitle her, and it is argued that, if she saw that the possession of nuclear weapons had won a special position for Britain and France in terms of influence upon American policy, she might either attempt to develop a similar independent capability or put pressure on them to share their weapons in return for technical assistance.

Such a possibility cannot be excluded and might be made actual by any arrangement whereby the three existing NATO nuclear powers had an exclusive relationship to each other within NATO on decisions of high policy. But even if German views should change, the practical obstacles to Germany's becoming an independent nuclear power are very formidable. First, she is bound by treaty with six allies and by a solemn undertaking to the United States not to produce nuclear weapons on her soil: to denounce a treaty with a potential adversary is one thing, to denounce one with allies with whom one must continue to co-operate is quite another, and if Germany were ejected from the NATO system no independent nuclear weapons could protect her. She has, at present, only a modest power-reactor programme and it would take three to five years before she could produce even a nominal fission bomb: this could not be done in full secrecy, particularly since she has no area suitable for testing and would be forced to set up an elaborate seaborne test area in an equable ocean like the Pacific. Assuming that she exploded a nominal bomb in five years, and became an operational nuclear power in a shorter time than her predecessors, say three years later, she would have to traverse eight dangerous years during

which she would be exposed to constant Soviet hostility and threats, and enjoy the minimum of allied confidence, before she had a force to bargain with. Finally, her small densely populated land would make it very difficult to base a credible deterrent system in Germany itself, while, if she developed seaborne missile systems, she would be dependent on one or two ports for unfettered access to the oceans.

The possibility that some future German government might press for the sharing of warheads with Britain or France cannot, of course, be excluded nor would it be prohibited by Germany's existing international treaty obligations. But it is important to be clear what would be involved for Britain or France in agreeing to such a step. A British government would face not only a severe adverse reaction at home, but the cancellation of its existing nuclear agreements with the United States. The Franco-German treaty will be made explicitly subordinate to Germany's other treaty commitments and a French government would have to renounce the prospect of a constructive dialogue between Paris and Moscow as well as incurring the active opposition of its partners in WEU and NATO. The only circumstances in which such sharing is really conceivable is if a prolonged and unbridgeable conflict of interest and opinion develops over the role of nuclear weapons in Europe, at a distant date when France has fissionable material in sufficient abundance to provide low-yield tactical weapons for Germany as well as herself. This involves believing that the practical compromises suggested in the last chapter are stillborn, and to believe this involves clothing the whole future of allied co-operation in Spenglerian gloom.

It is therefore reasonable to assume, even if the future cannot be predicted with certainty, that the problem of control and co-ordination of strategy in so far as it affects the actual ownership of nuclear bombs or warheads will, for the foreseeable future, be an American-British-French one. The problem of the control of policy or of the decisions to use or withhold these weapons will, of course, continue to concern all the countries of the alliance, and Germany in particular.

The third point that can be established is that the European Community will, from the time when it begins to acquire a

political framework, be concerned with defence questions. This has been made clear throughout the discussions of recent years, and was explicitly accepted by the British Government when it was negotiating entry.¹ In the spring of 1963, the form in which this responsibility could be organised and expressed was still unclear, since the discussion on the political superstructure of the Community had been laid aside. Even though Britain is not to be a member of the Economic Community, there seems a *prima facie* case for converting the existing machinery of Western European Union (which unites Britain and the Six) into a functional Defence Authority, but what its responsibilities might be are as yet undetermined. For clearly there is a common interest between the countries of the Community and Britain, in accelerating those interdependent arrangements for research, development and production of European aircraft and other weapons which have been gathering momentum in recent years. The pride and ambition of European technology and industry will now permit of no burden-sharing formula for the alliance which leaves the advanced technology—nuclear or non-nuclear—in the hands of American industry, while European industry is asked to concentrate on boots and barbed wire. The assumption, implicit in so much of American thinking, that the United States should provide the technocrats while Europe supplies the hoplites of the allied military effort, is now wholly unacceptable to the West European countries. The countries of the Community may therefore find a common voice on certain aspects of defence policy, most especially in the fields of technology and logistics, long before they have achieved anything like a common foreign policy.

However, there exists no commitment on the part of any of the member countries to create anything like a European nuclear force, and the governments of the two European nuclear powers have not expressed any support for such an idea. Although the European governments will certainly be

¹ 'We quite accept that the European political union, if it is to be effective, will have a common concern for defence problems and that a European point of view on defence will emerge.' Speech of Mr. Edward Heath to the Ministerial Council of Western European Union, April 10, 1962

drawing closer together on defence planning as a whole throughout the years ahead, it is still an open question whether the Community can or should become a nuclear entity in itself.

One final consideration should be borne in mind in considering alternative solutions on the control of strategy and nuclear weapons. Beneath all the cross currents of pride, fear and ambition—American or European—which apparently dominate the argument over the control of Western strategy, there is a strong instinct that the Atlantic alliance is the only solid foundation on which to base the security of any of the countries concerned, that Europe without America would perish, that America without Europe would wither. Despite the differences of national outlook and interests which must be reconciled, there is a basic desire to find a solution which strengthens rather than weakens the trans-Atlantic relationship.

In this connection two points must be established. In the first place Americans must be made aware that Europe's preoccupation with a nuclear strategy and the control of nuclear weapons, and their unreadiness to contemplate strengthening a more flexible form of defence, cannot be allayed until the European governments, individually or collectively, have a greater influence upon the strategic policy of the alliance, which means primarily influence upon the policy of the United States. To imagine that the European countries can be encouraged to accept an interdependent relationship while the United States retains an unfettered right to decide strategic policy is a delusion.

At the same time Europeans need reminding that the American commitment to help defend the integrity of Europe shows no signs of weakening. It is true that she would prefer to meet this commitment in a rather more flexible fashion than in the past. But there is nothing in American policy statements, or in the expression of informed thinking or public opinion, to suggest that the basic American decision of the post-war years, that the survival of Western Europe was vital to her own survival, has altered. The fact that she has been more prepared than her major European allies to contemplate the necessity of general war in order to deter

threats to Berlin in 1961 and 1962, even though at least fifty of her major cities could be demolished instantly by Soviet ICBMs with warheads of 10 megatons or more, is evidence of this.

Within this general framework there are certain unknown quantities which may affect the final decision on the control of Western strategy. Some contingencies seem more theoretical than conceivable: for instance, that the Soviet Union and the United States might reach some general *détente* over the heads of the European countries which involved the removal of all nuclear weapons from Europe, or conversely that Soviet pressure on the West might become so intense as to accelerate some form of Atlantic union or integration in the next ten years. Between these extremes one can imagine certain contingencies that may affect the final outcome of the Western debate: one is an agreement on nuclear tests: another is some Soviet-American understanding that each would remove the vulnerable first-strike weapons in their own armouries: there may be great-power agreements in such matters as the non-militarisation of Outer Space: and there might even be some progress towards a disarmament treaty. At the other end of the scale, pressure from China may inhibit Soviet agreements with the West, and make the Soviet Union intent on protecting her Western flank by reaching a European settlement. Any solutions for the control of Western strategy which we examine must take some account of variations in the climate of East-West relations in the foreseeable future.

III

If the policies pursued by the major NATO powers from 1960 onwards had persisted unaltered beyond the end of 1962, the following position on the control of strategy and nuclear weapons would most probably have developed.

Britain would have remained an independent strategic power until the end of the 1960s or beyond and would have exercised this power through her own bomber force using the American air-to-ground *Skybolt* missile. It is important to be clear that her 'independence' would not have been from close co-operation and consultation with the United States but

from NATO. Her independence of the United States really began to end in 1958 when by an amendment of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act a very close interchange of information began between the R.A.F. and SAC, in the course of which it became desirable to adjust British operational procedures and targets so that in practical terms the two forces almost became one. One of the conditions of this collaboration was an understanding that Britain would make no move that might risk nuclear war without consulting the United States, in return for an informal American undertaking to consult Britain in similar circumstances. The decision of 1960 to depend upon the *Skybolt* missile merely added a form of technical dependence on the United States to a form of political dual control which was already in existence. Nevertheless, Britain would have remained an autonomous nuclear power, able in theory to deploy her nuclear weapons on her own initiative to protect not only the United Kingdom but her interests in the Persian Gulf or the Far East. Her contribution to NATO would have remained confined to ground, naval and tactical air forces.

It is hard to say what form of association France would have developed with the United States, Britain or NATO on nuclear weapons had there not been a decisive change in Anglo-American policy at the end of 1962. In 1964 France will become an operational nuclear power and therefore eligible under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for the same co-operative arrangements as were extended to Britain in 1958. At some point thereafter, both the United States and France, the former for diplomatic reasons, the latter for financial reasons, might have found it desirable to make such an agreement despite the consistently pejorative references which American officials have made to France's effort. The essential American condition, namely an integrated system of targeting, is one which France might not find difficult to accept, since without it her limited stock of bombs and aircraft might be used, in a war situation, on targets already demolished by SAC. Moreover, France would find, like Britain, that the requirements of being an operational nuclear power would necessitate so close a form of Franco-American-British co-operation as to amount to standardisa-

tion on certain American systems of training, warning, counter measures and other forms of deterrent planning. However, if the same arrangements were made for France as for Britain, the *force de frappe* would remain an autonomous French force in the same way that R.A.F. Bomber Command would remain a nominally autonomous force.

Franco-American co-operation of this kind would have implied no change to the structure of NATO: and indeed those NATO organs, such as the Military Standing Group in Washington which were based, twelve years ago, on the assumption that Britain, France and the United States stood in a special relationship to each other within the alliance, could have begun to function effectively once again. The substance of President de Gaulle's desire for a tripartite *directoire* within NATO would have been met.

But such an arrangement would not have satisfied the non-nuclear powers in the alliance and there would have been continuing pressure for a NATO deterrent, for which there is considerable support in Germany, some support in other European countries, and a sympathetic willingness to make constructive suggestions in the United States. The proposal for medium-range missiles in Europe has been exhaustively discussed, and a great deal of work has been done in Washington on the technique by which a multinationally manned seaborne missile force could be evolved, either for submarines or for surface ships. The United States made it clear in a number of policy statements throughout 1962 that she would not put forward proposals for the control of such a force, but that if the European members of NATO could themselves evolve a satisfactory system of multilateral control, as well as agreeing on the financing of the force, that the United States would not seek to dominate its structure or deployment though it was clear that she constitutionally could not relinquish her veto on its use.

It is hard to believe that these lines of policy could all have been successfully pursued, or would have converged into any satisfactory system of strategic control within NATO which would have solved the problems of inter-allied tension or increased mutual confidence. The special British arrangement with the United States depended on the latter giving an

absolute priority to one weapons system on which American security was only marginally dependent. To have evolved a satisfactory Franco-American strategic relationship on the basis of American support for the small force of *Mirage IVs* would have involved repudiating a number of American official statements. A European plan for a multinationally manned and controlled seaborne force would have postulated a measure of agreement among twelve European nations (not just the six or seven members of the European Community but Greece, Turkey, Portugal and the Scandinavian countries as well) of very different traditions and viewpoints, something which is hard to conceive.

Moreover, as Henry Kissinger pointed out early in 1962:

A multilateral NATO nuclear force superimposed on the existing framework would bring about three, or perhaps even four, kinds of strategic forces within the alliance: a very large one under exclusive United States control (depending on how the NATO force comes into being, this may be split into two parts, one assigned to SAC, the other 'committed' to NATO); two smaller national forces; and, finally, a medium-sized NATO force in which all the countries already possessing national forces would also participate. This plethora of forces will present formidable problems of command and control. As we have seen, it is also likely to signify to the Soviets that there are degrees of intensity of the American nuclear commitment to Europe. Why else would we devise such gradations of retaliatory power?¹

IV

In December 1962 occurred the Nassau meeting between President Kennedy and the British Prime Minister which has radically altered many of the suppositions about the control of strategy and strategic weapons in the alliance.² The central

¹ 'The Unsolved Problems of European Defense' in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1962

² It did not prove possible to discuss the implications of the Nassau meeting in the full international study group. Consequently this section commits the other members of the study group even less than the rest of the study

purpose of their meeting was to re-examine Anglo-American nuclear co-operation in the light of the American desire to abandon further development of the *Skybolt* missile. But the meeting became more than just a haggle over a particular weapons system when, by reason of a rapid change in British policy, it was decided to seek an arrangement for the supply of *Polaris* submarine missiles to Britain instead. In the course of considering this request an equally rapid change of American policy occurred, when it was agreed to accede to the British request but on the condition that all the future British *Polaris* submarines should be assigned to NATO, *pari passu* with any American contribution, as the nucleus of a NATO force. The United States made an offer to supply *Polaris* missiles to France on similar conditions.

Much of the press and parliamentary comment after the Nassau meeting, especially in Britain, was preoccupied with the secondary point that this marked the end of Britain's independence as a strategic power, or that by setting the agreement in a NATO context it marked the eclipse of the special Anglo-American relationship. But the key decisions were:

- (a) The American acceptance of the fact that Britain and France would continue indefinitely to be nuclear powers. This marks the end of any American hopes that the United States might regain its post-war nuclear monopoly within the alliance, and presumably represents a satisfaction of American fears that the existence of two European nuclear powers would lead to an indefinite multiplication of them.
- (b) The acceptance on the part of both Britain and the United States that part of their existing strategic forces—in Britain's case the V-Bomber force—should, in the 'immediate future', be subscribed to NATO: 'such forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force and targeted in accordance with NATO plans'. This is something which neither has been willing to do before.
- (c) The assignment of the future British *Polaris* force (which will come into being with British boats and American missiles, after 1968), to NATO to be used unilaterally

only where 'supreme national interests are at stake'. The United States will subscribe to a NATO multilateral nuclear force of this kind 'at least equal United States forces'. Thus within this decade the whole of the British strategic effort will be within the framework of NATO. It will be difficult for her to operate *Polaris* submarines outside European waters and although she may retain under national control some medium-range bombers and light nuclear forces, such as strike aircraft, which could be used outside Europe, she will have no true strategic forces normally under purely autonomous control. If one accepts any normal definition of 'supreme national interest' the only circumstance for which she would withdraw them from allied control is to assure the survival of the United Kingdom itself, not Kuwait or Singapore. Britain has thus been forced to recast her strategic planning in a primarily European context, while acknowledging that the U.S. strategic force fulfils a world wide role.

- (d) The American decision to make positive proposals for a seaborne missile force owned by NATO and manned jointly by those NATO non-nuclear powers who wish to subscribe financially to the project and participate in its control.

There is no doubt that the timing and presentation of these Anglo-American proposals were unfortunate. They were put forward at a moment of great delicacy in the negotiations between Britain and the Economic Community, in such a way as to perpetuate the strong European dislike of the tendency of the Anglo-Saxon powers to take decisions for the alliance as a whole. It will be for the historian to decide whether Nassau was a prime or a subsidiary cause in President de Gaulle's decision to exclude Britain from the European Community; but the manner in which this radical change in the whole British and American approach to the multilateral control of nuclear weapons was presented to the French Government, as a *fait accompli* and without any time for private negotiations before the proposals were made public, was an act of diplomatic folly. It can only be excused, first, in terms of the awkward political predicament in which the American

decision to cancel *Skybolt* had placed the British Prime Minister, and of the need to reconcile this with the American reluctance to go on supporting the British independent nuclear programme on a bilateral basis for fear of the repercussions in Paris and Bonn; second, by the sense of alarm which the impending Franco-German treaty had aroused in Washington and the urgency that was thereby felt in providing a means of more satisfactory German participation in nuclear planning and control.

But the Nassau meeting and the events which succeeded it mark a watershed in the history of the Alliance. They seem to have disposed, for the time being at any rate, of any prospect that the alliance could be reconstituted on the basis of a 'partnership' between the United States and a European political grouping, including Britain, which would be strategically autonomous with it. They regenerated the quest for a trans-Atlantic solution to the problems of strategic control.

The Nassau agreement conceals two different approaches to this question. The first is the American proposal for the creation of a multilateral seaborne force under the control of some special multilateral authority in NATO. As the proposal emerged from Nassau and subsequent discussion this force would eventually have four elements: a British component of some four or five *Polaris* submarines, an equivalent or larger contribution from the American *Polaris* fleet, a French contribution that is rejected at present, and a force of surface ships belonging to NATO itself and manned jointly by those NATO non-nuclear powers who decided to subscribe. This is a long-term plan, looking to a point in the late 1960s when the force has been constructed, which welds control and ownership together.

But paragraph Six of the Nassau communiqué, which is of British drafting, implies a rather different approach. It envisages the immediate creation of a NATO nuclear command of which the basic elements would be R.A.F. Bomber Command, the American *Polaris* submarines 'earmarked' for NATO in 1962 and the French *Mirage IVs* if France were willing. Most important of all, it offers a place within the system of NATO control to those NATO non-nuclear powers who have got important tactical nuclear weapons, aircraft

or missiles. It is a more pragmatic approach but capable of immediate application.

Both plans represent a profound change in the British and American attitude to NATO in that they imply a decision to make NATO itself part of the process of strategic planning and control, and they are not in the long run intended to be mutually exclusive. In theory the British proposal is complementary to the American. The two plans do, however, present the non-nuclear powers in NATO with different alternatives to support in the immediate future; and it is therefore important to decide which is likely to prove the most attractive to the European powers, and in particular to Germany.

A great deal of hard work has gone into the American proposals for a multilateral force: military calculations of how crews made up of several nationalities could be trained and welded into one; legal research on multinational ownership; financial and technical estimations. There seems little doubt that the multinational element in the NATO seaborne force could be made to work. And it has the advantage that, at a time when the American public is becoming restive at bearing so high a share of the costs of Western defence, access to control must go hand in hand with a country's willingness to make some financial sacrifice towards the cost of building and maintaining the force. Moreover, it meets a standard European military argument that a country cannot play an influential role in the process of NATO planning unless its representatives are deeply involved in the technology of the relevant weapons.

But its disadvantages seem numerous. The first is the reverse of its chief advantage, namely that the European non-nuclear powers will be faced with the alternative of expanding their defence budgets at a time when the pace of economic growth is decelerating, or diverting resources from their conventional forces. The costs of constructing and maintaining the multinational element of the multilateral force may appear modest by American standards or even in relation to the \$18 billion that Canada and the European NATO countries spend on defence. But if one exempts France, a Britain that is building its own separate force, countries like Greece and Turkey that are too poor to contribute, and

Canada and the Scandinavian countries which may be inhibited by their domestic policies, then the cost to the rest could represent an increased defence expenditure of the order of 5 per cent, even if the United States bears one-third of the \$500,000 million which a force of twenty-five missile ships is estimated to cost.

Hence it becomes an open question whether these countries and especially Germany (which by any burden sharing formula based on national income would carry the lion's share of the cost), will wish to subscribe such resources to a force which, unlike the British force, does not guarantee them freedom of action in an acute emergency, does not earn them influence with the Pentagon which is interested in their conventional forces, and exposes them to Soviet hostility. The fact that the multimanned element will use surface ships while the British and the Americans use submarines merely emphasises the distinction between the nuclear and the non-nuclear powers in NATO which the multilateral force is designed to obscure. (The original American proposal for multimanned submarines succumbed to Congressional opposition, and would in any case have posed difficult operational problems.)

Third, the American plan seems to raise the question of whether political confidence can be enhanced by a share in a force for which there is no obvious military requirement. If the existing American strategic forces are as effective and diverse as Secretary McNamara claims, is there likely to be allied enthusiasm for participating in a project which merely adds to the American margin of strategic superiority? In theory there is, since this is a NATO force in whose deployment and potential use the American voice will be important but not decisive; it therefore gives the European allies some control over the plan for strategic retaliation in the event of an attack on Europe. But here the characteristics of the *Polaris* missile are relevant. In the overall American strategy such weapons are now to be kept in reserve in a nuclear exchange until *Minuteman* and more accurate systems have effectively disarmed the Soviet Union. The development of the multilaterally controlled force around *Polaris* will either necessitate a revision of this strategy to a simpler one of early

general retaliation or else some overriding American control on the timing of the use of the NATO force must be built in, which would destroy much of its political purpose. In any case it is clear that the European powers can only be offered an additional safety catch each but not a trigger: although the German Government has proposed that operational decisions on the use of this force should eventually be taken by majority vote, in practice the United States cannot relinquish its veto as long as the warheads remain in American hands.

Then there are the aspects both of stability and of burden sharing. Is it wise in the interests of a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union deliberately to augment the Western strategic superiority by, say, another 300 missiles (25 NATO owned ships, 6 British submarines)?¹ Will the United States accept this kind of European expenditure as a shifting of its own burdens? If so, will the size of the American *Polaris* fleet be cut back from its planned level of 41 boats to, say, 21? A decision is soon required since 17 have been built or are building and 35 had already been authorised by the beginning of 1963.

Finally, there is the question of the invulnerability of a force of surface ships. It is true that 25 missile carrying merchantmen are not easy to detect in the 2,500 ships at sea on any one day in European waters. But the large Soviet trawler fleet has a military as well as a commercial function, and this project could mean spreading the Cold War to an area which has hitherto been more or less immune from it, namely the high seas. To offer Europe a destabilising weapons system would be to perform a very poor service for the alliance. With half a dozen national vetoes on its use, yet with its units exposed to Soviet surveillance and interference, it could prove no more than a dangerous and useless status symbol.

The implications of the somewhat different British approach to the problem have been obscured by the Macmillan Government's political necessities which have forced it to concentrate public attention on the salvage, by its own *Polaris* deal, of a theoretic capacity for independent strategic action, rather than on its more constructive initiative in

¹ See comment by Michael Howard, p. 232

deciding to place the whole of R.A.F. Bomber Command under the planning control of NATO.

Stripped of its political reservations, the British suggestion is that NATO control of nuclear weapons be constructed around those that exist and which already have an agreed military application to the security of Europe itself. This primarily means the interdiction of major military movements in Eastern Europe, such targets as Soviet communications, airfields and missile bases. The core of this force would be the V-Bombers, which should be redirected from strategic targets deep in Russia itself to NATO interdiction targets, plus the American *Polaris* submarines already committed to NATO. But these are not the only countries involved: Canada will shortly have 140 F-104s with a nuclear capability in Europe: Germany has the *Mace* missile and other medium-range interdiction weapons: and several other countries, Italy, Belgium, Holland, are acquiring forces that are involved in this role. All these will need continuous modernisation over the years, requiring an interdependent effort towards new missiles or vertical take-off and landing aircraft. Why not, it is argued, found the principle of multilateral control on those countries whose governments might be involved in an early and agonising decision to unleash nuclear interdiction and thus expose themselves to great dangers, rather than on a new seaborne force whose military function is still obscure? The actual weapons would remain under existing national control under an overall commander, while the nations involved were drawn into a special relationship within NATO.

The advantages of such an approach are, first, that it involves no new diversion of resources on the part of the European countries, a consideration that becomes increasingly important as the cost of improving the quality of their conventional forces increases. Second, it establishes the principle that countries who are involved in a particular kind of military risk have a right to participate in the planning and control of the forces involved, and of the grand strategy which governs them. Its most serious disadvantage is that a total of ten nations in NATO now have nuclear weapons or launchers of one kind or another, and this is a very large

number on which to base a nuclear control executive for planning, let alone operational, purposes.

Like the American, the British initiative—delayed by service and political opposition—has unfortunately come too late to hold out much hope that France may divert the *force de frappe* of *Mirage IVs* from an independent strategic to a NATO interdiction role. The question of which approach deserves the greater support must turn to a considerable extent on two considerations. First, which will elicit the greatest European support: the more modest but immediate, the more imaginative but the more distant? Second, which would be the easiest for France to accept should there be a change in French policy? The answer is not clear yet, but it is possible that German defence policy, now that it is being re-examined, would seek a greater say in NATO strategy as a whole and in particular the deployment and use of those weapons which directly affect her own front, rather than accept the dubious honour of helping to finance and man part of a seaborne force which does not belong to her, and could not revert to her control in an emergency. The American search for a formula by which Germany could become associated with allied nuclear planning by manning a faction of the seaborne missiles which support NATO strategy has been devised to meet a particular political situation in Bonn which may soon be dissolving. By the same token, France may one day find it harder to accept a NATO system if during her absence from the discussion table a new NATO force, with its own tight rules of membership, has been built up without her, than if her own nuclear capability clearly had a role to play within it.

This study has been completed before it is clear how much support either the multilateral or the multinational nuclear force commands in Europe. Clearly the former would gain greater support if Britain and France, or even Britain alone, decided to abandon a separate programme and join the mixed-manned force. But it is very improbable that either country will decide to do so in the near future. The multinational force is more likely to be accepted at least as a first stage, but only on three conditions. The first is that Britain's decision to assign her strategic bombers to NATO is not

hedged about with so many conditions as to make it meaningless. The second is that it commands the eventual support of the United States: this seems probable, for the multilateral proposal has never commanded the support of a united Administration or Congress. The third is that it is not regarded as an end in itself but as part of a much wider re-examination of the needs and structure of NATO itself.

V

If the national and the multilateral approach to the control of nuclear strategy both seem to raise more problems than they solve, there is one other solution that must be considered before examining the reorganisation of NATO itself. This would make control conform to the emerging political and economic pattern of the alliance, and would involve the creation of a European nuclear deterrent, separately controlled by the European Community or some European Authority but co-ordinated with the nuclear forces of the United States.

Although European governments have been cautious in their statements on this subject, there is a body of European opinion to which this seems the only logical outcome. M. Arthur Conte, the President of the Assembly of the Western European Union, expressed a widely held view when he said that the development of a European nuclear striking force is essential to the Atlantic alliance. 'Our task is to build a European pillar to NATO so as to strengthen the political, economic and military foundation of the alliance.'¹ Since so much was said and written before January 1963—on both sides of the Atlantic—about the 'twin pillars' concept of Atlantic partnership, it was natural that many people should come to believe that Europe's new sense of identity and cohesion must find not only a military expression, but a nuclear military expression. If Europe is to be one of the world's great powers, how can it be denied the central attribute of great power status, namely the resources to conduct its own strategy? This view has adherents not only in

¹ *New York Times* (European Edition), October 12, 1962

the European Movement and in continental governments but in Britain as well.

Superficially it might also appear that there is American support for it. Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Adviser on National Security to President Kennedy said in a speech in Copenhagen on September 27th, 1962:

No one should suppose . . . that we are blind either to the common military needs of NATO or to the special political and psychological forces which may most understandably press on our friends in Europe. No one should suppose that we are unwilling to share in this grim responsibility whenever the responsibility is truly shared. It would also be wrong to suppose that the reluctance which we feel with respect to individual, ineffective and unintegrated forces would be extended automatically to a European force, genuinely unified and multilateral, and effectively integrated with our own necessarily predominant strength in the whole nuclear defence of the alliance.

But it is important to note that the key word is 'integrated': there is no American official support for a European deterrent that would be only 'co-ordinated' with the American forces or was used as the basis of a separate foreign policy.¹ This formulation differs little in reality from American proposals for the kind of NATO system of control embodied in the suggestions for a multilateral force.

This distinction is crucial. If Europe were to build a nuclear striking force which was integrated with the much larger American force, then without a revision in the whole structure of the alliance, the governing decision as to its use would be American, even though Europe might have an unfettered control over its size, nature and location. But would it be worth the effort and risk involved to Europe to build a force which was ultimately controlled by the United

¹ In his address to the NATO Parliamentarians in December, Mr. George Ball, the U.S. Undersecretary of State, used much the same formulation as Mr. Bundy, but with the words 'closely co-ordinated' instead of 'integrated'. But it is clear that in practical military terms the two concepts are identical

States? Why not accept American weapons? Only European technical and scientific pride would have been satisfied, not European political fears or ambitions.

But if the force is to be only 'co-ordinated' as to targets and timing with that of the United States, with the ultimate decision to use it in European hands, then it is hard to see how the United States could give technical or financial support to the proposition, even if she made no effort to prevent it. This is not just from a desire to retain a general hegemony in the alliance, for in the economic field she is deliberately abdicating this and in the political field is anxious to share power. First, it is because in her arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union she has now gone too far in seeking joint Soviet-American agreement to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons to be in a position to encourage the development of a new centre of effective nuclear power in Europe: to do so might break down the Soviet defences against helping China to become a nuclear great power. Second, it is because a European force, which was only co-ordinated with SAC, would possess some power to trigger the use of American nuclear weapons against the will of the United States, unless NATO itself were formally abandoned. Though some American analysts have endorsed the desirability of a separate European force, it must be assumed that, once the question had become sufficiently concrete to involve a decision by the American Government and Congress, little or no American assistance would be forthcoming in developing a European deterrent, even the relatively small 'minimum deterrent' or counter-city force which European advocates of the idea suggest is all that Europe would require. It is in this light that the two questions which the proposition raises—its feasibility and its desirability—should be viewed.

(1) *Feasibility*

There are a number of different aspects of the development of a European nuclear deterrent to be considered: the nuclear explosive; the means of delivery; the finance of the programmes; the siting of the force; the credibility of the force, and its control.

As far as the provision of nuclear material is concerned the

entry of the United Kingdom into a European arrangement would profoundly alter the prospects for a European deterrent during the next decade. The military side of the British nuclear-energy programme is now running in low gear, since Britain's own requirements are satisfied, and could be accelerated to meet the needs of a larger force, whereas France will not be producing fissionable material in large quantities until 1966 or 1967. The existence of the gaseous diffusion plant at Capenhurst might make it unnecessary to continue with the expensive French diffusion plant at Pierrelatte, and enable French resources to be diverted elsewhere. However, if Britain decided to cast in her lot with the European Community in the development of such an independent force, the U.S. Congress would almost certainly insist on the denunciation of the 1958 Anglo-American agreement, so that access to American developments, in warhead and missile design and many other projects, would be cut off, and a corresponding expansion of European research facilities would be necessary.

As far as the means of delivery are concerned, a force of British V-Bombers and TSR2s plus the French *Mirage IVs* would not provide a sufficiently heavy or secure force to give Europe a credible system of strategic deterrence against Russia beyond about 1968. If the decision to develop a new generation of weapons to give Europe the basis of an independent strategy in the late 1960s and early 1970s were taken some time in 1964, it would be necessary to consider a diversified force which would probably have to include some VTOL bombers, some land-based missiles and a small force of missile-firing ships or submarines. The cheapest alternative would probably be a force of hardened solid fuelled IRBMs, but here one is confronted with the problem that Western Europe is an area of high and evenly distributed population density with only certain areas—parts of the Scottish highlands, small areas of North Wales—and still smaller areas in the French and Italian Alps, which are sufficiently sparsely populated and distant from metropolitan centres, to base missiles without risk of a Soviet disarming attack doing almost as much damage as a counter-city attack.¹ (The most suitable country in which to

¹ The U.S. *Minuteman* and *Titan* missiles are being placed in the lowest density areas of the U.S. The following gives the density of

base hardened IRBMs would be Norway, but this would risk upsetting the very delicate balance in Northern Europe and would very likely lead to a Soviet re-occupation of Finland.)

Even so a diversified force of this kind, of say 500 units of strategic delivery, by air, sea and ground launched missiles, is probably within the capability of Western European industry to build and of their governments to finance. The Europe of the Seven (the EEC plus Britain) spent \$13,642 million on defence in 1962, or less than a quarter of the defence expenditure of the United States. This represents about 5.5 per cent of their combined national incomes. If the defence expenditure of the Seven were increased by \$3-4,000 million a year, that is by about 22-30 per cent, this should enable the Community or a European Authority to build and maintain a diversified system of strategic deterrence over a six-year period, provided the governments were prepared to allocate a high level of scientific and technological manpower to the programmes. This would still only mean allocating some 7 per cent of the 1962 national income of the Seven to defence where the United States devotes 11.25 per cent and the Soviet Union about 18 per cent of its national income to this purpose.¹

these areas and that of their European counterparts. (In sq. km.)			
<i>U.S.</i>		<i>Europe</i>	
Montana	1.78	Scottish Highlands	5.75
North Dakota	3.47	North Wales	26.5
South Dakota	3.44	French Alps	13.53
Nevada	1.5	Val D'Aosta	29.00
Wyoming	3.4	Norway (average)	10.6
U.S. overall		Western Europe overall	209.3
	19.6		

¹ This estimate is based on a crude extrapolation of American figures for the three systems mentioned above and for the overall cost of maintenance. It is a fair assumption that the American and European costs in these fields would be roughly identical, certain lower production costs in Europe being offset by the higher cost of the necessary research and development programmes, on a scale to which European firms are not generally accustomed. This includes the protection of the force, but not such things as reconnaissance satellites which may be an essential part of a deterrent system by 1970

There is however one serious difficulty about such a programme. Now that Algeria is a sovereign state, soon no European country will have access to an area for testing warheads or missiles closer than Woomera range in Australia and the British and French islands of the South Pacific. This might increase the cost and might make it difficult to complete the programmes in a short span of time. Even if a test-ban were in force and it was decided to rely on existing knowledge of nuclear techniques without fresh tests, Europe would still need a missile range of 1,500–2,000 miles and that would not be easy to organise across the metropolitan territory of the Seven.

Since the idea of a separate European nuclear strategic force first began to be discussed, it has become clear that Britain will not become a member of the Economic Community in the near future. This does not dispose of the idea entirely, for it is possible that defence co-operation may flourish among all the leading West European countries more easily than economic co-operation. But to enter some European nuclear defence union or authority would now mean a major reversal in British policy. Yet without Britain the technical and demographic problems of creating a European strategic force become very formidable indeed.

However, the most serious problem about the feasibility of a European deterrent centres round the question of control. Hitherto the Economic Community has owed its success to the fact that it has not wasted time in arguing over blueprints for supranational institutions, but has attempted to evolve those which reflect the highest community of interest. There is now an effective relationship between the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Six governments, so that national decisions and plans can become, by discussion with this central body, more and more closely harmonised. This process may gradually be carried further to the point where the Community becomes a formal confederation. The decision to embark on a separate European nuclear deterrent could perhaps be taken by the Council of Ministers of the European Confederation: but the decision to use, threaten or withhold such weapons in a crisis could not. To become an operational nuclear power the Community would (after ac-

cepting Britain) first have to become a tight federation with a powerful central government like the United States, and its peoples would have to have acquired a sense of common identity which would make an Englishman ready to see operational control over nuclear weapons in the hands of an Italian or a German, and vice versa. More than that the resort to nuclear weapons is so far the most awful decision that any political society could be asked to contemplate that it could hardly be taken by any collective body, and might require, if a European deterrent were to be politically credible in its own right, the concentration of power in the hands of a President of Europe with authority analogous to that of the President of the United States.

Very possibly Western Europe—with or without Britain—may be able to take the very big step from confederal to federal institutions within the next ten years. No doubt this sense of identity between the peoples of the Community will flower within a generation. But is it possible to conceive, within the time span we are considering, the highly centralised form of government that would be necessary to make credible the deterrent threat of a system of nuclear weapons under the control of the Community itself? It has been suggested that the need to control nuclear weapons may have a decisive effect upon the structure of the Central European institutions. This is possible but by no means certain, especially as long as the European powers have an alternative, namely association with the control of American weapons.

One point in particular needs clarification in connection with the question of control. There has been some tendency to assume that the existing British and French nuclear forces, whether fused into one force or highly integrated, but still under the control of those two governments, would be acceptable to the other countries of the Community as a European deterrent. This view is open to dispute. For one thing, the British Government has maintained for five years that its deterrent force operates 'on behalf of' her European allies, without carrying any conviction on the Continent. More important, it is widely appreciated in Europe that to create a European deterrent would inevitably mean weakening the American guarantee of the integrity of Western Europe: in

fact one of the prime arguments for its creation is that this guarantee is weakening in any case. But the other five members of the Community, and the Federal Republic in particular, will not be prepared to help finance an alternative to the American deterrent unless they have a full share in every decision concerning its construction, deployment and use. Yet, without the assistance of their five colleagues, Britain and France might face a rise in defence expenditure of the order of 50 per cent or more to create an effective European alternative to the American system. Even then, with the United States and the Soviet Union spending between them some \$12,000 million a year on military research and development, a series of Franco-British weapons systems might be obsolete by the time they were produced.

(2) *Desirability*

There is a general desire, not only in Europe itself, but in the United States as well to see Europe regain an important influence over the course of world affairs. There are many problems which confront the free societies as a whole to whose solution Europe and the Europeans may be able to make a more effective contribution than the United States, the Commonwealth, Japan or the other major power centres outside the Communist bloc—the economic maturity of Latin America, the development of Africa, for instance. But although Europe will acquire this kind of influence, is the development of a separate European system of strategic deterrence really desirable?

The answer partly turns on whether the European Community is to become a 'Third Force' (or a Fourth Force if one includes China) in world politics. Clearly Western Europe is, and has been for many years, a political third force in the sense that European attitudes and policies over a wide range of issues, have not been identical with American views, and that both the super-powers have had to take account of this fact. The difficulty in giving any precision to the idea in strategic terms is to know to what end this influence would be exerted. If it means that the European Community might seek to reconcile its differences with the Soviet Union and to evolve a political settlement of Europe, independently from

the United States, then the decision to build a series of offensive weapons systems of its own throughout the latter 1960s hardly seems likely to create the atmosphere in which any such negotiations could be successful. If, on the other hand, a 'third force' policy means that the Community should have the power to resist Soviet-American arms control agreements, on say the withdrawal and dismantling of certain kinds of weapons in Europe—agreements, which it might feel were made over its head and were prejudicial to its interests—then this means either effectively blocking great power accords to stabilise the arms race, or that Europe will insist on remaining a highly armed area, even though some measure of great power *détente* has been painfully achieved. In effect, this implies a belief that Europe might decide to 'go it alone' in a situation in which the two present nuclear super-powers had reached agreement that they had certain limited interests in common which transcended their ideological hostility.

To believe this means accepting the view that European and American interests might diverge in the same fashion as Soviet and Chinese interests are diverging, and that Europe might become the China of the West. At this point the Atlantic Alliance would be in danger of collapse, leaving Europe solely responsible for its own security. In this situation Europe would require a very strong system of deterrence, considerably more costly than that outlined above. Even then Europe could not overcome the fact that it is one of the most vulnerable areas in the world, with a population density over ten times that of the United States and over twenty times that of the Soviet Union, with 76 major cities many of them contiguous, few civil defence options and minimal warning time of attack. Perhaps only a counterforce strategy would enable it to offset this vulnerability, if a point was reached where Europe had to become solely dependent on its own resources for strategic protection, and this would involve strategic weapons programmes of two or three times the size and cost that have been considered above.

But even if one assumes that the conception of Europe as a 'third force' is not to be pushed to its logical extreme in the political or strategic sphere, and that the Atlantic Alliance is to be maintained on the basis of an American and a European

pillar, the idea of a European deterrent still raises three questions.

The first concerns the relationship between the European Community and the United States. Could a European system of strategic deterrence be evolved without weakening the American commitment to Europe? It is agreed by all those who advocate the European solution that Europe would require only a limited strategic force targeted on Soviet cities, 'to tear an arm off Russia' in President de Gaulle's graphic phrase, if she should ever attack Europe. The difficulty of a co-ordinated relationship between a small and a large force is that the former can only force the hand of the latter, not restrain it. Because R.A.F. Bomber Command is so closely meshed with SAC, the United States does not greatly fear that Britain might commit the United States to nuclear strategic war against its will. But a European force that was merely 'co-ordinated' with SAC could be used without the agreement of the United States, and yet the Soviet Union would be more than likely to retaliate against American as well as European cities.

There would thus be a growing pressure in the United States to make clear to the Soviet Union that the United States was no longer automatically committed to the support of Europe in the event of war. At the very least it would lead to political pressure to withdraw American forces from Europe, for nearly half a million American lives could be jeopardised by actions over which the United States had no control, a withdrawal which would create severe instability in Europe until such time as the European ground forces are very much larger and better trained than at present.

Analogies from trans-Atlantic economic relations are, in this respect, misleading. It is true that a demonstration of European economic power, independence and unity has had a valuable effect in forcing a revision of American tariff legislation and creating a more equal balance of interest and influence between the United States and Europe. But the passage of the Trade Expansion Act in 1962 really came about because the European Community and the American Administration were fighting on the same side against the conservative elements in Congress and American industry. But

in the strategic field, Europe would be faced by an Administration, a Congress and a public opinion that were united in their determination that Europe should not gain the power to commit the United States to nuclear war against the better judgement of the President. Moreover, while the economic strength of the European Community is very considerable indeed in relation to the United States, in military terms there is no such equal balance, and would not be for many years, even if Europe were armed with strategic nuclear weapons. Consequently, instead of increasing European influence with the United States, the decision to build a European deterrent might lead to a progressive desire on the part of the United States to loosen the structure of the Atlantic alliance and an increasing trend towards unilateralism in American policy and neutralism with regard to Europe's quarrels.

The second question concerns the effect of such a decision upon the Soviet Union. As Soviet statements throughout 1962 have made clear, she regards the European Community, in its purely economic aspects, as a major challenge. Western Europe is the ancient highroad of invasion as far as Russia is concerned: she now also fears the disruptive political effect of a dynamic Community upon the Eastern European countries. If Western Europe decided to develop its own weapons of mass destruction, would the Soviet Union be content to do nothing during the five to six years while this force was growing from drawing-board to actuality? Might not the Soviet Union be tempted to exploit the vulnerability of Western Europe before it was too late? If so, there are many exposed areas of Southern, Central and Northern Europe against which she could exert pressure.

The third question concerns the effect upon the European Community itself of the decision to become an independent nuclear power. So far it has been grounded upon a solid foundation of common economic interests. But the unresolved disputes within the Community itself show that the next stages, the evolution of a political framework or of a common foreign policy, are going to be extremely difficult. In view of the very different attitudes about the desirability of a European deterrent that exist between European governments, within governments, or between governments and their public

opinion, on this question might not the attempt to evolve, European strategic nuclear programmes within the next decade, break up the Community itself? At a later stage, when a very solid framework of institutions and common interests has been established (possibly in the kind of European Defence Authority which is sketched below), and when it is clearer what kind of strategic relationship will develop between the Soviet Union and the United States, the idea should be thoroughly explored. But to disrupt one of the most promising experiments in supranationalism that this century has witnessed, by reason of a vague equation between great power status and the possession of weapons of mass destruction, would be a profound tragedy.

VI

So far our examination of the various alternative lines of policy for evolving a more satisfactory control of Western strategy has ended in a series of negative propositions. The American nuclear monopoly has gone, and the attempt to reconcile purely national control of strategic planning and decisions with the political and psychological obligations of the alliance has proved impossible, as the United States and Britain began to recognise in 1962. The rise of non-nuclear powers, Germany, Italy and Canada in particular, to positions of world influence has made it impossible to consider basing the higher direction of policy on a tripartite *directoire* of the three nuclear powers in NATO. The American proposals for a multilateral NATO nuclear force seem to be unworkable and counter productive, at least in isolation from other measures, and the alternative of a multinational nuclear force also has obvious drawbacks, if it too is considered as an isolated step. At the same time, the idea of an Atlantic strategic partnership based on a European as well as an American strategic force proves to be a dubious proposition, at least for the foreseeable future.

We are faced, therefore, with the alternatives of maintaining something like the *status quo* within the alliance, or considering a more radical approach that will tackle directly the

sources of political malaise of which the preoccupation with nuclear control is only a symptom.

It is not possible to resign oneself to accepting the *status quo* over the remaining five and a half years before the NATO treaty comes up for renewal, even on the basis of the Nassau agreements. It means leaving unresolved or debating publicly a number of serious European-American arguments, over negotiations with the Soviet Union, over the correct military stance of the alliance in Europe, over control of nuclear policy. It means postponing for many years consideration of the political and strategic role of Western Europe, and it means the virtual abstention of France from collective political and military planning. It means, above all, accepting the prospect of an economically dynamic but politically stagnant Atlantic world, which is debarred by its own internal contradictions from pursuing an effective dialogue with the adversary at a time (which may not last indefinitely) when the Soviet Union is under some considerable pressure to reach accommodations with the West.

But just because the Soviet attitude is less menacing and the general balance of power is more secure, it is fruitless to imagine that the tensions within NATO can be resolved by some grandiose plan for Atlantic union, for there is no longer enough fear in the West to overthrow the strong tradition of the nation state. If the purely national approach to defence and disarmament is now anachronistic, neither the United States or Europe are ready for supranational institutions that bridge the ocean. We, therefore, have to fall back on the less glamorous but more rewarding alternative of improving the pragmatic instrument of international co-operation which was forged fourteen years ago.

The events of late 1962 and early 1963 which demonstrated the limitations outside the economic field of an Atlantic partnership based on twin pillars, have reminded all the major governments of the importance of NATO, which has once again become their principal channel of discourse. At the same time there is now a clearer appreciation of the reasons why NATO has become somewhat moribund in recent years and subordinate to a network of bilateral negotiations and agreements.

One reason is that the NATO Council is neither organised nor equipped to take decisions, but only to mull over problems. Since it operates by the rule of unanimity, since the standing of its permanent members within their own governments varies considerably, and since it is not served by a strong Secretariat, its deliberations have not had an important bearing upon the policy decisions of the various governments. It has not become the strong centre of Western policy making, either on European questions or on global policy, for which its founders hoped. The United States is as much responsible for this as is any European government, though none is blameless.

A second reason is that the military structure of NATO no longer fits the political requirements of the alliance. The United States has at last realised the harm which its own security policy with regard to all aspects of nuclear planning has done to its own interests: it has surrounded all questions of nuclear policy with an air of unnecessary mystery, and consequently encouraged European governments to find a means of penetrating it. The decision taken at the Athens meeting of the NATO Council in 1962 to inform the allies of American and British nuclear planning therefore represents an important step towards a more confident alliance.

But, in addition, an anomalous position has developed whereby the NATO Council has become dependent for military advice upon one local military commander, SACEUR, whose plans, divorced from those of national governments, tend to be evolved in a political and economic vacuum. The consequence is that NATO is not the focus which it should be of the central Western debate on strategic questions, but one party to a protracted series of bilateral arguments between governments.

The third major defect of the NATO system is that no adjustment has been made to give expression to 'the European idea', to the sense of common identity of the West European members of the alliance. Much of the American longing for a united Europe comes from a weariness of being involved in complex relations with so many allies. Though its support for an alliance of twin pillars may have rested on false assumptions

about the degree of political unity attainable in Western Europe at this stage, and also on a confusion between Community Europe (the Six) and NATO Europe (the Twelve), there is a reciprocity of interest between the United States and Western Europe to which the structure of the alliance could be adjusted.

VII

If we accept that, in terms of European stability and allied confidence, it is undesirable that the physical ownership of nuclear weapons should pass out of the hands of the existing nuclear powers in NATO, while the project for a multilateral force is largely an attempt to sidestep the issue of control, then there are two separate aspects to the allied control of strategy to be confronted. One is control and influence over the *planning* which surrounds their potential use: the numbers and kinds of nuclear weapons; their deployment; the contingencies in which they would be used; the way in which they would be used: the targets on which they would be used. The second concerns the operational *decision* to fire them in war.

The way in which a solution that satisfied the political and psychological needs of the alliance might be evolved, would be to obtain clear agreement on the distinction between these two forms of control initially, and then to regard them as objectives to be sought consecutively rather than concurrently.¹ What follows is an attempt to suggest the logical steps towards the attainment of the first objective, and a preparation for a more realistic consideration of the second.

The first tentative step towards greater allied control of the

¹ For more detailed consideration of this problem see 'The Practice of Partnership' by Dean Acheson in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1963, 'The Reform of NATO' by Alastair Buchan, *ibid.*, January 1962, and 'Nuclear Control in NATO' by Robert Osgood, *op. cit.* A different approach to the one outlined here, and commencing with the creation of a NATO nuclear executive 'to be the sole authority deciding on the deployment and use of nuclear weapons in the territory covered by the Alliance' may be found in a report of October 16, 1962, to the Assembly of Western European Union (Document 251)

strategic planning process was taken in 1962 by the creation of the Nuclear Committee of the Atlantic Council, and the British and American decision to inform their allies of what their strategic plans are. It is to be hoped that France will follow suit when she is ready. But this by itself is not a complete step, since it provides no means for a reconciliation of conflicting allied views and interests. The next step should involve a reorganisation of the NATO Secretariat in order that it can become an effective centre of informed allied discussion and planning, instead of being one of several channels for an unsatisfactory dialogue between American strategic planners and reluctant or uncertain European governments. Essentially what is required is the development of a strong civil-military staff, including influential American officials, under the Secretary-General who should continue to be a European. The unsatisfactory situation whereby the Supreme Commander Europe is forced to double as the military adviser to the Council should be ended by the appointment of a Chief-of-Staff of NATO, either parallel with or below the Secretary-General, at the head of a combined military planning staff. He would continue to be an American officer, but he would have three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, French, British and German, each responsible for a major field of European and Atlantic defence planning. The Standing Group could then be replaced by a senior NATO representative in the Pentagon. The Supreme Commander Europe would become once again an operational commander who would receive his directives from the combined staff. Since he would be responsible for the defence of Europe he should be a European, perhaps a French officer. These changes would have the effect of making the central structure of NATO approximate to that of a national government. Parallel with them should go a close study of the techniques evolved by the European Commission and Community for arriving at a consensus between national governments and for taking firm decisions. Though there can be no question of using the technique of weighted voting for deciding issues of peace and war, there is every reason to introduce it into the Council's discussion of planning problems, and most particularly into the functional committees on weapons policy, standardisation, civil defence

and many other subjects, which are now largely ignored by national governments because they seldom present clear advice.

The next forward step, which could only be taken after the reorganisation discussed above was working satisfactorily, would be to create a second NATO Supreme Commander (SACAIR) in Europe (making, with SACLANT, three in all) charged with the planning and control of all nuclear weapons with an interdiction function which are based in Europe or the adjacent seas, responsible to the Chief-of-Staff, and with his headquarters close to SACEUR. His command would include the British V-Bombers now assigned to NATO, those American *Polaris* submarines similarly assigned, the U.S. B 47s based in Spain and Britain, the *Mace* missiles in Germany, the Canadian, German, Italian and other fighter bombers. If French policy is revised the *force de frappe* could be assigned to this command.

This would be a multinational command with the individual forces remaining under national commanders. The only theoretic difference between the forces of the nuclear powers and those of the non-nuclear powers would be that the former could be withdrawn (subject to the consent of the Council) either to meet an extra-European commitment or in a national emergency that was not an emergency for the alliance as a whole, a contingency which, as M. Raymond Aron has pointed out, is highly theoretical. 'Il est difficile d'imaginer, dans l'avenir prévisible, que les intérêts suprêmes de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne ne soient pas en même temps ceux de l'Alliance atlantique.'¹

While SACEUR was primarily concerned with defence against all forms of ground and local air attack in Europe, SACAIR would be concerned with the prohibition of all forms of major Soviet military movements in Western Russia and Eastern Europe. For this purpose he would be required to work in intimate collaboration with SAC headquarters in Omaha. For this reason and because most of the nuclear warheads under his control would be American, there is a case for an American officer in this post; equally, while the V-Bombers form the largest single

¹ *Le Figaro*, December 26, 1962

element in the command, there is a case for a British officer.¹

But this step alone is still not wholly adequate to ensure a full European grasp of strategic nuclear planning. It would therefore be desirable for the United States, if not formally to assign the SAC forces to NATO, at least to have a strong NATO liaison team permanently stationed there.

But within the framework of a strengthened NATO, the Western European powers, including Britain, could concurrently strengthen their own means of evolving a common European view on questions of European defence and strategy. One means is ready to hand in Western European Union, which already includes Britain, and whose structure would need little revision to convert it into a European Defence Authority. Though it could not be regarded as a substitute for NATO, since so many decisions concerning the defence of Europe are contingent on strategic plans in which the United States must have a major voice, there is no reason why it should continue to be the shadowy organisation it has been for the past decade. Though an EDA would not have command responsibilities it could immediately be charged with two special functions. One would be to evolve agreed plans for the production of aircraft, tanks and the other major armaments required for purposes of European defence, to finance research and development, and to organise production. This would involve a close European dialogue, not only on technical questions, but also on the strategic and tactical requirements which govern weapon design. Without being directed against the United States, such an agency would stimulate European technology and the development of a European view on defence questions, and also provide a safeguard against American commercial pressure which has frequently led to the sale of expensive but unsuitable American armaments to Europe.

Its second function would be to translate into terms of the

¹ There is a certain fear in some European governments that to divide SACEUR'S authority, and to separate the nuclear interdiction element, might at some stage facilitate American 'nuclear disengagement' from Europe. But the fact that, under the reorganisation suggested above, planning recommendations would be in the hands of a combined NATO staff with strong European representation, rather than in SHAPE, should offset this fear

budgets and plans of individual European countries, agreements reached with the United States, Canada, and the other European NATO countries on the general burdens to be assumed by the West European countries as a whole. For instance, if it were still agreed that there should be 30 divisions in the Central Area of NATO, of which the United States would continue to supply 5, then it would be up to the EDA to negotiate how the burden of the other 25 would be distributed among the other West European countries. This would eliminate a great deal of haggling between the United States and her individual European allies, and would force the West European countries to reach internal agreements about the division of a common European effort. By this means there should emerge an increasingly consistent European view on questions of European defence which would enable them to exert greater influence on strategic planning, inside a reorganised and strengthened NATO, which governs the potential use of nuclear weapons, whether based outside or inside Europe.

The final logical step would be to bring Italy under the Central Area of NATO so that all the WEU or EDA countries fall within a single military command. SHAPE, under a European SACEUR, would become a primarily European instead of primarily an American headquarters, but, of course, taking its operational directives from the NATO staff. The senior area commanders below SACEUR would continue to be both European and American but with greater responsibility than at present. The defence of the revised Southern Area (Greece and Turkey), which has quite separate problems from that of Western Europe, should remain under an American commander, backed up by U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean. A British commander would continue to be responsible for the Northern Area (Norway and Denmark). In the Central Area a German commander (as at present) would be responsible for the ground defence of Germany and France.

Would these steps go far enough to meet the desire for allied control of strategy? They would go a considerable distance and be a marked improvement on the present system. For the apparent parity of influence which all the nations

enjoy has obscured the extent to which NATO policy has been American policy, accepted with various degrees of reluctance or enthusiasm by different allies, but rarely emerging out of the same kind of prolonged argument, study and reconciliation of different views by which national policy is made. The real clue to success lies therefore in the central organisation of NATO itself. By the kind of reforms suggested above, the European allies could not only have confidence that their views and interests had been reflected in planning decisions, in the so-called 'guide lines', but would also have a firm knowledge of the action that the nuclear powers would take in different kinds of emergency—something of which they have had only the sketchiest outline hitherto. And this cannot be achieved merely by meetings, however regular or frequent, of ministers and generals. It requires the participation of combined European-American teams at all levels from junior officials, civil as well as military, upwards, so that within NATO itself there can be the same intensive study of the complexities of modern strategic choices as takes place, at present, for the most part only in Washington.

But a reorganised NATO along these lines would have wider advantages. In the first place, by making the defence of Europe primarily the responsibility of Europe, there would be a prospect—for the first time in a decade—of enlisting the deepest interests of European governments and their publics in the problems which it presents. It has been suggested earlier that stability in Europe would be hard to maintain without an American presence there. But if the United States is forced, for financial reasons, somewhat to reduce her forces in Europe, the existence of a European Defence Authority would make it somewhat easier to adjust the load.

The speed with which the non-nuclear allies could move from active participation in planning to actual sharing of the operational decision to use nuclear weapons would really depend on how satisfactorily this process of sharing the control of planning were to proceed and how firm a consensus emerged from it. Three qualifications inevitably limit the conception. One is that fifteen nations cannot all participate in an operational decision of this kind. Second, it is doubtful if the United States could be asked to share control of a deci-

sion to use nuclear weapons outside the NATO area, say in the Far East, although the Council and the NATO staff must have full access to American contingency planning for that area. Third and most important, it is impossible to envisage any form of international control of a decision to strike first with nuclear weapons: it is doubtful enough if such a decision could be taken even by a national government. Therefore, the evolution of such control seems to imply a relatively simple second strike strategy only, and casts doubt upon its reconcilability with the more complex forms of a strategy of controlled nuclear response.

The question is whether, if such participation were successful, European governments would still feel anxious to share in nuclear decisions before Europe had acquired strong central institutions. The answer depends partly on the Soviet Union, whether the kinds of crisis which, like Cuba, dramatise the nuclear decision making process, occur in Europe in the next decade. It depends partly on Britain and France and the emphasis which they give to their own nuclear programmes. If they decide, and Britain well might, that they will concentrate on a specialised nuclear contribution within a general alliance framework, high performance strike aircraft for instance, and, if at the same time there is the minimum of discrimination between the nuclear and the non-nuclear allies in the command and planning structure, then the envy which the apparent prestige of nuclear power arouses might subside as quickly as it arose.

Finally it depends on the extent to which the present and future American Administrations can succeed in meshing alliance planning with the complicated and untidy processes by which American policy decisions are achieved in Washington.¹ If it cannot, then it must in all probability be ready for continued European pressure for a share in the making of nuclear decisions. If it can, then it should reasonably calculate

¹ A good case can be made for developing subsidiary NATO political machinery in Washington, perhaps in the form of a consultative council of the ambassadors of the NATO countries, meeting regularly with the Secretaries of State and of Defense, and with a small permanent staff. Its essential purpose would be to provide a multilateral setting in which American ideas and proposals could be raised before they solidified into official policy

that its European allies would prefer an intimacy with the United States over the wide range of global strategic policy, while leaving operational control in American hands, rather than seek a large share of control over a very small part of the American strategic forces. If the United States wishes to retain operational freedom of action, then it is in its interest to encourage Europe to be concerned with the problems of the free world as a whole rather than preoccupied with the defence of Europe alone.¹

Comment by the Centre d'Etudes

The question whether British, French, or 'European' nuclear forces are or will be effective or ineffective is not in good logic the one to take up first nor is it one to which the answer is easy. The paramount question is whether or not there is a need for non-American nuclear forces in Europe. To that question, Washington answers 'No': London and Paris 'Yes'. This is not the place to discuss the pros and cons of both stands. The only useful approach should be to attempt to find a common denominator of interest *vis-à-vis* these forces which by nature are to be controlled by national military authorities. It could then be agreed that they can play a complementary role in the deterrent posture of the West. But as long as there is disagreement between Washington on the one hand and Paris and London on the other, the common ground on which to build an arms control policy will remain extremely narrow.

¹ See comment by Professor Léo Hamon, p. 232

Conclusions

THE countries of Western Europe, torn for so long by internal rivalries, have begun to develop into a true Community. Western Europe is emerging as one of the world's great centres of power and energy, and is likely within a generation to take its place in the constellation of Great Powers on whose relationship the history of the world will depend. Yet this rebirth is happening in the strange world created by the presence of thermonuclear weapons and the will of governments to use them. Almost solely by reason of its geographical position, this crowded extension of the Asian mainland lacks the strategic options which are open to the two existing great nuclear powers, with their relative inviolability to ground attack, their vast empty spaces in which to base retaliatory weapons, their distance from each other, the relative dispersion of their cities. That Western Europe is, in Mr. Khrushchev's words, a 'hostage to the Soviet Union' is at present in physical terms true, and it may become more true as its population grows and its industries multiply: what makes it untrue in political terms is the Atlantic Alliance.

But the Atlantic Alliance is approaching a new strategic deadlock with the Warsaw Pact. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can mount a nuclear attack on the other without risking the destruction of its own cities in return. This new deadlock means that the old deadlock which once imposed a forcible stabilisation on the European continent, namely the stalemate of the years after 1945 between Soviet land power and American strategic power, is breaking down. The approach of a strategic stalemate on both sides gives increased opportunities for limited attack or selective threats as the Berlin crisis of 1961-2 has shown. The military confrontation in Europe is, as a result, developing few of the characteristics of true military stability—and American attempts to reinforce stability in an age when the strategic balance is changing, by recasting the strategy of deterrence, have in fact increased European anxieties.

The fact that Western Europe is emerging as a strong political and economic centre at a moment when her vulnerability to Soviet military pressure may be greater, and the conflict between the political aspirations of the European powers and the American insistence on centralised strategic control, have led to severe stress within the Atlantic Alliance. If the Soviet Union is not to succeed in its object of dividing Europe from the United States, and if the Alliance is to be renewed on terms which are equitable to all its members when it runs out in 1969, it will soon be necessary for the NATO governments to take a number of long-term strategic and political decisions.

Whether Western Europe, and the Community in particular, can develop its economic and social strength in peace over the next decade, and whether it can take the first slow steps towards a more liberal system of coexistence with its sister nations in Europe, will depend to a crucial extent upon its own policies. It has been suggested that there is now a certain dilemma in American policy: the nature of the arms race will make the completion of certain limited agreements with the Soviet Union increasingly urgent if the two major powers are not to become involved in so complex and dangerous a deadlock that they risk losing control of the course of international relations. Yet merely to embark on a bilateral dialogue exposes both powers to the danger of a cleft in the series of alliances of which they are the centre. But within the West, any American move to reach arms control agreements with the Soviet Union that affect European interests can be based only on a high degree of European confidence in the long-term objectives of American policy and in the continuing integrity of the American commitment to the security of Western Europe. A consolidation of the Atlantic Alliance is therefore an essential prerequisite to any fruitful negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, if the latter is not to risk an estrangement of the countries of continental Western Europe which might make such agreements unenforceable. But on the basis of a united Alliance it would be possible for the NATO countries to attempt to create a greater stability in Europe: to repair the effects of the change in the strategic balance by making the military situation less vulner-

able: and to work towards a more liberal system of coexistence with the nations of Eastern Europe.

It is no longer possible to attempt this by a geographical approach to the problems of the divided Continent. The technological developments in short-range nuclear weapons, the mobility and miniaturisation of nuclear firepower for instance, and the political developments of Soviet and Western policy since 1955—the rearmament of the Federal Republic, and the Soviet insistence on maintaining the division of Germany—have now so narrowed the possibilities of negotiations that no policy of disengagement is feasible any longer. More limited geographical measures such as the creation of de-nuclearised zones are equally difficult, since the degree of inspection that would be required today would probably involve a large-scale military withdrawal almost tantamount to disengagement.

Nevertheless, it is probable that there will be a growing need to draw a geographical line between nuclear and conventional weapons, since nuclear weapons now stretch in an almost unbroken gradation from battlefield mortars to missiles with megaton warheads and it will be increasingly difficult to check escalation from the smallest to the biggest. A nuclear-free zone is likely to be more necessary in future than it has been hitherto. But it can be created only when certain dangers have first been eliminated; and the most fruitful approach to an arms control policy in the near future would be a functional one addressed to the elimination of these dangers.

Of these the first is that of a surprise attack: not because it is the most pressing, but because it looms the largest psychologically and because there can be no question of withdrawing nuclear weapons from the exposed areas until the danger of a massive ground attack has been eliminated. A system of static ground inspection at key points could do much to prevent the kind of reinforcement that would be necessary before a large-scale ground attack could be launched.

The most effective safeguard against other specific dangers of war in Europe, war by miscalculation, or war by accident, would not depend so much on inspection as on communication between the two alliances. Here an informal system could

probably work better in the early stages than a formal one, but it could gradually extend its scope. If this were achieved, and if the dangers of surprise attack receded, there could be some hope of an arms reduction in Europe, in a form which would make the military balance more stable. Such a prospect is still very distant, but it would repay detailed study.

An arms control policy of this kind would have small beginnings and its progress to wider achievement would be slow and devious. But the alternative is to allow the strategic deadlock, which does not represent a stable equilibrium, to degenerate into an unstable stalemate which is liable to be unexpectedly broken at any time.

But in the later winter of 1963—frostbound and dispiriting all over Europe—it has seemed that some considerable period of time may have to elapse before even the conservative measures of arms control in Europe which are outlined in this study can be successfully negotiated with the Soviet Union. It is likely that the years immediately ahead will be preoccupied with arguments and negotiations within the alliance systems on either side of the wall—despite the perturbing onward march of military innovation—rather than between the two systems.

In the West, the dissensions of recent years have revealed that beneath the clash of rival doctrines about the defence of Europe, and the ratio of nuclear to conventional forces there, lies a conflict of interest. The United States must, now that her own cities are vulnerable, seek for a means of honouring her commitments to Europe that provides the best prospect of avoiding a choice between humiliating defeat and nuclear war, namely strongly conventional forces. The Europeans, with more vivid memories of the horrors of all forms of war, believe that for the West to equip itself with serious options to virtually immediate nuclear retaliation against attack is to tempt the Russians to adventures. But conflicts of interest between allies can be mitigated as they can in national life and there are sensible measures that can be contemplated, improving the quality of the existing forces, the development of a capacity for mobile counter-attack, better logistics, that will meet a good deal of American anxiety without increasing European fears.

NATO itself has its own contribution to make to the stability of Europe. Though the nuclear weapons in Europe cannot be dispensed with, discrimination can be used, for instance withholding the smallest weapons whose control is difficult, discrimination in arming forward units with them, care in the planning of tactical air support and interdiction policy so that, at the same time as measures are being taken to avert an automatic or mistaken nuclear response on the land of Europe, precautions are developed against the dangers of nuclear escalation in the air above it. The possibility of disorganising and defeating a highly mechanised army like the Russian by other forms of firepower than the nuclear bomb offers a challenge to which military science must respond.

But it is the controversy over control of strategic policy which has principally weakened the alliance at a time, ironically when the opposing alliance is weakened also. It was inevitable that, with the revival of the political dynamic of Europe, the argument over the control of nuclear weapons should come to dominate the Atlantic today, for there is no historical experience of a situation in which a group of proud and ancient powers remain dependent on the protection of the government three thousand miles away. Yet the obvious ways to modify this dependence all seem fallible. The national solution, American, British or French, has increased distrust within the alliance without increasing its security. The offer to Europe of a multilaterally manned but internationally owned segment of the strategic forces is essentially a device that provides the appearance of European participation in American strategic decisions without the reality. The proposal for a separate European system of deterrence, a parallel in the strategic field to Europe's economic parity with the United States, is technically unsound and seems politically unworkable in the foreseeable future. Moreover it might lead to a division of Atlantic responsibilities and to the development of 'spheres of influence' which would carry great dangers for Europe as well as the United States.

The road toward a comprehensive system of Atlantic planning and control is much more arduous. It involves, in the first instance, a reorganisation of the central institutions of NATO, designed essentially to divorce the function of strategic

planning from the ownership of nuclear weapons, to promote a more intimate political and military dialogue between the two halves of the alliance, and to reflect Europe's growing power and identity of interest.

This task will impose a formidable strain on European and American foresight and leadership, for its driving impetus cannot, as in the immediate post-war years, be fear alone nor its inspiration merely anti-Communism. Moreover, there is a deep-seated weariness in the United States with the complexities of 'the entangling alliance', and a desire to win greater autonomy and to confine Europe's influence more closely to its own continent. This must be resisted no less than the European weariness with the problems of being allied with a large, restless and self-contained nation.

Thucydides, trying to analyse the causes of the breakdown of the Treaty of Euboea, which had been made between the Hellenic cities after their deliverance from the Persians, a breakdown which began the internecine strife that led to the decline of Greek civilisation at the moment of its greatest brilliance, was certain that it arose from the tendency of the Athenian leaders to pose as the fountain of wisdom as well as of military power, until Sparta was goaded into opposition by her less responsible friends. This is the human danger that the leaders of Atlantic civilisation must guard against, if they are to use their enormous collective strength to forward a more stable military relationship in Europe which will eventually permit its two halves to grow together again.

Comments

Chapter 1 (p. 6)

Michael Howard writes: It would however be naïve to suppose that the alignment of these countries, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia, is the result simply of Russian *force majeure*. Fears of German revival, and bitter experience of the inability of Western powers to come to their aid in a crisis, would be powerful factors inclining the governments of these countries, whatever their political complexion, to look to the Soviet Union as their principal ally, even at the price of considerable restriction of their internal and external freedom of action. The surest guarantee of the survival of the Warsaw Pact is the existence of an armed Western Germany not only seeking reunification but refusing to abandon its claims to the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line. To attribute their fears of Germany simply to Communist propaganda would be wishful thinking.

Chapter 2 (p. 44)

Professor Scheuner writes: It must be kept in mind that even after the Moscow visit the German Government has strongly and consistently refused to recognise the Soviet theory of the two states as a presupposition for, or even as a possible outcome of, negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Chapter 6 (pp. 127–8)

Le Contrôleur-Général Genevey writes: The arrival of ground reinforcements might escape the attention of fixed posts if it is spread out over a long period. Now, conventional resources need to be concentrated quickly in a defensive position in order to respond to a surprise attack. A surprise attack itself, if it is premeditated by the aggressor for a moment of his own choosing, can be prepared at leisure by inconspicuous reinforcements.

In this way, the absence of definite information from the fixed posts could give a false impression of security. This system is less effective against preparation for attack than

against the defensive measures which are necessitated by the late discovery of an order of battle which has been secretly prepared for attack.

(p. 137)

The idea, which these pages raise again, of a reduction of conventional armaments in Europe arouses some reserve.

(a) If such a reduction were verified, the difficulties to which attention has justly been drawn in pp. 99–100, arise immediately: inspection leads to a more or less complete neutralisation which holds greater disadvantages for Western Europe than for the Soviet system.

(b) Reduction without any verification, that is with no guarantee but that of a unilateral declaration, is of no value. Have the *official* assurances been forgotten which the Soviet Government gave and repeated before the Cuban crisis, on the absence of all offensive armaments from the island?

Chapter 6

Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard (a member of the I.S.S. study group) writes: The discussion here of arms reduction in Europe raises the much wider question of whether the present defence posture of the West does not obstruct disarmament, since its strategic nuclear superiority encourages tension and a strategic nuclear arms race, while its conventional inferiority makes it difficult to forgo this superiority and at the same time encourages the development of independent nuclear forces. I feel that this fundamental point has not been given sufficient attention in this study. There is no need to delay discussion of this question until there is a basic change in Soviet or American strategy or in the strategic balance. It should be possible to adopt a gradualist approach whereby the Soviet Union was asked to surrender *some* of her superiority in *offensive* conventional weapons against *some* of the Western superiority in *strategic* nuclear weapons.

The first step might be a balanced limitation of tanks (and perhaps ground attack aircraft) on both sides in Central Europe (ignoring Western Russia initially), in exchange for some unilateral reduction and/or withdrawal of Western strategic forces. Inspection for this should not be too difficult, and there would be none on Soviet territory.

With the conventional balance thus achieved, we could then afford to attempt some withdrawal of front-line nuclear weapons on both sides, perhaps by tacit, informal agreement, in order to obviate the difficult inspection involved.

The above plan as a whole could be combined with that proposed for warning against surprise massive ground attack, of which it would be an elaboration. But the improved conventional balance would make it more acceptable to the West, and the improved strategic balance more acceptable to the Soviet Union. Moreover both stability in Europe and the prospects for disarmament would be increased.

On Part Two as a whole

Professor Léo Hamon writes: A strictly military analysis of the situation in Europe would attempt to provide safeguards against every conceivable form of aggression, and ignore the areas where one may, with the least disadvantages, take those risks that are inseparable from the concessions which would be necessary in negotiating for a *détente*. In this light, the considerations of a geographical approach in Chapter 5 seem to be too negative. The military disadvantages attached to a de-nuclearised zone on the Rapacki model are real, but they need not exclude from the outset every plan for a territorial arrangement that does not form part of an overall agreement. The section on arms reduction in Chapter 6 reveals the advantages which could be gained from a reduction of tanks in a given space, and should be considered in connection with the possibility of technical advances in anti-tank defence (Chapter 5, p 101).

Chapter 7 (pp. 161-2)

Dr. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen writes: This view is debatable. The first steps towards a German-American agreement have been taken. The German view is that logistic planning of the individual allies should be more closely co-ordinated in peacetime, and that possibly NATO might even take over part of the responsibility. There are real difficulties, similar to those which hamper the standardisation of weapons. Nevertheless all efforts to achieve a common logistic system for as many items of supply as possible are worthwhile. But such a system

cannot be restricted to West Europe, for though concepts of future conflicts may differ, the logistic support of Europe must depend partly on American resources.

Chapter 8 (p. 198)

Michael Howard writes: Any form of NATO or European deterrent will of course complicate any disarmament negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States that may be based on the retention of a minimal deterrent until the final stages of any disarmament process. At present the Soviet Union seems likely to negotiate about this, if at all, only on the basis of such a deterrent being retained in Russian and American hands alone. If any kind of European deterrent force came into being, Western Europe might be faced with a disagreeable choice between abandoning it in the interests of overall disarmament, although this would involve a substantial risk to her own security, or retaining it and thus jeopardising a far-reaching agreement between the principal nuclear powers.

On Part Three as a whole

Professor Léo Hamon writes: (a) The conception of a counter-force strategy is illusory. It is already dying away, and the sooner it is abandoned the better. It is incompatible with certain forms of inspection which imply a second-strike strategy, and it is less reassuring than a counter-city strategy which entails such disasters for those who embark on it first that it is hard to imagine any recourse to it.

(b) The role of tactical nuclear weapons might eventually be redefined and reduced if the guarantees offered by measures for the reduction of conventional forces themselves in certain zones are taken into account.

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